


a muslim manual of war



edited and translated
by
george t. scanlon

A Muslim Manual of War

Edited and translated by
George T. Scanlon

With a Foreword by
Carole Hillenbrand

and a New Introduction by
George T. Scanlon

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Foreword

by Carole Hillenbrand
Professor Emerita of Islamic History,
University of Edinburgh

The twelfth to the fourteenth centuries in the Middle East were a time of wars and rumours of wars. The peoples of the Fertile Crescent lived under a cloud of dread which nothing seemed able to lift. First, there were the unheralded wars of the Cross, when Muslims had to fight an unfamiliar enemy, the Franks. The Crusades were a phenomenon generated by medieval Christendom with its roots and inspiration in medieval Europe. Throughout the world today, there is still a continuing and genuine interest in the history of the Crusades, and these wars between Christians and Muslims still resonate in public discourse in both east and west. Close on the heels of the Crusaders, from 1220 onward, came a succession of invasions from another alien race, this time from the remote east, with the irruption of wave upon wave of Mongol hordes under the command of Genghis Khan and his successors. Later in the fourteenth century, this destructive cycle repeated itself, with the invasions of Timur, who eventually, around 1400, reached the Mediterranean in the west and the borders of China in the east before death arrested his career. It is against this backdrop of apparently endless wars that the treatise edited, translated, and explained by George Scanlon was written.

When Professor Scanlon's Princeton dissertation about a work by a scholar called al-Ansari (d. 1408), which was in manuscript form in the Princeton University Library, was published by the American University in Cairo Press in 1961 as a book entitled *A Muslim Manual of War, being Tafrij al-kurub fi tadbir al-hurub* (The dispelling of woes in the management of wars), scholarship on the Muslim art of war was still rudimentary. Inevitably, it seems, it focused on the period of the Crusades, where the historiography was very one-sided and Eurocentric. The success of Runciman's three-volume work was well deserved, but without a knowledge of Arabic he could draw on only that small number of Muslim chronicles that had already been translated into European languages. So inevitably the

views of this conflict written down by Muslims could not be a major part of the narrative. George Scanlon saw the need for good translations of key Arabic texts and he became a pioneer scholar with his work on the conduct of war seen from the Muslim side.

Since 1961, however, there has been a steady increase in books which have helped to rectify this gap in our knowledge of the Crusades, and scholars such as Sivan and Maalouf blazed a trail which others have followed. George Scanlon's fascinating study of a Muslim military manual was soon joined by the publication of editions and translations of other works in the same genre by al-Tarsusi in 1968 and al-Aqsara'i in 1979. Doctoral theses on aspects of *jihad* in the Crusading era have been written, and many more articles on Muslim aspects of the Crusades have been published. Popular graduate courses on Islam and the west, the history of war, and the Crusades such as those offered, for example, at Saint Louis University in the US, and Royal Holloway and Queen Mary in the UK, would no longer contemplate omitting the Muslim dimensions of these exciting and important subjects. So the re-publication of George's pioneering book—an in-depth study of a key primary Arabic source—in electronic form will be warmly welcomed by scholars and students across the world. George Scanlon's book provides an elegant translation of the Arabic text, the Arabic text itself, an erudite overview of the history of medieval military manuals, and a very useful glossary of military terms.

Al-Ansari, an influential figure at the Mamluk court, a man who held the high office of *qadi al'askar* in Aleppo and who suffered imprisonment when Timur attacked Syria, presents a fascinating picture of how war was conducted in Egypt and Syria at a time when the Muslim memory of being attacked by the Crusaders from the west and the Mongols from the east was still green. There is no reason to doubt that much of the content of al-Ansari's treatise is relevant for an understanding of warfare in the immediately preceding centuries. Al-Ansari gives advice on a wide range of military stratagems, pointing out the importance of good leadership and the value of excellent communications and the sending of messages by pigeons or by riders on fast horses, mules, and camels. He also states firmly that it is preferable to avoid engaging with the enemy and that fighting should be a last resort.

It is a great pleasure—on several counts—to write a foreword to this most welcome reissue of George's book. First of all, it is

good and right to honor a scholar who has worked so assiduously in his field for so long. Indeed, this new electronic version of al-Ansari's work could be seen as a kind of diamond jubilee celebration for George's tireless activity in the study and in the field alike. Next, it is always good news when an established classic is snatched from the jaws of the antiquarian market and made available once more to the wider and less wealthy public (including students, of course) eager to consult it. George's book has been a rarity for decades and has been virtually unobtainable. No longer. And with the exponential growth in Crusader history over the last thirty years or so, accompanied by a correspondingly increased interest in the Muslim side of this extended conflict, this treatise can now come into its own for a new generation of readers. And finally, thinking of George always involves me in a trip down memory lane, to the Oxford of the late 1960s, when his annual visits to the Oriental Institute were eagerly awaited by students of every stripe—for his fame as a charismatic lecturer on Islamic history preceded him. Impeccably tailored and groomed in a distinctively dashing style, he would stride into the lecture room, eyes sparkling with determination to make Islamic history fun. I still remember him describing the early Mamluk state as an eggshell reality balanced between the Crusaders and the Mongols, or characterising Jalal al-Din, the last of the Khwarazm shahs, harassing the Mongols, as "a valorous gadfly on the underbelly of the galloping horde."

George could make the gravel on the road interesting, and it is symptomatic of his catholic interests that his reviews of books on Islamic history, art, architecture, and of course archaeology are consistently worth reading for their width of reference, their piercing insights, and their style, at once vigorous and elegant. So George is a man of parts. He will be remembered as the archaeologist who patiently sifted, categorized and explained the treasures of Fustat for the benefit of future generations. His translation of al-Ansari showcases his talents as an Arabist. His diverse publications on many aspects of Islamic art and architecture make him a critic to be reckoned with in that field too. And running through these multiple contributions is his steady accomplishment as a caring, inspiring teacher, a guru who will be remembered by the thousands of young Egyptians whose horizons he broadened and whose talents he cultivated. His contributions to his adopted country have been immense. Long may his restless curiosity and his sparkling prose continue to entertain us.

New Introduction to the Electronic Reissue of the 1961 Edition

George T. Scanlon

A Second Introduction, Half a Century (+) Later! Why?

This is a facsimile edition of the book, published by the American University in Cairo (AUC) Press in 1961, whose source was my doctoral thesis, defended and approved at Princeton University in September 1959. The conditions under which the 1961 edition was printed and distributed were unusually stringent—a direct result of new regulations introduced by the Egyptian revolution of 1953 and the consequent Suez War of 1956. Part of that first (and only) edition was lost to thievery, severely tried postal operations, and the struggles of the Press to achieve adequate distribution. Except for notice of its publication, the volume was but sketchily reviewed, though its substance was discussed at the 1960 Congress of Orientalists in Moscow and Leningrad.

This rather troublesome nativity was exacerbated by the signal shift of my interest and career toward the fields of archaeology and art history, which pursuits proved to be totally absorbing, and in which I found satisfaction and pedagogical success. I scarcely noticed that my own two remaining copies of *A Muslim Manual of War* had been stolen somewhere within the newer termini of my working life (Cairo, Oxford, and various teaching posts in the United States). Though my health prospered and continued beyond the usual span allotted to most scholars, I never returned to the original bent of research occasioned by this first publication.

But time worked its revenge, for on August 31, 2011, I found myself in retirement still without a thought of that first, comparatively brief immersion into this world of Muslim warfare. Then accidentally a review copy of Dr. Peter Gubser's *Saladin* (Gorgias Press, 2010) reached me, which I read with relish but no honest regret, insofar as its author, with unoriginal qualifications, anchored his work in the 'great men of history' theory. While I was

yet absorbed with Gubser, the Department of Arabic and Islamic civilizations at the American University in Cairo (AUC) suggested, through the AUC Press, that a facsimile of the original edition, replete with a newer introduction, would make a fitting compliment with which to mark my retirement and would serve those who—like myself—had lost the fraught original edition, or desired it for their libraries, particularly those dedicated to its arcane subject. I would like to thank Professor Nelly Hanna, the department's chair, and Dr. Amina Elbendary, who suggested its reissue to the AUC Press; and Mr. Neil Hewison, the Press's associate director for editorial programs, who accepted it.

The opportunity now becomes more precious, for very, very few scholars after so long a hiatus return to comment on their debut publications in a field they had abandoned expeditiously, no matter the circumstances. However, the conditions of this reissue do not permit internal corrections: whatever was printed originally remains in the electronic facsimile. Thus my commentary will take the form of a) considering the original introduction as an antique in itself; and b) providing something of an overview of what movements in the field have gained visibility since 1961. Neither part will be exhaustive, but each will be relevant to points raised in the original. The erasers alluded to on page 33 of the first introduction have not been handled since 1960 but they will be useful at this moment, even after fifty-two years.

Is the Original Edition and Translation of *Tafrij al-kurub fi tadbir al-hurub* an Antique in Itself?

By newer sophisticated standards of research, composition, and publication, it is. But such a conclusion would be tantamount to applying the hard-won norms and techniques of 2012 to those available in 1961. The political and economic landscape of Egypt after the Suez War was not propitious for sophisticated academic publishing. This facsimile edition preserves the truth of that statement, insofar as the paper, and the incapacity of the fonts to hold the ink, are concerned: typos and blurrings abound, and the footnotes are not consistently arranged, so that page layouts appear wavering to the eye. Many of these blemishes might have been resolved had I been in Cairo; but I was in Nubia, unknowingly embarked on a totally different career. What might seem somewhat slipshod as published was signally less so in manuscript. Hence the

more egregious errata are now acknowledged and can be seen in the final section of this second introduction. Regrettably, any corrections to the Arabic text of the *Tafrij* cannot be accommodated in the electronic reissue.

The style of the printed translation within this volume will certainly appear awkward to a keen ear. It was pursued at a time when *idafa* and *ta' marbuta* were stumbling blocks in medieval Arabic relative to exact grammatical referencing, made more onerous in the absence of correct and consistent vowelings by the scribes. These flaws, of course, could not be corrected within the text; but by the utility of brackets and parentheses the exact meaning would be conveyed in translation. Had a revised translation been possible, the keen ear would have found the translation flowing but no less exact.

"A Preliminary Glossary of Muslim Military Terms" (pages 123–30 of the facsimile edition) was deemed necessary by the Press for the edited text, in preference to an index of the translation. It had formed part of the dissertation, where it represented my experience of the terminology discovered in studying the manuscripts surveyed in the introduction. The terms do not all appear in the edited text of *Tafrij*, but were broadly common within that range of manuscripts. It goes without saying that today the list of terms would have to be quadrupled at the very least. And more importantly, such an up-to-date glossary would draw on manuscripts in the various categories of *'ulum al-harb* in Persian and Turkish (in all their written variety), plus their equivalents to the terminology in Arabic.

Overview of Muslim Warfare Studies since 1961

When a field of academic endeavor achieves both popularity and intellectual regard, it gains the almost inalienable right to its own channel of publication. In the interval between the original edition and this new introduction, the field of Muslim warfare now possesses two separate outlets for publishing original sources and discussion of what these sources add to the field: whether they are formal repetitions, or if they, in sum or in part, represent genuine additions to what we know of chronology, attribution, and the dangers inherent in copying earlier sources. These are the Osprey Press in the United Kingdom, and more recently Kitabat in Cairo; together they contract the number of excuses for non-publication to nullity.

Two scholars, in the interval from 1961 to 2012, have distinguished themselves through their manifold publications on all phases of warfare in the *dar al-Islam*: David Nicolle and Shihab al-Sarraf. Dr. Nicolle has been the shaping spirit insofar as his work has included practically all forms of military activity throughout the medieval world. His early and sustained interest in Muslim warfare has recently been capped by the publication of his research on the Mamluk military artefacts from excavations at the Damascus Citadel: *Late Mamluk Military Equipment* (Damascus/Beirut, 2012), including an exhaustive bibliography encompassing all the published materials within the interval alluded to above. In his introduction he refers to the *Tafrij*, agreeing with Dr. al-Sarraf that its text is really an uncredited excursus on the work of the Abbasid savant Ibn Akhi Hizam, whom Dr. al-Sarraf considers the father source of all works on *furusiyya*.

Had circumstance dictated that there would have been no seismic shift of my career so soon after the publication of the *Tafrij*, I would be hugely indebted to Shihab al-Sarraf—as are the majority of scholars in the interval. His three-volume doctoral dissertation on Muslim archery contains a magistral survey of all writings on medieval Muslim warfare to the date of its submission (“L’Archerie mamluke AH 648–923/AD 1250–1517,” 3 vols., PhD diss., Université de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1989). He proceeds well beyond the scope of the antecedent scholars surveyed in my original introduction and conjures the free utility of manuscripts (both the extant, and those destroyed or lost but alluded to in later works) but in such a comprehensive manner that we see the slow establishment of reputations unknown to Sprenger, Mercier, and Ritter.

The most important early masters were well-established Abbasid court and literary figures whose works were constantly cited and/or copied throughout the Mamluk period (for example, Ibn Akhi Hizam, Ibn Harthami, Ibn Manjili, and the author of the *Tafrij*) when most of the better premodern studies were written, and survived until the present day. However, it seems to me that this most valuable activity is flawed by Dr. al-Sarraf’s insistence that all the manuscripts surveyed in his dissertation be considered exclusively as within *furusiyya*, and no other classification employed by scholars antecedent to himself can be accepted. His idiosyncratic position is fully posited in his article “Furusiyya Literature of the Mamluk Period” in *Furusiyya*, ed. by David Alexander, Riyadh: 1996, vol. 1: 118–

34. This is awkward, even illogical within his early research into archery, simply because the unmounted archer was always part of field tactics, and in Europe (after the battle of Crécy, where the long-bow was singularly successful) achieved strategic parity with mounted archers. This held true until the introduction of gunpowder.

This unresolved ambiguity of approach has left the landscape of Muslim warfare studies in an unfortunate stasis. It postpones the cleanup of attribution, even chronology, and theoretical discussion; and finally it exhausts scholarly patience. Dr. al-Sarraf was quite right to discern how much of the *Nihayat al-su'l*, hitherto the lodestone of scholarly approach, was really a restatement of the work of Ibn Akhi Hizam. The same holds true of the *Tafrij*. But not entirely, because both authors were more redactors (when possible) than unscrupulous copyists; after all they were deeply interested in the 'manual' aspect of the undertaking. According to Dr. al-Sarraf's trawl of the manuscript sources, there are ten extant copies of the *Nihayat al-su'l*; when carefully edited with redactions, and fully translated, the total reality must demonstrate something more than plagiarism of a dead author's masterpiece.

There remain one minor and two major points consequent to this republication of the *Tafrij*. The minor one is quickly resolved: in this overview I limited myself to mentioning those trends and scholars looming in publications since 1961. Especially in non-*furusiyya* publications, many eminent scholars have made signal contributions to our understanding of medieval Muslim warfare. Their names and works can be appreciated in the magnificent bibliographies of David Nicolle and Shihab al-Sarraf alluded to above. For example, I would cite Robert Elgood's cumulative publications within the ancillary field of Muslim arms and armaments; the same bibliographies chronicle the utility of newer manuscript data within historical publications since 1961, most particularly those relevant to the technical aspects of warfare during the Crusades. When the proceedings of the colloquium on Muslim warfare hosted by the Institut français d'archéologie orientale (IFAO) in December 2011 are published, this process will become apparent and apposite to our aims.

The first of the major points confirmed by the *Tafrij* is that most of the authors of Mamluk manuscripts relevant to warfare were not military officers as such but, being the only literate caste at the time, probably *'ulama* commissioned by the sultan, or a leading

Mamluk within his entourage, to educate himself about subjects of immediate or remote interest—though ones that would require what we would deem ‘research.’ In the introduction to the original edition, such an author’s work would achieve resonance through connections to the masters of the past; but such masters had to be consistent in terms of Muslim belief and experience, so our Mamluk author would redact what he was reading and copying to conform to the mores and mindset of his own day. In my original introduction, our Mamluk author is deemed an ‘armchair strategist’; if I were permitted to reedit that introduction he would be considered a well-read and most literate redactor.

The other major point is as important today as it was in 1961: namely that the Muslim masters of warfare, their patrons and rulers, their soi-disant strategists, did not view field confrontations as opportunities for illogical heroics, but rather as the result of training and logical conformations, of knowing when and how to fight; one prayed for victory but fought by the book. Essentially they took the view that what might come by chance is to be faced with cunning and hope . . . and correct procedure. The *Tafrij* confirms that the guiding light of a great field commander is not to waste men or the addenda of battle, so that even single combat had its rules which cannot be forsworn for chimerical rewards. One is left with the feeling that *jihad* per se has no place in the Muslim warrior’s *consciousness* once the battle has begun. The reiteration of this guiding light throughout the manuscript resources provides the ideational penumbra for the consideration of medieval Muslim warfare . . . a very, very good thing indeed to read constantly. Once stated, this one Martian generality would not be gainsaid by any eraser conceived by men.

Errata in the facsimile edition

- p. 4, note 11, line 7: for Murda read Murtada.
- p. 7, two lines above footnotes: for “leads Ritter,” read “led Ritter.”
- p. 8, ten lines above footnotes: for “Mamlu,” read “Mamluk.”
- p. 9, line 4: for “tournament play,” read “tournament, play.”
- p. 20, four lines above footnote: for “ma e,” read “make.”
- p. 43, line 18: for “Antarat,” read “Antarah.”

- p. 44, line 12: for "encircling trenches," read "encircling moats."
- p. 45, note 5, penultimate line: for "the Greek," read "Alexander's."
- p. 46, line 14: for "be t," read "best."
- p. 48, note 9, line 2: for "qu ting," read "quoting."
- p. 49, line 9: for "Halab," read "Halab (Aleppo)."
- p. 51, line 12: for " against him rather for him," read "against the ruler, rather than for him."
- p. 52, line 10: remove comma after "about."
- p. 59, two lines above footnotes: for "t ," read "to."
- p. 60, line 14: for "ev ry," read "every."
- p. 62, line 25: for "Yazdagurd," read "Yazdagird."
- p. 71, line 9: for "donned," read "worn."
- p. 74, line 12: the footnote number at the end of the paragraph reads "4."
- p. 86, line 26: for "negligence about him," read "negligence about it."
- p. 87, line 8: for "that they," read "that some."
- p. 87, line 24: for "un il," read "until."
- p. 87, line 29: for "a a," read "at a."
- p. 101, note 2, line 1: for "Cf. Machiavellion" read "Cf. Machiavelli on"
- p. 107, line 9: for "for he," read "for him."
- p. 119, line 7: for "(Ture)," read "(Tyre)."
- p. 122, note 1, lines 4/5: for "and theory, and both," read "and theory; both."

A MUSLIM MANUAL OF WAR

being

TAFRĪJ AL-KURŪB
FĪ TADBĪR AL-HURŪB

by

‘UMAR IBN IBRAHIM AL-AWSĪ AL-ANSARĪ

Edited and translated

by

GEORGE T. SCANLON



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations	vii
Introduction	I
Editor's Preface	35
Translation	37
A Preliminary Glossary of Muslim Military Terms	123-130
Arabic Text	9v - 1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Atiya Atiya, Aziz Suryal. *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London: 1938).
- Ayalon Ayalon, David. *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom* (London: 1956).
- EI *Encyclopedia of Islam*
- GAL Brockelmann, Carl. *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* (2 vols. and 3 vols. Suppl; Leiden: 1938-1949).
- H. Kh. Ḥājjī Khalifah. *Kashf al-zunūn*, ed. G. Flügel (7 vols; Leipzig: 1833-58).
- Hava Hava, J.G. *Arabic-English Dictionary*. (Bayrut: 1951).
- Huuri Huuri, Kalervo. "Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen Geschützwesens aus Orientalischen Quellen", *Studia Orientalia* (Helsinki: 1941).
- Lane Lane, Edward W. *An Arabic - English Lexicon*. (London: 1863-93).
- MF Sprenger, Aloys. *Fihrist al-kutub allatī narghab an nabtā'ahā*. (London: 1840). Generally referred to as the *Munster Fihrist*.
- Mercier Mercier, Louis. *La Parure des Cavaliers et l'Insigne des Preux*, tr. of Ibn Hudhayl's *Hilyat al-Fursān* (Paris: 1924).
- Nihāyat-al-su'l* Muhammad b. 'Isā b. Ismā'īl al-Hanafī. *Nihāyat al-su'l wa 'l-ummiyah fī ta'līm a'māl al-furūsiyah*, Ed. Abdul Lais Syed Muhammad Lutful-Huq (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis. University of London: 1955).

- Ritter Ritter, H. "La Parure des Cavaliers und die Literatur
über die ritterlichen Künste", *Der Islam*, v. 18
(1929), pp. 116-154.
- Steingass Steingass, F. *Persian-English Dictionary* (London: 1892).
- Wensinck *Conc.* Wensinck, A.P.J. *et al*, *Concordances et indices de la
tradition musulmane* (3 vols. *et seq.*; Leiden: 1933-).
- Zaki Zaki, Abdur Rahman "Military Literature of the
Arabs, *Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne* (June: 1955),
pp. 149-160.

INTRODUCTION

I. Source materials for the study of Muslim warfare.

War has fascinated the mind of Western man from earliest antiquity, and his literature, reflecting his interest, attests the development of his understanding of this awesome phenomenon. A work such as Machiavelli's *The Art of War* represents in the broadest terms this development.¹ It integrates the military perceptions and technical accomplishments of the classical and medieval worlds while mirroring the modern concept of war as a gauge of social and technological progress. It, and other works of its type, form a chain of authorities from Vegetius and Aelian and Arrian to a Köhler,²

-
- (1) For an interesting analysis of Machiavelli's *The Art of War* as a watershed in military thinking see Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War", *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Edward Meade Earle (Princeton: 1944), pp. 3-25.

In his treatise Machiavelli insisted that he was limiting himself to what we today would deem the Western European scene. But his concerns and sometimes his very language seem to duplicate those of the author of this treatise. Wüstenfeld believed that Aelian was available to the Muslim theorists (*infra*), and Aelian preceded Vegetius, the authority most often found influencing Machiavelli's thought. It seems that common sources of authority on military matters were appealed to on both sides of the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages.

(The most common classical sources on the art of war, and all employed by Machiavelli and his successor-theorists were: Aelian, Greek citizen of Rome who dedicated his treatise on tactics to Hadrian c. 106 A.D.; Arrian, who died in 180 A.D., who also wrote a treatise on tactics and the famous history of Alexander's wars; and Vegetius, who wrote in the 4th century A.D. on the military practices of the Romans.)

It is in his insistence on the tactical superiority of the armed footman over the lightest of cavalymen, an idea derived directly from Aelian and Vegetius and their celebration of the phalangial battle formations, that Machiavelli parts company with the Middle Ages and with the Muslim military traditions. Apropos of the latter, one can point to the Mamlûks who suffered defeat rather than reform their military organization by giving primacy to infantry-adapted firearms and artillery, accessible to them before they were to their Ottoman conquerors. (Ayalon, Chapter III.)

- (2) G. Köhler, *Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesen und die Kriegsführung in der Ritterszeit*, 3 vols. (Breslau: 1886-89). The Muslim activity and contribution is found in Vol. III, pts. 1 and 2, *passim*, but only insofar as they relate to fortification, ballistics, and fire-projectiles. The tactics of the Muslim armies during the Crusades and

a Delbrück,³ an Oman⁴; a continuum of military history and military theory clear and accessible to investigation. And the sources pertinent to war, both in its historical and technical facets, have been made available to anyone choosing to study European warfare from any angle whatsoever.

Yet should the same person attempt to assess the same subject and the same development in a Muslim setting, he would encounter a comparatively shallow treatment. The primary sources about Muslim warfare were not employed by either Röhricht⁵ or Prutz, who depended almost entirely on Western chronicles and those portions of the Arab historians to be found in the *Recueil* for their analyses of the Crusades.⁶ In 1848 Reinaud published a cursory and exploratory article on Arab military tactics and weapons, and specified those treatises still in manuscript form upon which future research might be based.⁷ Wüstenfeld published a portion of such a source and its translation in 1880. He found the names of Aelian and Polybius mentioned therein and described for the first time the relationship between classical tactics (no doubt received through the influence of the Byzantines) and the Muslim military strategists of the Crusades and post-Crusading period.⁸

those of the Mongols and Ottomans are discussed in pt. 3 of the same volume, pp. 136-273 and 401-487. He relates Wüstenfeld's article on Muslim leadership (*infra*) to later Ottoman tactics (Vol. II, p. 643.)

- (3) Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, 4 vols. (Berlin: 1900-1920). In vol. III, p. 210-231, he discusses the Muslim military organization's relation to the feudal social and political system, and traces, through appeal to the work of Wellhausen and Weil, the emergence of the "military-state" in the era of the Crusades. As did Kohler, he handles Ottoman tactics and military organization by focussing on the battle of Nicopolis, *op. cit.*, pp. 487-496.
- (4) Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Boston and New York: 1924).
- (5) Reinhold Röhricht, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, 2 vols. in 1, (Berlin: 1874-78).
- (6) Hans Prutz, *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin: 1883); *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Orientaux* (5 vols; Paris: 1872-1906).
- (7) M. Reinaud, "De l'art militaire chez les arabes au moyen âge", *Journal Asiatique*, VI série, no. 12 (1848), pp. 193-237. His main interest, however, was the origin and development of "Greek-fire" and the evolution of cannon. His and other works on this subject are discussed by Ayalon in the Introduction to his volume on firearms. (Ayalon, pp. ix-xvii).
- (8) F. Wüstenfeld, "Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner nach dem Arabischen", *Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (1880). This is an edition

It is true that military history, or the sources relevant to the Muslim military techniques, did not interest the great Orientalists to any extent; or if they did, it was only to the degree that they made some political or economic or social point clearer. Indeed so great a military historian as Sir Charles Oman, disinclined to ferret out and use Arabic sources, had to depend on Leo's *Tactica* for his analysis of Muslim warfare. He was unsure how to gauge the Muslim improvement in tactics and armaments between Manzikert and the fall of Acre. What he said of the "Saracen" army of the tenth century,

"But they never raised a large standing army, or fully learned the merits of drill and organization,"⁹

simply did not obtain in the thirteenth and-fourteenth centuries when the Mamlūks of Egypt, a standing army built into the very structure of society, ousted the Crusaders and kept the Mongol hordes at bay. The body of manuscripts to be discussed later bears witness to the degree of drill and organization to be found among these later Muslim armies, if it was not already present in the tenth and eleventh centuries, particularly in the military reforms and organization of Saladin.¹⁰

and translation of the second half of Gotha MS 258, f. 110-215.

In an addendum to his edition of the *Nihāyat al-su'l*, Dr. Lutful-Huq contends that this fragment is directly related to the work he edited :

"*Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner* consists of the Arabic text of the chapter on the different swords of the Muslims from the first section of the second half, and the Lessons viii and ix of the second section of the second half, with their German translation. These two Lessons with their various diagrams are the same, word for word, as those of the *Nihāyat al-su'l* except that some chapters are wanting in the former. So it may be that this extract has been derived either from a work upon which the *Nihāyat al-su'l* is based, or even from the *Nihāyat al-su'l* itself."

This is quoted with the author's permission (Addendum, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1955, p. 155).

In another short article, Wüstenfeld deciphered the stenographic recipes for various explosive mixtures and the treatment of certain types of wounds. The deciphered text compares favorably with Lessons Ten and Twelve of the *Nihāyat al-su'l*, wherein explosives, poisonous smokes, wounds and their treatment are discussed (*infra*). "Ein Arabische Geheimschrift", *Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (1879), pp. 349-355.

(9) Oman, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 209.

(10) Cf. H.A.R. Gibb, "The Armies of Saladin", *Cahiers d'histoire Egyptienne*, III série, fasc. 4 (May 1951), pp. 304-320. In 577-1181 Saladin could call on a reorganized

Except insofar as *jihād* was related to *fiqh*, or the various equestrian arts to cavalry training, the Muslim writers up to the Crusading era devoted very little of their talents to military affairs. In the *Fihrist* of books relating to war, which Aloys Sprenger compiled in 1840 in Arabic at the request of Lord Munster, the greater part of the first list, i.e. those books relating to military sciences specifically, is given over to a discussion of saddles and bridles and stirrups, hunting, the names of horses, etc.; while the second list is of various historical accounts of wars and battles and famous warriors. It is not until one reaches the middle of the eleventh century that one begins to hear of books devoted to lance and sword exercises, cavalry practices, archery, fortification, missiles, etc.¹¹ There can be little doubt that the Crusades brought home to the Muslims their vulnerability and their need to improve their

standing army in Egypt of 8,640 men; and, at Hittin, in addition to the 4,000 trained troops accompanying him from Egypt, he had 7,000 more seasoned men from Syria and the Upper Euphrates area, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-315.

By the middle of the 14th century, an author can describe the great army, *al-askar al-a'zam*, as numbering 16,384 men, exclusive of auxiliary troops and tribesmen, *Nihāyat al-su'l*, p. 148. Oman's "classic" estimate for the ready army of the Byzantines numbers but 4,600 men. Though this figure is for the tenth century, one still wonders what he means by "large", especially as it relates to the size of the Muslim armies. The "classic" estimate was again irrespective of auxiliaries, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 198.

- (11) Aloys Sprenger, *Fihrist al-kutub allati narghab an nabtā'aha*, (London: 1840). This was compiled on the request of the Earl of Munster, and is generally referred to in the literature on the subject of Muslim warfare as "The Munster Fihrist" (hereinafter *MF*). The first eighty-two pages are devoted to military terminology, weapons, battle formations, camping, single combat, siege machines, etc. The drawings prove that Sprenger had seen and studied such treatises as the *Nihāyat al su'l*, that on weapons by Murda al-Tarsūsi (*infra*) and those on archery by Taybughā and on tactics by Muhammad b. Mankli (*infra*). Both Reinaud and Wüstenfeld quote the *MF*, but its Arabic composition placed it outside the needs of the western military historian.

The majority of the manuscripts mentioned by Ritter and Mercier (*infra*) are not cited in Sprenger's list, leading one to believe that he did not take into account the libraries of the Maghrib and of Istanbul. The *Tafrij al-kurūb* is not mentioned.

The first list (pp. 106-160), is entitled "Kutub fi 'ilm al-ḥarb wa al-siyasah" and contains some 238 titles. The second list (pp. 84-106), called "Kutub fi al-ta'rikh", cites over 500 titles. To date there has not appeared a critical appraisal of the *MF*; Mercier, Reinaud and Wüstenfeld merely checked titles which they had compiled against this earliest of all bibliographies in the field of Muslim military history.

military tactics and armaments in the face of the heavier European cavalry and more complicated siege machines and weapons.¹²

Professor Atiya, in speaking of the remarkable technical literature occasioned by the Crusades, remarked that parts of it were concerned with the weapons of war and their proper usage, and other parts with strategy and tactics and battle formations.

"These are intended for the initiation of the ranks and for the edification of the generals who led the Muslim battalions. This extensive literature imparts the impression of an elaborate system of war which accounts for the brilliant victories of the Islamic armies ... The material extant in this field is ample enough for the writing of a book on the History of the Eastern Art of War..."¹³

It is this literature which proves that after the eleventh century the Muslim armies had a military skill based on something more than "their numbers and their extraordinary powers of locomotion".¹⁴ It is our purpose here to investigate the extent of this literature and the research it has prompted.

In 1922, Louis Mercier published the second part of a lengthy treatise, entitled *Tuhfat al-anfus wa shi'ar sukkān al-Andalus* ("L'Ornement des âmes et la Devise des Habitants de l'Andalousie"), by the Andalusian savant, 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Hudhayl al-Andalusī, composed sometime in the last decade of the fourteenth century on the orders of the Sultān of Granada, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf VI, who reigned between 1392 and 1408.¹⁵ This second section bore, in Mercier's edition, the title *Ḥilyat al-fursān wa shi'ar al-shuj'ān* ("La Parure des Cavaliers et l'Insigne des Preux").¹⁶ To his translation of this text, published in 1924,

(12) See Reinaud, *op. cit.*, p. 212 *et passim*, for the first mention by an Arab writer of the Franks' accuracy with the new, deadly hand-weapon, the *zanburak*. For a wider discussion of the introduction and variety of uses of this weapon and of the meaning of this word, see Huuri, pp. 96-97 and note 4. Hava, p. 297, lists the word, without plural, as meaning "metal-spring cock of a gun". Steingass, p. 623, calls it simply "crossbow".

(13) Aziz Suryal Atiya, "The Crusades : Old Ideas and New Conceptions", Summary of two lectures delivered in the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago (mimeographed: Jan. 22 and 24, 1951), p. 6.

(14) Oman, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 209. Cf. note 10 *supra*.

(15) Louis Mercier, *L'Ornement des âmes* : Arabic text (Paris: 1936); translation (Paris: 1936).

(16) Louis Mercier, *La Parure des Cavaliers* : Arabic Text (Paris: 1922); translation (Paris: 1924). The latter is hereinafter referred to as Mercier. Another edition of

he appended a detailed list of the manuscript materials in Arabic on the subjects of hippology, veterinary sciences, falconry and "furūsiyah".¹⁷ In addition to the material available in Brockelmann, the *Fihrist* of Ibn al-Nadīm, Hājji Khalifah, and the *Munster Fihrist*, he culled the catalogues of the collections of Oriental manuscripts in Europe and incorporated the bibliography of titles on hippology brought out by Hammer-Purgstall in 1855.¹⁸ This represented a considerable improvement on the *Munster Fihrist*, and, more than the translation itself, revealed to the scholarly world the range of materials yet to be mastered before any definitive comment could be made on the subject of Muslim military techniques.

The most penetrating review of Mercier's work appeared in 1929. In it Ritter took Mercier to task for the inaccuracies he detected in terminology, but devoted the major part of his review-article to a criticism of Mercier's listing of the manuscript sources. He then proceeded to provide an annotated list of the manuscripts present in Istanbul and Europe which had been overlooked by Mercier (or listed incorrectly by him) and which Ritter felt to be of the first importance on the subjects of "furūsiyah"; archery; and tactics, strategy, weapons and military organization. It is this list of thirty-eight separate treatises which forms the basic corpus of these subjects. The *Tafrij al-kurūb* is listed among them.¹⁹

Ritter arranged his list in three categories, and it is convenient here to follow his method, making additions or corrections as subsequent research has provided :²⁰

A. "Furūsiyah". It is important here to remember that this subject covered the training of the horse, the training of the rider to wield

=the text, collated from two more MSS than were available to Mercier, was brought out by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ghanī Hasan (Cairo: 1951).

(17) Mercier, pp. 432-459.

(18) Hammer-Purgstall, "Das Pferd bei den Arabern", *Denkschr. d. kais. Ak. d. Wiss. (Wien)*, *Phil-Hist Kl.*, VI, (1855), pp. 211-246. A discussion of the relevant bibliography will be found on pp. 212-223.

(19) Helmut Ritter, "La Parure des Cavaliers und die Literatur über die ritterlichen Künste", *Der Islam*, XVIII (1929), pp. 116-154, hereinafter referred to as Ritter. The criticism is on pp. 116-119; the remainder of the article is given over to citation and discussion of the manuscripts overlooked or slighted by Mercier.

(20) Except where otherwise noted the location of the MSS is given in Ritter and/or Mercier.

certain weapons consummately, e.g., sword, lance, battle-axe, mace, bow and arrow, etc., the concerted actions of cavalymen on the field, the technique and variety of single combat, tournaments, and the basic elements of veterinary science.

1. *Kitāb al-furūsiyah wa al-bayṭarah.*

Though none of the manuscripts available to us antedates the beginning of the 13th century, this work, under a variety of titles, provides the basic teaching and practice of Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb b. Akhī Ḥazzām (or Ḥizām) al-Khattali. He was the master of horse to the 'Abbāsīd Caliph, al-Mu'taṣim (218-227/833-842). He admitted the primacy of the Persians in the fields of cavalry training and tactics. However, since the manuscripts extant come after the Crusades and after the period when Byzantine sources on military techniques were available to the Muslims, an investigation of this body of manuscripts is essential before the question of incorporated influences can be safely decided.²¹

2. *Kitāb al-makhzūn (fī ?) jāmi' al-funūn.*

An abridgement or variation of the above work. Ritter relates this Paris manuscript (28263) to Ibn Akhī Ḥazzām's work.²²

3. *Kitāb al-khayl wa ṣifātihā wa alwānīhā wa shiyātihā etc.*

A compilation based on the work of Ibn Akhī Ḥazzām by Ibn Abī Qutayrah, who flourished in the reign of the Rasūlid, Muzaffar Yūsuf al-Sa'īd (647-694/1249-1295).²³

4. *Kitāb fī 'ilm al-furūsiyah wa istikhrāj al-khayl al-'arabiyyah.*

This covers the same material as the work of Ibn Akhī Ḥazzām, and it leads Ritter to believe that its author, called simply Nāsir al-Dīn Muḥammad, might be Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb b. Akhī

(21) There seems to be some disagreement about the correct transliteration of this man's name, and whether he held his position under al-Mu'taṣim or al-Mutawakkil (Mercier, p. 433), or al-Mu'taḍid (Ritter, p. 125). Whoever he was, and this is a matter that cannot be determined until all the relevant MSS, particularly those ascribed directly to him, have been collated, suffice it here to point out that his work appears to be fundamental to an understanding of the Muslim art of "furūsiyah". Cf. Ritter, pp. 120-126 and Mercier, pp. 433-35.

(22) Ritter, p. 123, the final paragraph discussing the parts of the *majmū'* contained in Welieddin 3174. Cf. Zaki, p. 155.

(23) Ritter, p. 125.

Ḥazzām. The manuscripts date from the 9th century H./15th century A.D.²⁴

5. *Qaṭr al-sayl fī amr al-khayl*.

This is an abridgement of al-Dimyāṭī's work, *Faḍl al-khayl*. The author, 'Umar b. Raslān b. Naṣr al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1402), goes beyond the subject of hippology and speaks of cavalry and tournament exercises.²⁵

6. *Kitāb al-furūsiyah bi rasm al-jihād*.

This is the basic work of the great tournament master and lance-joust, Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb al-Aḥḍab al-Rammāḥ (d. 694/1294). It was the source book for all future work on the subject of cavalry exercises, tournaments, and battle formations. No less than thirteen manuscripts, covering the whole or parts of the treatise, exist, many of them illustrated. Of particular note is the exhaustive treatment of offensive and defensive lance-and-javelin play.²⁶

7. *Tawārikh salāṭīn Misr*.

Rather short historical studies of the wars of the Mamlū Sultāns of Egypt, from 778 to 841 A.H. (1376-1438 A.D.). Author anonymous.²⁷

8. *Tuḥfat al-mujāhidīn fī al-'amal bi al-mayādīn*.

This work by Lājīn al-Ḥusāmī al-Ṭarābulī incorporates the work of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab and adds several variations on tournament exercises and lance-play. These jousting-exercises (*band*, pl. *būnūd*) are illustrated in many of the manuscripts. Brockelmann ascribes this work to Muḥammad b. Lājīn al-Ḥusāmī al-Ṭarābulī (no. 9 below), but Ritter contends that there are two different authors involved.²⁸

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 125 f.; Mercier, p. 456 lists this work as anonymous.

(25) Ritter, p. 127; Mercier, p. 444; M. Kh., II, p. 238. For a discussion of al-Dimyāṭī see Mercier, p. 447 where he notes three authors with this name, one of whom is cited in the *MF*, p. 95; and *GAL*, I, p. 88 for mention of the *Faḍl al-khayl*.

(26) Ritter, p. 126. Cf. Mercier, p. 441 for different titles of what Ritter believes to be the same work. The man and his work are discussed by Ritter on page 127.

(27) Ritter, pp. 129-130.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 128. Where it occurs in whole or in part, Ritter lists it later in the article by simply putting "(8)" after the relevant folios. Cf. Mercier, p. 488; and *GAL*, I, 368 and II, 168.

9. *Bughyat al-qāṣidīn bi al-ʿamal bi al-mujāhidīn.*

This work of Muḥammad b. Lājīn al-Ḥusāmī al-Ṭarābulī al-Rammāḥ is quite similar to no. 8. Numerous illustrations of cavalry exercises with weapons; of tournament play, and types of single combat.²⁹

10. *Hikāyat ibtidāʾ ʿuddat al-jihād.*

Anonymous sketches of not more than a folio apiece on various tactics and ruses employed by Muslim generals in the past.³⁰

11. *Bunūd al-siḥabah.*

Anon. A short study of the lance exercises of the masters.³¹

12. *Kitāb fī al-ghazw wa al-jihād wa tartīb al-laʿb bi al-rumh wa mā yataʿal-laḡ bihi.*

Another work of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab al-Rammāḥ, illustrating the seventy-two basic lance exercises, both astride and afoot.³²

13. *Kitāb fīhi ʿilm al-furūsiyah wa al-ḥarb wa al-ṭaʿn wa al-ḍarb wa al-tabṭīlāt.*

Anon. Almost a book of *adab* on the proper deportment of the cavalier in preparing for war and upon the battlefield.³³

14. *Kitāb fīhi khamsūn band min al-nawādir fī al-ḥarb.*

Anon. A selection from the works of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab and Lājīn. The choice fifty exercises from the seventy-odd prescribed by the masters.³⁴

15. *Nihāyat al-suʿl wa al-umnīyah fī taʿlīm aʿmāl al-furūsiyah.*

The author, Muḥammad b. ʿIsā b. Ismāʿīl al-Ḥanafī al-Aqsarāʾī

(29) Ritter, p. 131; Mercier, *loc. cit.* The list of works assigned to both Lājīn and Muḥammad b. Lājīn pose the same sort of problem as encountered with Ibn Akhṭar Hazzām, *supra*. Again, only a fuller analysis of the available manuscripts will provide a solution. Cf. the lists in Mercier, p. 438 and 456; the citations in *GAL*, II, p. 167f.; and Atiya, p. 544.

(30) Ritter, p. 129 f.

(31) Ritter, p. 131. Considering that no. 12 (*infra*) is part of the *majmūʿ* containing no. 11, this is no doubt a selection from the lance exercises of the masters.

(32) *Loc. cit.*

(33) *Ibid.*, p. 132.

(34) *Loc. cit.*

(c. 800?/1400?), based this exhaustive work on the military hand-books of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab. Ritter considers it the most important of all the sources in Arabic on Muslim military organization, training and theory.³⁵ It is divided into twelve lessons (*ta'lims*) whose titles indicate the amount of material covered in the text :

- Lesson One : archery.
- Lesson Two : lance-play and maneuvers with lance.
- Lesson Three : exercises in the use of sword and shield.
- Lesson Four : numerous problems relating to the use of the shield.
- Lesson Five : handling of mace and sword.
- Lesson Six : military play and exercise for cavalry.
- Lesson Seven : various kinds of weapons, and problems relating to soldiers in the field.
- Lesson Eight : recruiting and formation of the army; the strengths of units; their chiefs and commanders.
- Lesson Nine : disposition of the army in the battle-field in accordance with the circumstances.
- Lesson Ten : ruses of war and fatally poisonous smokes.
- Lesson Eleven : division of booty and various problems of Islamic law relating to giving protection (*amān*) to the enemy peoples, and the conclusion of treaties.
- Lesson Twelve : various branches of knowledge required by fighting soldiers, such as the drawing of augury, interpretation of the various signs of nature, precautions to be taken on the move, and wounds and their treatment with poultices, plasters and medicinal powders.³⁶

(35) *Ibid.*, pp. 132-135; Mercier, p. 458, lists it as anonymous. Atiya, p. 544, ascribes it incorrectly to Badr al-Dīn Baktūt (*infra*). In his discussion of the MSS of the *Nihāyat al-su'l*, Dr. Lutful-Huq disproves any other ascription but that noted above. Ritter calls him a student of Najm al-Dīn Aḥḍab, and therefore probably writing during the sultanate of Barqūq. But Dr. Lutful-Huq thinks him rather a student of a student of Najm al-Dīn, and has placed him chronologically, pp. 7-10.

(36) *Ibid.*, *passim*.

Dr. Lutful-Huq based his edition on five of the nine known manuscripts.³⁷ This edition, that of Zoppoth (no. 34 below), and this edition and translation of the *Tafriḥ* (no. 35 below) represent the only work done on the subject suggested by Ritter's basic list.

16. *Kitāb fī 'ilm al-furūsiyah wa al-nushshāb wa al-rumḥ wa ghayr dhālik*.
Anon. In composition and illustrations, this work bears a strong resemblance to the work of Najm ad-Dīn al-Aḥdab.³⁸

22. *Risālah fī al-furūsiyah*.

Anon. A short survey of the Greek, Persian, 'Irāqī and Maghribī methods of cavalry training.³⁹

B. Archery. These works include descriptions of the various types of bows and arrows, their manufacture and operation, the names and deeds attached to the masters. They tend, in general, toward being half prose and half poetry in composition, and not a few of them use the hunt, rather than the battle-field, as their basis of consideration. In this section Ritter depended quite a bit on the exhaustive survey of archery literature with which Hein prefaced his monograph on archery in the Ottoman era.⁴⁰

(37) That he missed the superb British Museum Add. 18,866, surely the oldest, most beautifully illustrated, and most clearly written of the MSS, is strange indeed. The omission was brought to the attention of the present editor in a letter, dated 24 June 1959, from Mr. J. D. Pearson, the Librarian of the University of London.

Thus, until Lutful-Huq's edition is collated with this MS and those in Istanbul and Cairo, we cannot be said to possess even yet a first-rate text upon which the necessary translation can be based. For his inability to utilize the latter texts see, *Nihāyat al-su'l*, p. 57.

(38) Ritter, p. 135 and 138.

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 140. This is listed with the archery MSS, since it is part of a *majmū'* on archery. But its very title forces one to place it with the "furūsiyah" treatises.

(40) Joachim Hein, "Bogenhandwerk und Bogensport bei den Osmanen", *Der Islam*. XIV (1925), pp. 289-360. This was in turn an analysis and discussion of a work by a certain Muṣṭafā Kānī, *Auszug der Abhandlungen der Bogenschützen (telhis resāil er-rūmāt)*. Though archery is not the subject of this dissertation, it is interesting to note Hein's distinction; p. 309:

"Das charakteristische der türkischen Werke ist, dass sie im wesentlichen nur von Fachleuten aus Interesse am Bogensport und zur Förderung desselben verfasst sind. Dieses unterscheidet sie von einer grossen Gruppe arabischer, bei denen religiöse Beweggründe vorherrschen. Die Ausbildung für den Krieg, das Grundmotiv arabischer Werke, tritt vollständig hinter den Sport zurück."

17. *Kitāb al-wāḍiḥ fī al-ramy wa al-nushshāb*.
Aḥmad b. ‘Abdallāh Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Tabarī (d. 694/1295).⁴¹
18. *Kitāb fī ‘ilm al-nushshāb*.
Anon. A compilation in East Turkish of various Arabic works on archery.⁴²
19. *Kitāb fī al-musābiqah*.
Anon. A commentary on an *urjūzah* of Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishī (no. 20 below). Composed for the Mamlūk Sultān, al-Malik Ashraf Sha‘bān, who reigned from 764 to 768 A.H. (1363-1376 A.D.).⁴³
20. The manuscripts of the works of Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishī al-Yūnānī (d. 797/1394) which appear under the following titles :
- a) *Kitāb fī rimāyat al-nushshāb wa ismuhu bughyat al-marām*.
Dedicated to al-Malik Ashraf Sha‘bān.⁴⁴
 - b) *Ghūnyat al-murāmī*.
Dedicated to al-Malik Ashraf Sha‘bān.⁴⁵
 - c) *Kitāb munyat al-ṭullāb fī ma‘rifat al-ramy bi al-nushshāb*.
A work for the most part identical with 20b. Copied in 864/1459 for the Mamlūk Sultān, Al-Malik Ashraf Sayf al-Dīn Ināl (857-865/1453-1460).⁴⁶
 - d) *Kitāb sharḥ ghūnyat al-murāmī wa ghāyat al-marām li al-ma‘ānī*.
This text of Ṭaybughā’s work forms the major portion of a *majmū‘* whose overall title is *Kitāb fī ma‘rifat ramy al-nushshāb wa rukūb al-khayl*. The other parts are selections from the works of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab, Lājīn, and the *Nihāyat al-su‘l*. Thus in one book were combined archery and lance exercises, cavalry tactics and battlefield deportment. It is interesting to note that the number of lance exercises (*bunūd*) has reached 108. The *majmū‘* is dated 802/1399.⁴⁷

(41) Ritter, p. 136 and 141; Hein, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

(42) Ritter, p. 136.

(43) Ritter, p. 137.

(44) *Loc. cit.*

(45) *Ibid.*, p. 138; Mercier, p. 450, Hein, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

(46) Ritter, p. 138; Atiya, p. 545.

(47) Ritter, p. 138 f.

21. *Irshād al-ikhwān fī aḥkām al-riḥān.*

Anon. Comments based on the *Sharī'a*, referring to various military contests or simple tests of skill, including archery matches.⁴⁸

22. See final entry in section of "furūsiyah".

23. *Urjūzah fī 'ilm al-rimāyah* or *Al-nihāyah fī 'ilm al-rimāyah.*

This lengthy poetical work with prose commentary is by Husayn b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh al-Yūnānī (d. 650/1252).⁴⁹

24. *Hidāyat al-rāmī ilā al-aghrād wa al-marāmī.*

Husayn b. Muḥammad b. 'Absūn al-Ḥanafī al-Sinjārī. The manuscript noted by Ritter seems to be unique and was ordered by the Mamlūk Sulṭān, Al-Malik al-Zāhir Sayf al-Dīn Jaqmaq (842-857/1438-1453). The copy is dated 855 A.H. (1451 A.D.)⁵⁰

25. *Ḥall al-ishkāl fī al-ramy bi al-nibāl.*

Anon. A commentary on a poetical work on archery.⁵¹

26. *Kitāb ramy al-nushshāb.*

Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Sughayyir. The manuscript noted by Ritter is dated c. 821/1418, and seems to be a rather free abridgement of an unspecified longer work by the same author.⁵²

27. *Ghars al-ansāb fī al-ramy bi-al-sihām bi-al-nushshāb.*

This work by the celebrated polymath, al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), mentions a work on archery, apparently lost, by 'Izz ad-Dīn b. Jamā'a (d. 819/1416). The Mamlūk Sulṭān Qa'it Bay (873-901/1468-1495), possessed this short work of al-Suyūṭī's.⁵³

(48) *Op. cit.*, p. 140. Hein cites an Abū 'Alī al-Haitīmī as the author, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

(49) Ritter, p. 140f; Hein, *op. cit.*, p. 306; H Kh., VI, p. 403 uses the latter title. Cf. *GAL*, Suppl. I, p. 905 for a MS with commentary.

(50) Ritter, p. 141 f.

(51) *Op. cit.*, p. 141; Mercier, p. 454. This work forms the first half of the *majmū'* which contains the *Ta'* MS of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* (*supra*). The poetical work on archery on which this work is a commentary may be that of Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishī or Husayn al-Yūnānī (no. 23 *infra*) or Minqar al-Ḥalabī (*supra*).

(52) Ritter, p. 142; Hein *op. cit.*, p. 306, cites a "Kitāb al-hidāyah fī 'ilm al-rimāyah" by a Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Saghīr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Shahīr who wrote c. 845/1441.

(53) Ritter, p. 143; Mercier, p. 449, does not include this title among al-Suyūṭī's works. But the *MF*, p. 98, does mention a work on archery, "Kitāb ūlā al-asbāb fī al-ramy bi al-nushshāb" by Ibn Jamā'a.

28. *Kitāb faḍā'il al-ramy fī sabīl Allah.*

A short and rather pious treatise on archery by al-Hāfiẓ Abī Ya'qūb Ishāq b. Ishāq Ya'qūb al-Qarrāb. Ritter was unable to identify the author and he does not figure in the lists of the *Munster Fihrist* nor in that of Mercier. Neither Hājji Khalifah nor Brockelmann provides any further identity.⁵⁴

29. *Kitāb faḍl al-ramy wa ta'līmihi.*

A collection of *ḥadīth* about archery compiled by al-Ṭabarānī (d. 281/892). The manuscript and that of no. 28 are included in the same collection which dates from the end of the 12th century.⁵⁵

30. *Risālat al-ramy bi al-nushshāb.*

Anon. A short collection of rules of archery, dated 900/1494.⁵⁶

C. Tactics and Military Organization. These works are given over almost entirely to those military procedures to be followed when war seems imminent or is actually at hand. Such subjects as fortification and siege, spying and stratagems, camping and picketing, battle-formations, qualities and types of commanders, erection and operation of battle machines, booty and its distribution, the rules for retreat, for pursuit of a routed enemy, and for single combat, etc. are covered in whole or in part in these treatises.

31. *Al-tadhkirat al-ḥarawīyah fī al-ḥiyāl al-ḥarbīyah.*

A very thorough study of the Muslim army in the field and under siege; in twenty-four books, the titles of many of which resemble those of the *Tafrīj al-kurūb*. The author, 'Alī b. Abī Bakr al-Ḥarawī (d. 611/1214), covers all the above-named subjects. It is Ritter's belief that this book was most probably composed under the influence of the Crusades, and incorporated whatever the Muslims had learned about offense and siege-craft. The unique Istanbul manuscript is dated 602/1205, within the author's lifetime. Sections of it were copied in 875/1470 for Qa'it Bay.⁵⁷

(54) Ritter, p. 143 f.

(55) *Loc. cit.*

(56) *Ibid.*

(57) Ritter, pp. 144-146. There are "books" on ambassadors, spies and agents, protection of booty, camping, stratagems to avoid meeting the enemy, ambushing, siege and fortification, etc.

32. *Al-adillah al-rasmīyah fī al-ta'ābī al-ḥarbīyah.*

This basic work by Muḥammad b. Manklī, head of the Sulṭān's guard in the reign of al-Ashraf Sha'bān, discusses the military systems and tactics of the Franks, Greeks, Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. It includes various sketches of battle-formations, very much in the style of those found in the *Nihāyat al-su'l*. The exact date of his death is not known, but it is assumed to be c. 780/1379.⁵⁸

33. *Al-tadhkirāt al-sulṭānīyah fī siyāsāt al-sanā'i' al-ḥarbīyah.*

Another and more exhaustive work by Muḥammad b. Manklī. A wide-ranging investigation of the tactics to be employed in a variety of types of warfare and under a variety of circumstances.⁵⁹

34. *Kitāb siyāsāt al-ḥurūb.*

The Pseudo-Aristotle "Taktik"; written by "Aristu" for "Iskandar dhū al-qarnayn". A comparatively short analysis of tactics by an anonymous author. One Istanbul manuscript dates sometime after 1000/1592 and was copied for the Ottoman Sultan, Muḥammad III, who ascended to power in 1003/1595. Another is written in a fifteenth-century *naskhī* style. It is doubtful if this particular work could antedate the work of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab and Lājīn, or of that of Muḥammad b. Manklī.⁶⁰

35. *Tafrīj al-kurūb fī tadbīr al-ḥurūb.*

Ritter thought the author was anonymous, and the Istanbul manuscript, unique until another copy was found in the Yahūdah collection, now being catalogued in Princeton, carried no author's name. From the Yahūda manuscript it appears to be one 'Umar

(58) Ritter, pp. 146-148; Mercier, p. 457, does not mention either of the two works cited here in Ritter's list (Nos. 32 and 33), and assigns 1362 A.D. as the year of his death.

(59) Ritter, p. 148. Both Atiya, p. 544, and Zaki, p. 159, in citing this work, refer to the author as "Ibn Minkali". Like Ritter, Brockelmann prefers "Mānglī", *GAL*, Suppl. II, p. 167.

(60) Ritter, p. 124 and 149. The text, based on the three known manuscripts, has been edited by Gerhard Zoppoth (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis), University of Vienna: 1951). Mercier's only citation of Aristotle is to his treatise on animals, translated into Arabic, p. 442.

b. Ibrāhīm al-Awsi al-Ansārī, and the work was written in the reign of the Mamlūk Sultān Malik Faraj b. Barqūq.⁶¹

36. *Kitāb anīq al-manājiq*.

The author of this treatise on various siege-machines mentions Manklī and the taking of various fortresses, particularly in the Crusading period. His name, however, was somewhat obliterated on the Istanbul manuscript, and Ritter reports it as "... ibn Arnbughā al-Zardkāsh". There are two dates in the colophon, 774 and 775, placing either the copy or its composition (since the author's dates are unknown) in the reign of Al-Malik Ashraf Sha'bān (*supra*).⁶²

37. *Kitāb al-ḥiyāl fī al-lurūb wa fath al-madā'in wa ḥifz al-durūb*.

A Pseudo-Alexander treatise: "min ḥikm dhū al-Qarnayn". In whole or in part, this work was copied throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It seems related in spirit to the Pseudo-Aristotle "Taktik" (no. 34 above), but distinct from it in composition.⁶³

38. *Kitāb al-mubārak fīhi ma'rifat la'b al-dabbūs wa al-ṣira' alā al-khayl 'ind mulāqāt al-khaṣm fī awqāt al-ḥurūb*.

Anon. This treatise details the steps to be taken when engaged in single combat and the methods of wielding various weapons while astride, particularly the mace. The unique copy in Istanbul is dated 779/1377.⁶⁴

39. A short untitled work about war machines and military implements, "Greek-fire" and other pyrotechnics; written relative to experiences occasioned by the "Frankish" (Crusader ?) wars. The MS is dated 871/1467.⁶⁵

It should be noted that Mercier's specific interest was hippology, rather than any of the subjects noted by Ritter, and he included the latter only insofar as they clarified the former subject. Withal, their

(61) See discussion of MSS and author *infra*.

(62) Ritter, p. 150 f.; Zaki, p. 159, refers to him as "Ibn Arinbugha al-Zardakash", and places the date of the composition on catapults at about 867/1463.

(63) Ritter, pp. 151-153; *GAL*, Suppl. II, p. 167.

(64) Ritter, p. 152.

(65) *Ibid.*, p. 153 f. This may be similar to the anonymous treatise on the same subject referred to by Atiya, p. 544.

two lists, rather than the unspecific one in the *Munster Fihrist*, constitute the fullest survey of the basic materials for a study of Muslim military history.

There are, however, other manuscripts noted elsewhere, or made available since the appearance of their work, which must be appended to it to round out this study. In the field of "furūsiyah"; Brockelmann notes the following :

- a. Two works ascribed to Muḥammad b. Lājīn al-Ṭarābulṣī :
 1. *Bunūd al-ramḥ min bunūd al-aḥdāth wa al-furūsiyah bi rasm al-jihād* (GAL, Suppl. II, 167).
 2. *Kitāb mubārak yashtamil 'alā bunūd al-rimāḥ wa ghayrihā min al-fawā'id wa al-mayādīn* (GAL, Suppl. II, 167).
- b. A work ascribed to Taybughā al-Baklamishī, the authority on archery (cf. no. 20 above) :
Kitāb fī al-jihād wa al-furūsiyah wa funūn al-ādāb al-'arbiyah (GAL, II, 169).
- c. A work on cavalry practices and lance-play by Badr al-Dīn Baktūt al-Rammāḥ al-Khāzindarī (d. 711/1311) :
Kitāb fī 'ilm al-furūsiyah (GAL II, 168) or, *Kitāb al-furūsiyah wa la'b al-rumh* (Mercier, 444).

Some additional manuscripts in the field of archery :

- a. Another poetical work on archery attributed to Ḥusayn b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh al-Yūnānī (cf. no. 23 above) :
Al-qaṣīdat al-Yūnāniyah fī al-ramy 'an al-qaws (GAL, Suppl. I, 905).
- b. A work composed in the form of 400 *rajaz* verses on the art of archery by Abū Bakr al-Ḥalabī Minqār (d. 887/1482) :
Al-urjūzah al-Ḥalabiyah fī ramy al-sihām 'an al-qusī al-'arabiyah (GAL, II, 170).
- c. An anonymous work giving many details on fingering, aiming, and shooting, and on the various styles of the masters of archery. This manuscript has been edited and translated :
Kitāb fī bayān faḍl al-qaws wa al-sahm wa awṣāfihimā (Garrett Coll. no. 793)⁶⁶.

(66) Nabih A. Faris and Robert P. Elmer, *Arab Archery : An Arabic MS of about A.D. 1500* (Princeton: 1945).

- d. Another treatise on archery by Taybughā al-Baklamishī :
Kitāb al-ramy bi al-qaws wa al-nushshāb.
- e. A treatise on archery by the famous al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497).
Princeton is especially fortunate in having an autograph :
Al-qawl al-tāmm fī faḍl al-ramy bi al-sihām (Yahūdah 3551).⁶⁷
- f. An incomplete MS on archery exercises and competitions by an
11th century author, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Laṭīf
al-Khuḍayrī :
Kashf al-niqāb ‘an al-musābaqah wa al-ramy bi al-nushshāb (Yahūdah 2312)
- g. A rather late work on archery with commentary by Abū al-‘Abbās
b. Sibṭ b. Ḥirz Allāh written about 1000/1591 :
*Kitāb hidāyat al-rāmī ila ṭarīqat al-marāmī*⁶⁸

The following additions should be made to the above list of manuscripts in the general field of tactics, weapons, and military organization:

- a. A work on tactics, stratagems and ruses by Abū Bakr Muḥammad
b. ‘Alī b. Asbagh al-Ḥarawī, whom Brockelmann thinks might be
the son of the author of no. 31 above :
*Kitāb al-badā’i’ wa al-asrār fī ḥaqīqat al-radd wa al-intiṣār wa ghāmiḍ
mā ijtama‘at ‘alayhi al-rumat fī al-amṣār* (GAL, Suppl. II, 166).
- b. A work on artillery, probably composed in the late 15th century,
originally in Spanish, and then translated into Arabic. It shows
some knowledge of the development of siege craft and field pieces
of the Spanish armies, at that time attacking the Muslim positions
in the south of Spain and along the Maghrib littoral. Its author
bears the Spanish name of Arribāsh, and is otherwise identified as

(67) This was mentioned in the *MF*, I, p. 98, as being anonymous, and reported by Mercier, p. 456, as such. On the strength of ‘Awwād’s hasty reading of the Yahūdah MS, Zaki, p. 157, reported the author as simply Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Shāfi‘i. Not only did ‘Awwād miss the more pertinent “al-Sakhāwī” of the autograph, he also reported it as Yahūdah 3088 rather than 3551. Kūrkis ‘Awwād, “Al-makhṭūṭāt al-‘arabiyah fī dūr al-kutub al-amirikiyah”. *Sumer*, VII, no. 2 (1951), p. 250. It can also be found cited without author in H. Kh., IV, p. 583.

(68) Hein, *op. cit.*, p. 306, and note 2, where mention is made of one commentary adding the words, “fann al-rimāyah fī al-bunduq”. Zaki, p. 159 f., reporting a Cairo manuscript, misreads the author’s name and adds to the title, “fī ‘ilm al-ramy bi al-bunduq”.

Ibrahim b. 'Alī Ghānim b. Muḥammad b. Zakariyah al-Andalusī:
*Al-'izz wa al-manāfi' li al-mujāhidīn fī sabīl Allāh bi al-ālāt al-ḥurūb
 wa al-madāfi'* (GAL, II, 617 f.).

- c. A treatise on the manufacture and operation of various siege machines and weapons, and directions for the manufacture of various types of armor. The author, Murḍā b. 'Alī b. Murḍā al-Ṭarsūsī, composed it for Salāh al-Dīn sometime before or after the taking of Jerusalem (583/1187). The more important extracts of this work have been edited and translated :
Tabṣirat arbāb al-albāb fī kayfiyat al-najāt fī al-ḥurūb (GAL, I, 653).⁶⁹
- d. A very interesting treatise dating from the 16th century on military geometry and surveying, the throwing of missiles, and the digging of mines. It was written by the Arab-speaking interpreter in the fortress of Bulghar on the Volga, 'Uthmān al-Muhtadī (d. after 960/1553). The manuscript in the Garrett Collection, probably unique, dates from the early 19th century :
Hidāyat al-muhtadī fī 'ilm al-handas h wa al-misāhah wa ramy al-khamīrah wa ḥafr al-lughm (Garrett Coll. no. 1056).
- e. A work noted by Mercier and Brockelmann and overlooked by Ritter; a treatise on war by Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī al-Miṣri d. c. 759/1358) :
Kashf al-kurūb fī ma'rifat al-ḥurūb (GAL, II, 168)⁷⁰.
- f. A very late work on *jihad* by Ahmad b. Zaynī Daḥlān (d. 1304/1886) :
Irshād al-hādīr wa al-bādd limā jā'a fī faḍā'il al-jihād
 (Yahūdāh 2623).

From this list of over fifty titles, five only have been made available, and in varying degrees of quality and completeness, for scholarly consideration, *viz*, Lutfūl-Ḥuq's edition of the *Nihāyat al-su'l*, based upon five of the nine known manuscripts; Fāris and Elmer's edition and translation of the Garrett manuscript on archery; Cahen's edition and translation of extracts from Murḍā al-Ṭarsūsī's work on weapons

(69) Claude Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie composé pour Saladin", *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales*, Tome XII (Beyrouth: 1947-8).

(70) Zaki, p. 158, refers to the author as one of the "ḥalqa" leaders in the time of Sulṭān Jaqmaq. According to Ayalon this would put him in one of the non-Mamlūk Cavalry squadrons, p. 62-5 *et passim*, and note 93 for other references.

and armor; Zoppoth's edition of the Pseudo-Aristotle treatise and the present edition and translation of the *Tafrīj al-kurūb*. Though not all of the works are of equal value, it would appear that between fifteen and twenty are of the first importance in Muslim military thinking, since the various copies of any single one of them span as many as four centuries.⁷¹ It would seem impossible to gauge that renaissance in Muslim strategy and tactics which begins with the roll-back of the Frankish invaders and reaches its apogee in the Ottoman assaults on Vienna without resource to these rich and vital materials.

Two monographs on the subject of Muslim field and hand weapons, both employing some of the manuscripts named above, illustrate one phase of the problem of the disinclination of the Orientalist to pursue the technical study of Muslim warfare. In his study of the history of medieval artillery according to Oriental sources, Kalervo Huuri devoted the greater part of his work to elucidating the approximate meaning of various military terms, not only those employed in the Byzantine and Arabic worlds, but in the Persian, Indian, Chinese and Mongolian as well. Thus, he had to trace the terminology for both crossbow and arbalest (both under 'armbruste'), and the separate body of terms relative to siege-machinery, e.g., the ballista, the mangonel, the culverin, etc. To clarify the difference between light and heavy field or siege pieces ('leichte steinwerfende' and 'schwere steinwerfende'), Huuri made appeal to the illustrations accompanying the manuscripts of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥḍab's work, and categorized the siege-machines as being either traction-fired ('ziehkraftbilden') or fired by means of torsion-release ('torsionsschleudergeschütze'). His glossary of hand and field artillery is a scholarly landmark of its kind, and any future research of the topic will be greatly indebted to it.⁷²

Although Ayalon's purpose in his monograph on Mamlūk weaponry was ultimately to make a comment more relative to social and intellectual history, he was forced to make a detailed study of the nomenclature of firearms and gunpowder, and to outline the evolution of the uses of the words *naḥṭ* and *bārūd* from their utility in medieval pyrotechnics to their later relevance to the arquebus, the mortar and the cannon.⁷³

(71) For example, one MS of the *Nihāyat al-su'l* is dated 29 May 1841 whereas the earliest one was copied in 1372. *Nihāyat al-su'l*, pp. 1-3, and note 37, *supra*.

(72) Huuri, pp. 94-192 *passim* for the evolution of Islamic field weapons and their attendant terminology; pp. 255 ff. for the glossary; and cf. illustration nos. 15-19.

(73) Ayalon, Chapter Two on terminology; Chapter Three, *passim*, for the attitude

Since Huuri's work had little to do with firearms or naphtha, except insofar as it was used as a projectile, Ayalon's terminological findings are at once original and seminal. In both cases, however, the space devoted to assaying terminology points up the inadequacy of the published lexicographical and technical literature through which this important phase of Muslim development has to be assessed.⁷⁴

It is against such a background of primary and source materials, available or still in manuscript, and in terms of the technological and terminological problems, that this edition of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* and its somewhat problematic translation must be gauged. It proposes to do no more than bring to the attention of the scholarly community one more original source-book on the subject of Muslim warfare, and to illuminate, insofar as the literature makes possible, some of its puzzling aspects.

When all the sources are published and the terminology proven accurate, perhaps then Western military theorists will understand that the military supremacy of the Mamlūk and Ottoman societies was based on something more than mere numbers and hit-and-run tactics. These societies put primacy upon the military vocation, and their basic security was in military success. They maintained the tempo of success, initiated by Saladin, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It must have been based on superior patterns of logistics and armament and tactics, as their discipline must have canalized their zeal.⁷⁵ The basic sources discussed above and this present study might be considered as fairly contributory to making plain those patterns and defining that discipline.

of the Mamlūks towards the new weapons, and their continued adherence to *furūsiyah* exercises. The second-hand study of terminology carried out by J.R. Partington leaves Prof. Ayalon's reputation unimpaired : *A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder* (Cambridge : 1960), Chap. V, *passim*.

- (74) It is interesting that Ayalon could find but two definitions relating *naft* to *bārūd* in his study of the evolution of the terminology for gunpowder. These were supplied by Ibn Khaldūn and al-Qalqashandī. Ayalon, pp. 21 f. and notes.
- (75) Atiya's summation, p. 482, of the military inadequacy of the Christians in the 13th and 14th centuries can hardly be bettered or disputed, and forms an interesting corollary to Ayalon's work which proves the disinclination of one Muslim group to reshape their formerly successful tactics and weapons. However, the Ottomans did make the necessary shifts in weaponry and continued into the 16th century the substance of Muslim military superiority. As the sources detailed above become available, and as they pertain to the period before 1683, they will complement these two seminal studies, and those of Huuri and Smail (*supra*).

2. The manuscripts, the author, the work.

This edition is based on the collation of the only two manuscripts known to the editor. One of them is listed in Brockelmann (*GAL*, II, 168) as an anonymous work written for "al-Malik al-Nāṣir". This is somewhat misleading for it could refer to al-Malik al-Nāṣir b. Qalā'ān, who is indeed mentioned in the treatise.¹ However, in the eulogistic introduction accompanying this manuscript of the work (which is missing from the Yahūdāh text), the ruler is correctly identified as Abū al-Sā'ādat Faraj b. al-Sultān al-Malik al-Zāhir Abū Sa'id Barqūq. Upon his succession to the throne (15th of Shawwāl 810/20 June 1399) he was given the throne name of al-Malik al-Nāṣir.²

It is number 35 in Ritter's list of manuscripts and he correctly reports its composition in the reign of Sultān Faraj b. Barqūq.³ He reports it as a large octavo volume of 152 folios with no other work included within its binding. Photostats of a film of this MS were secured for the editor from the film library of the Arabic Manuscript Section of the Arab League in Cairo. The title-page is illuminated with a decorative medallion as its center-piece. The *tughra* of the Ottoman Sultān Maḥmud I (1143-1168/1730-1754) appears to the right, as does a remark to the effect that this volume has been made part of the royal *waqf* and has been so recorded by Darwīsh Muṣṭafā, the superintendent (*mufattish*) of the royal *awqāf*. Beneath this is the seal-mark of Darwīsh Muṣṭafā.⁴

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- (1) Book IV, Chap. 1 : p. 40, v (Hereinafter the first page reference will be to the translation; the second to the edited text).
 - (2) William Popper, *History of Egypt 1382-1469 A.D., Translated from the Arabic Annals of Abū al-Maḥāsīn b. Taghrī Birdī*, Part II, 1399-1411 A.D. (University of California Publications in Semitic Philology, Vol. XIV; Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1954), p. 1. Faraj reigned twice: 801-808 and 808/814/1399-1411. For two months and ten days in 808/1405 he was superseded on the throne by his brother, al-Malik al-Manṣūr 'Abd al-'Azīz, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-124.
 - (3) Ritter, p. 149.
 - (4) An explanation of the seals and of *lacunae* in *Fa'* was kindly supplied the editor by Dr. Albert Dietrich of the German Archaeological Institute in Istanbul in a letter dated 26 February 1959. Some of the missing words were obviously inscribed in gold and have flaked off, or were in a light red or blue pigment which has faded. Paper was thin and soft, and a light outline of some words appears on the folio beneath, giving one the impression of a palimpsest. Dr. Dietrich found conclusively that it was not so.

The manuscript is undated and was copied by al-Faḍl b. 'Abd al-Wahāb al-Sinbāṭī, who was undoubtedly an Egyptian. It is written in a clear 9th/15th century *naskhi* with nine lines to a page. Book and chapter titles are written somewhat larger and are allotted distinguishing lines to themselves. Most of the text is vowelled but not always correctly and not completely, *e.g.* those vowels indicating case ending and tense forms are seldom included. The clarity of the copy and the illuminated title-page lead one to believe that this copy was destined for the royal library and may have been executed within the author's lifetime, though the absence of his name from the copy is puzzling. This manuscript is no. 3483 from the Fātiḥ mosque in Istanbul, and will be referred to hereinafter as *Fā'*.

The other manuscript is contained in the *majmū*, which is numbered ELS 3954 in the Yahūdāh Collection now in the process of being catalogued in Princeton University. It contains :

1. f. 1b-91a. *Ḥall al-ishkāl fī al-ramy bi al-nibāl*, which is a commentary on an *urjūzah* on archery by an unnamed author.⁵ This copy is by the same *kātib* who copied the *Tafrīj al-kurūb*, and was completed on the 24th of Ṣafar 924/8th of March 1518.
2. f. 94b-153a. *Tafrīj al-kurūb fī tadbīr al-ḥurūb*, a treatise in twenty books on the arts of war by 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm al-Awsī al-Anṣarī. The copyist was Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Rifā'ī al-Ḥasanī al-Shāfi'ī who completed his work on the 25th of Muḥarram 924/7 February 1518.
3. f. 154b-167b. *Kitāb raf' al-tashkīk fī qawl al-nās al-ra'āyā 'alā dīn al-malik*, a polemical work by a *Shaykh al-Islām* identified simply as 'Alā' al-Dīn. The copy dates from 928/1522.

Various short selections of poetry with commentary or other excerpts are copied in the intervening folios. The leather binding and the pages of the *majmū* are severely worm-eaten, but fortunately most of the damage is in the marginal area of the text, permitting an almost perfect reading. It measures 15 by 21.5 cm.

The script is a rather debased *naskhi* and is immediately seen as such when compared to *Fā'*. There are thirteen lines to a page except for one with fourteen, and two, including the colophon page, where there are fifteen lines. There is practically no vowelising, and the incursion of

(5) See no. 25 of Ritter's list, *supra*, and note 51 accompanying it.

worm holes makes the proper pointing of a word a difficult problem. The marginal area of some folios is filled with various medical formulas, diagnoses and treatment. They are completely unrelated to the text and subject-matter of the *Tafrīj al-kurūb*, and are not in the hand of its scribe, but rather in a hand which appended commentaries to other parts of the *majmu'*. This manuscript will be referred to hereinafter as *Ta'*.

Except for the introduction which forms a part of *Fa'* and is absent from *Ta'*, the two manuscripts are in most respects textually identical. The differences are ones of word order, more grammatically correct forms, and *lacunae* of from a word to a whole clause. In the latter case, and lacking any other MSS. upon which a decision of textual correctness might have been reached, the wording of the more complete text was retained. Incorrect forms of the verb and incorrect usage of cardinal numbers (e.g., *thalāth* rather than *thalāthah* with *fuṣūl*) are the most glaring of the grammatical errors; but they occur with such regularity as to give credence to the belief that during the Mamlūk period the Arabic language as a literary medium was undergoing some process of decay. Stylistically there is little to commend the work. It was a work, however, which was meant to convey a good deal of supposedly practical information to certain people, and its language is neither far-fetched nor abstruse. Except for some words of a purely technical nature, this work in its simplicity would be accessible to any literate person in the epoch of its composition.

Though the author is named in *Ta'*, the given form of his name is such that it is difficult to identify him exactly. An 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm b. 'Umar al-Anṣārī al-Awsī al-Mursī is mentioned by Brockelmann, but he died in 633/1284.⁶ Neither of the two biographical sources for this period, viz, al-Sakhāwī's *Al-daw' al-lāmi'* and Ibn Taghrī Birdī's *Al-Manhal al-ṣāfi'*, cites anyone with this particular name. Ḥājji Khalīfah lists neither author nor work.

However, using simply "'Umar b. Ibrāhīm'" as a clue, and knowing that the author had to live during the reign of Sulṭān Faraj, both the *Daw'* and the *Manhal* mention and draw attention to the important offices held by a member of a renowned family of Ḥanafī jurists from 'Aleppo.⁷ His full name is given in the former as: 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm b.

(6) *GAL*, II, p. 265 and Suppl. II, p. 378.

(7) Al-Sakhāwī, *Al-daw' al-lāmi'* (8 vols. Cairo: 1353-1355 A.H.), vol. VI, p. 65f.,

Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Muḥammad b. Hibat Allāh al-Kamāl Abū Ḥafṣ b. al-Kamāl Abī Ishāq b. Nāṣir al-Dīn Abī 'Abdallāh b. al-Kamāl Abī Ḥafṣ al-'Uqaylī al-Halabī. He was generally known as Ibn al-Adīm or Ibn Abī Jarādah. The *Daw'* gives his birth date as 754/1353, but the *Manhal* has 760 or 761/1359. These latter dates are cited in the *Daw'* but are considered inaccurate. He died in 811/1408. His family-tree as deduced from the *Manhal* is demonstrated by Wiet.⁸ In the usual manner he studied *fiqh* and the *uṣūl*, and with his father and a certain Ibn Ḥabīb he pursued the study of *ḥadīth*.

He was appointed *Qāḍī al-'askar* in the Aleppo district, and later deputy to his father, the Ḥanafī *qāḍī*. In 794/1392 he became Ḥanafī *qāḍī* in Aleppo and in this position amassed great wealth. He visited Cairo, but cut short his stay when he heard that the Tatars of Timūr Lenk were ravaging the Syrian provinces. He was taken prisoner and very badly treated. When Timūr withdrew in 803/1401, he attached himself to the entourage of the chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī* of Egypt, Amin al-Dīn al-Ṭarābulṣī. In 805/1403 he succeeded the latter, and held at the same time the position of head of the Shaykhūnīyah *ṭarīqah*. Due to his association with the Mamlūk *amīrs* and his growing influence at court, he was appointed *shaykh al-shuyūkh* in 808/1406. Upon his death less than three years later he was succeeded in his office of chief *qāḍī* of the Mamlūk realm by his son Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad.

Al-Sakhāwī maintains in the *Daw'* that he used his position at court and his connections with the various *amīrs* to amass great wealth and neglected, or performed only perfunctorily, his religious duties. These were charges no doubt garnered from al-Maqrizī who esteemed 'Umar not at all. Ibn Taghrī-Birdī, however, defended him:

"Cadi Kamāl al-Dīn was a leading and erudite scholar, respected and highly regarded by the rulers, sedate, and a man of noble qualities and virtues. Shaikh Taqī ad-Dīn Maqrizī charged him with faults of which he was innocent; the charge was the result of some difference between them — God pardon them both."⁹

Though a student of al-Maqrizī's, Ibn Taghrī-Birdī was the son of a

number 221; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Les Biographies du Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, ed. Gaston Wiet (Memoires à l'Institut d'Egypte. tome XIX; Cairo: 1932), p. 256 f., number 1706.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 65.

(9) Popper, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

leading Mamlūk *amīr*, and the phrase "respected and highly regarded by the rulers" might be construed as betraying a *parti pris*.

For purposes of identification, three facts from this biographical sketch should be noted. His holding of the position of *qāḍī al-ʿaskar* would have made him conversant with army organization and he would have ridden with the army in any general operations around Aleppo. His presence in Syria during the depredations of Timūr, and his consequent imprisonment, gave him some knowledge of Mongol military organization, tactics and strategy. The author of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* is moved to include the mode of Mongol mobilization for battle in his discussion of the usual Muslim theory of battle-rankings :

"The Mongols from among the Turkish people accustomed their people [to fight as] a single squadron of cavalry, so that they struggled together against the enemy. Retiring [from the battle] and returning [to it] was denied to each of them. They gained from this great experience which was not[duplicated]by others."¹⁰ And, speaking of the problem of razing captured fortifications, the author adds :

"This was the method also of the Tatar rulers, such as Hūlākū and Ghāzān and those after them. They had demolished many of the cities and fortresses; some whose rebuilding ensued, and some which remained as they were."¹¹

Finally there is the tone of the introduction as related to his companionship with the important Mamlūk *amīrs* and his fulsome praise of the Sultān. The author of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* says that he pursued his research and wrote his treatise for two types of readers :

1. "...he who chances upon it of the [Sultān's] noble commanders and the leaders of his armies",
and
2. "He among them who did not experience the path of war, because of the youth of his age..."¹²

In both cases it is directed at the Mamlūk military caste, for the second group might be thought of as the Mamlūks undergoing their training in the Citadel. The author did not have sultān Faraj in mind, for "... he

(10) Book XVI, Chap. 3 : p. 103, v v

(11) Book XIX, Chap. 3 : p. 119, 4 4

(12) Introduction : p. 41, A

has gone through the wars and experienced them and has known, by exploits and battles, their conditions and their nature."¹³ Thus, on the basis of chronology and these three biographical possibilities, it may be that 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm Al-Awsī al-Anṣarī and the chief *qāḍī* of Egypt, Kamāl al-Dīn Abū Ḥaṣṣ 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm, known as Ibn al-ʿAdīm, are synonymous. But even this possibility is rendered yet more tenuous by the distinction between "Awsī" and "ʿUqaylī".

On the whole, one must admit that there is something deficient in the *Tafrīj al-kurūb*. It is a work of the second rank, lacking the detailed scope of the *Nihāyat al-suʿl*, the urgency of Ibn Hudhayl's call to the *jihād*, the practiced warrior's flair for military exercises and tournaments and duels which animates the works of Najm al-Dīn Aḥḍab and Lājīn. The work reeks of the library and of the court, rather than of the camp and the battle-field. Its tone is that of the observer rather than of the participant. Platitudes and amusing stories abound when one had hoped for more concrete strategy or more varied tactical analysis. Though stylistically mediocre, one is moved to count it among the works of *adab*, rather than those of *funūn ḥarbīyah*.

Although the author contends that he reflected upon the opinions of the military experts and upon their recommendations to future military leaders, not once does he cite the name of Najm al-Dīn or Lājīn or Taybughā or al-Ḥarawī or Muḥammad b. Manklī or Moḥammad b. ʿIsā b. Ismāʿīl al-Hanafī, the author of the *Nihāyat al-suʿl*. It is from the books of *ḥadīth*, of Ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidi, al-Jāḥiz, Ibn Saʿīd and Ibn al-Athīr that citations are drawn. Saladin and Baybars and al-Malik al-Nāṣir b. Qalāʾūn are mentioned, but are not so prominently invoked as are the Persian kings of pre-Islamic times, or Alexander and Muʿā-wiyah. The questions of armor and archery are slighted, while hand and field weapons are simply named in passing. Where the *Nihāyat al-suʿl* describes and illustrates five separate methods of battle formations, the author of *Tafrīj al-kurūb* is moved to describe only a five-line battle array with straight- or curved-line variants.¹⁴ Finally, it is only at Book Nine, exactly half-way through the treatise, that the army moves out to battle. By then we have been treated to lengthy discussions of peace-time vigilance, agents and spies, envoys, deceptions and stratagems to avoid battle, consultations about going to battle, the qualifications of generals and troops, etc. The adjuncts of caution

(13) *Loc. cit.*

(14) Books XVI and XVII *passim*.

and diplomacy and the exhaustion of alternatives seemed to have usurped the place of military action in the thinking of our author.

Paradoxically it is in the relationship of this last point to the military thinking of the Middle Ages that the work makes its soundest contribution. All later military historians have looked upon the disinclination of the Muslim armies to engage in immediate battle, and their super-sensitive cautiousness and their appeals to stratagems and cunning and trickery to avoid open battle as derogatory aspects of Eastern warfare. In taking the modern military historians and theorists to task for their inept handling of warfare during the Crusades, Professor Smail wrote :

“The interpretation of the events of one age in the light of the assumptions and prejudices of another can never produce satisfactory history, and the story of medieval military methods told wholly or principally in terms of battle is very far from complete. It was not an age when commanders in war consciously applied strategic doctrine, but they were well aware of the risks involved in giving battle, in adverse circumstances they prepared to refuse it. Yet even when they decided against combat, conditions in the Latin states were such that by keeping their army in being in the neighborhood of the enemy they achieved important military objects.”¹⁵

In an adjoining footnote, he points out that the most widely influential military theorist during the Middle Ages was Vegetius, and that he “more than once stated that battle was an uncertain business, to be rejected in favor of other means unless circumstances were favorable.”¹⁶

Smail believes that both sides during the Crusades fought along principles of “Eastern” warfare, i.e., erection and maintenance of fortified strategic points, a small army ever ready and practiced in quick forays, the avoidance of open battles, *per se*, until the last minute. His work points out with singular clarity that the Latin armies lost or were put at serious disadvantage only when they veered from these principles as a result of rash leadership, personal vendettas, or inaccurate or incomplete intelligence about the enemy. The chivalric impetuosity

(15) R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare* (Cambridge: 1956), p. 15. For the shortcomings of the historians of crusading warfare see Chapter One of Smail's work, and cf. the first paragraphs of this introduction.

(16) Smail, *op. cit.*, p. 15, note 2.

of the Christian warrior appears less than laudable against the intelligent policy of caution served alike by the Byzantines and the Muslims. These latter groups had cognizance of the terrain, particularly of the logistical problems of engaging in battle beyond the fortified frontier, or between fortified places; of the dependence of the various elements of public security upon an army that had to be kept in being and whose numbers could not be hazarded at every alarm; and, lastly, of a particular type of strategy and tactics, honored by usage and dictated by numbers and terrain, which contravened the training and experience of the invaders from the West. By constant arrow fire and feigned attacks and diversionary ambushes, the Turkish militia on the Muslim side generally established whatever superiority they could before coming to fight at close quarters. This, contends Smail, was "a natural expression of the common sense maxim that, before irrevocably committing itself to battle, an army should gain every possible advantage over its opponent."¹⁷ The Eastern warrior thought it "no less creditable to retreat than to pursue"; he was like a fly "who could be beaten off but not driven away."¹⁸ Thus if overweening cautiousness was uppermost in the mind of an Eastern general, then deliberate tactics of attrition were employed by him in confronting an equal or superior enemy.

Battle, then, was the very last resource; and it could not be countenanced until every other one had been investigated and found nugatory. Chapter One of Book IV of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* affirms the utility of deceptions and stratagems so as to avoid war by appeal to Law and Reason, and then goes on to cite cases from the Islamic past, including the words and actions of the Prophet and his Companions, where they were employed successfully.¹⁹ In Chapter Two of Book VII, the author compares confronting a strong enemy at the very moment of his appearance to stirring a serpent from its lair while one is unarmed, and says quite distinctly that such action is not permissible.²⁰ And in the same chapter his words form an informing corollary, as it were, to Smail's thesis about Crusading warfare :

"In general, the one seeking to do battle against the enemy should not move to engage him, but should accept safety and peace as

(17) *Ibid.*, p. 83.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 78

(19) Book IV, Chap. 1 and 3 *passim*

(20) Book VII, Chap. 2 : p. 78, 19

long as they are granted to one. The Prophet said, "Don't seek to encounter the enemy; rather ask safety of God. They can conquer just as you can conquer." If you have met them, stand fast. One should not become disgusted at the procrastination of one's enemy; for in the interval of waiting is the grasping of possible circumstances and what has been concealed of their affairs. One does not seek victory by engaging him so long as victory can be attained through stratagems. For going out against the enemy involves exposing one's self to danger and the endangering of one's wealth and being distant from one's country, even if only to the frontiers of it. Considering what may be in this going-forth of expectation of the perishing of self and the courting of dangers, and the bearing of affliction, it may be that stratagems can do that which battle cannot..."²¹

This same philosophy attaches to the wiping-up operations following a rout, our author going so far as to point out that no soldier should get in front of a routed army, nor seek to shunt it from its path of flight, nor deny the defeated access to water if they seek it. He says, further, that "standing in the direct path of routed warriors is not sagacious".²² And he cautions the commander of an army laying siege to a fortified place :

"It must also be stressed that the besieger of the enemy is also besieged in the sense that he is not secure from their going out against him and their hastening to do so when the opportunity, during the day or night, presents itself to them; for they desire victory as much as the besieger desires it over them. Hence it is incumbent upon the commander to be cautious with respect to himself and those of the army with him as much as possible."²³

It is the Mongols, the various Central Asian tribal conglomerations moving as a unit, who bring to the late Middle Ages the military theory of "total war", of total devastation and almost total annihilation. The Muslim armies of western Asia and the southern Mediterranean littoral and their European medieval opposites, particularly during the Crusades, fought the same general type of war, though the tactics differed, as they sprang from somewhat analogous feudal societies. Their warfare

(21) *Loc. cit.*

(22) Book XVIII, Chap. 1 : p. 113, 114

(23) Book XIX, Chap. 3 : p. 118, 119

"... but rarely afforded the spectacle of two armies bent on mutual destruction; the true end of military activity was the capture and defense of fortified places. In its simplest form the struggle could be between an army on one side, and a garrison manning its walls on the other."²⁴

Both sides came to know that "decision by battle was more likely to serve the ends of the aggressor than those of his intended victim."²⁵

Obliquely, the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* adds something of note to the most ambiguous of the military problems of Crusading warfare, viz., the evolution of the role of infantry. Smail emphasizes the lack of conclusive proof from the Latin side for the prominence of the *pedites*, and highlights, in his discussion of the Muslim armies, the almost complete tactical dependence upon lightly-mailed cavalymen.²⁶ Yet, between Ḥiṭṭīn, the terminal date of his study, and the beginning of the fifteenth century which saw the composition of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb*, a tightening of the military organization took place, which, while it did not give strategic equality to the infantry, integrated their activities more reasonably in military thinking. Thus in Book VI, Chapter Two, the author deems it necessary to include the qualifications of infantrymen. They had quite specific places within the camp, and were not grouped with either the tribal auxiliaries or the general camp followers.²⁷ And he explains the tactical use of the infantry during the battle and the wiping-up operations in Books XVII and XVIII. Though these are minimal in comparison to the space allotted the organization and operations of the cavalry divisions, it does indicate a tighter organization of the various elements of the army, more concern for the infantrymen and a wiser use of their capacities.

Thus one finds in the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb* a value more relative to time and place and to perceptual realities *vis-a-vis* war on the part of a differently motivated civilization than to absolute military considerations. It complements the work of Smail, though its ultimate contribution may be, like Ayalon's work on the gunpowder and firearms, in the fields of social and intellectual history. Withal, it gives to the study of Muslim warfare a wider context and touches, in its best moments, a set of generalities heretofore unavailable to the scholar and the student of the Muslim East.

(24) Smail, *op cit.*, p. 39.

(25) *Loc. cit.*

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 106-120 and 75-83.

(27) See the diagram of a Muslim camp in the *Nihāyat al-su'l*.

3. Acknowledgements

This work is substantially my doctoral dissertation. It can be fairly said that not one line of it would have been possible without the sustained aid of the Department of Oriental Studies of Princeton University. To all its members, I convey my gratitude for the sustenance and concern rendered on my behalf.

Dr. Rudolf Mach was the first to rouse my interest in the problem of Muslim warfare by making available to me the copy of the text in the Yahūdah collection, and facilitating its photostating for my use while in Cairo. For this and his subsequent assistance I remain much indebted.

The task of checking the collation and correcting the translation and of general supervision of the work was undertaken by Professor Farhat J. Ziadeh. For all this, I am most grateful.

Two sets of colleagues did yeoman service on my behalf and sometimes at a distance of a continent or two: Mr. Majed Sa'īd, who checked my translation and assisted me in tracking down some obscure references in Arabic literature; Mr. Michel Mazzaoui, who typed the Arabic text of the edition from pages which carried the corrections and notations of a two years' struggle; and Dr. John A. Williams, who never failed me when I needed his opinion or his services in checking the contents of works inaccessible to me. To my thanks to these three Princeton friends I add the same to the following in Cairo: Dr. Charles Geddes, of the School of Oriental Studies of the American University, who told me about Dr. Lutful-Huq's edition of the *Nihāyat al-su'l*; Mr. Maurice Ṣalībī of the same institution, who read through with me my rough translation of the collated text; and Mr. Rashād 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, of the Arabic Manuscripts Section of the Arab League, who checked my unraveling of the Yahūdah manuscript, and who secured for me photostats of the Fātiḥ manuscript in the files of his office.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank most respectfully Dr. David Ayalon and Dr. 'Aziz Suryāl 'Atiya, from whose conversations and correspondence I garnered the intellectual support to pursue my research in the somewhat neglected field of Muslim warfare.

No one of the above persons or institutions can be considered remotely culpable for any errors contained herein; they are but products of my own oversight, haste and ignorance. But, since this does but

represent the inauguration of more pertinent, and, we trust, less assailable work, it is Time which will grant the final indulgence and the cleansing correctives.

“Outwearers of Apollo will, as we know,
Continue their Martian generalities.
We have kept our erasers in order.”

E P. *Homage to Sextus Propertius*

Cairo, 1960.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

For the sake of convenience the source of the Qur'ānic quotations was placed after each one in both the text and the translation. The translations are those of Professor Arberry's *The Koran Interpreted* (2 Vols; London: 1955).

The notes accompanying the Arabic text are those prompted by the collation only. Explanatory notes and problems of literary sources accompany the translation.

A comparatively short glossary of terms relevant to Muslim military nomenclature has been added after the translation. Its scope, however, is beyond that of the terminology encountered in the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb*.

Two variations on the Princeton system of transliterating Arabic should be noted : "b." is used throughout for "ibn", except where the latter is the first element of a given name; and "Abi" is used for "Abū" when the latter appears in the genitive case. Long vowels occurring at the end of words were given macrons.

In the translation, the words between brackets are editorial insertions; those between parentheses are either explanatory or convey alternate meanings and usages.

TAFRĪJ AL-KURŪB
FĪ TADBĪR AL-ḤURŪB


TRANSLATION

وَاللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَلَى أَمْرِهِ
 الْعَالِي بِإِبَادَةِ عِبَادِهِ الطَّائِفَةِ الْمَارِقَةِ
 النَّاتِلَةِ مِنْ غَيَابِ دَهْرِهِ وَسَعِيدِ حَقِّهِ
 مَصَارِعِ أَنْفَادِهِ بِمَا يَنْقُطُ بِهِ الْمَاطِلُ وَيَقْدُ
 وَدَوِّ كَيْدِهِ فِي خَزَائِهِ وَمُرِيدِهِ مِنْ
 الْمَآرِجِ عَنْ عَظَائِدِهِ يَجْعَلُ مَلَأَ كَيْدِهِ
 الْمَآصِرَ مَعْرُورَةً وَمَرْغُورَةً
 وَمُيَسَّرَةً

وَتَعَوُّوْهُ بِصُفْرَتِهِ الْإِبْنِ تَعَدَّ الْأَبَ وَتَزَوُّوْهُ
 عَلَى الذَّلَالَةِ وَأَمَّا الْأَوَّلُ مِنْهُمْ الْأَخِيرُ
 الْمُلُوكُ كَأَنَّهُمْ كَارِزُونَ وَبُؤْسُ هَـ
 وَحْدَهُ لَا يَشْرِيكَ لَهُ شَهَادَةُ يَوْمِ الرَّفْعِ عَظِيمًا
 شَدِيدًا وَأَعْبَقُوا رَاحَ وَاسْتَهْدَأُوا لَآ إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ
 لِيَسْتَشْفُوْهُ مِنْ طَبِيبِ أَلَمِيَّةِ الزَّامَةِ أَطِيبُ
 وَأَلْهَابُ قُلُوبِ الْبَرِيَّةِ بِأَسْعَدِ مَلِكِ
 الزَّعِيَّةِ بِأَرْوَاقِ طَلَارِكِ كُلِّ شَقَّةٍ وَجَرَحِ
 أَنْجَحِ الْأَمَّةِ مِنْ صُفْرِ طَلْقِ قَوْجِ

The first folios of the Istanbul Manuscript (Fātiḥ 3483) of *Tafriḥ al-kurūb*.

الصفحتان الأوليان من مخطوطة استانبول (مسجد الفاتح ٣٤٨٣)



The colophone of the Istanbul Manuscript (Fātiḥ 3483). Though giving the name of the scribe, it lacks a date. Probably late 9th/15th Century.

الصفحة الأخيرة من مخطوطة إستانبول (مسجد الفاتح ٣٤٨٣). ورغم أنها تورد اسم الناسخ إلا أنها غفلت من التاريخ والمرجح أنه كان في أواخر القرن التاسع الهجري (الخامس عشر الميلادي).

INTRODUCTION¹

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE ... he is the supporter of Islām by his power, the conqueror by the might of his victory ... and the humbler of the nose of the deviator from His obedience by quickening his destruction and returning his malice to his own throat ... exhibiting to him through the destruction of his enemies that by which the wise person is instructed and which the contemplator numbers among the miracles of his age ... And [he is] the cause of his noble sire's happiness through the annihilation of his enemies, tyrannical and heretical. And God is the determinor of his affairs ... [wherein] he brought the nation from hardship to relief ... and he raised from [his] subjects, by the kindest rule, every hardship and misfortune (contraction of heart) ... and He lightened the hearts of the people by the most fortuitous of kings, from the odor of whose flowering days, the sweetest fragrance and the most evanescent perfume is inhaled.

I declare that there is no god but God alone, with Whom there is no partner: a declaration which the greatest kings inherit, the great from the great (i.e. the son from the father) ... The first of them recommends

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- (1) This introduction does not appear in *Yā'*, where the opening takes the following form :

IN THE NAME OF GOD, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Praise belongs to God, the Lord of the Worlds and the Reward is for the God-fearing. May His blessing be upon our lord Muḥammad, the Seal of the Prophets, and upon his Family and his Companions; may He bestow upon them a Great Benediction.

This book is entitled "The Dispelling of Woes in the Management of Wars", arranged in twenty books, and in each of these is three chapters about the management of wars and what is known of the nature of battles and its explication. The author, the humble slave of God, the Exalted, is 'Umar b. Ibrahīm al-Awsī al-Anṣārī; may God, the Exalted, have mercy upon him.

Either there are chapters missing from both MSS, and this seems hardly possible due to the enumeration of book - and chapter-titles in *Fa'*, or this is a patent addition on the part of the scribe. In thirteen of the twenty books there are but two chapters apiece, while in one, Book VI, there are four chapters; leaving but six books with three chapters each.

it to the next in continuity unbroken, and the son undertakes to uphold it after the father and he relates it on the authority of the victorious to the [oncoming] victor ... I declare that our lord Muḥammad is His slave and His messenger; favored with [His] support throughout the continuation of Time; the Victorious by [reason of] the terror which impresses the hearts of the people of unbelief at a distance of a month's journey. May God bless him and his family, whose battles fulfilled for the enemy the dates of Destiny, and whose swords gulped the blood of unbelief, returning with the saffron of victory and not with the crimson of shame; with a blessing [such that] their stars rise in the galaxies of stars, and whose form does not change with the passing of Time; if God, the Almighty, wills it. And may God bestow a great benediction.

To proceed: Since the great Sulṭān, the King, the Victor, the Sage, the Just, the Struggler, the Perseverer, the Trail-blazer,² the God-supported, the Conquering, the Victorious, the Ornament of the World and of Religion, the Sulṭān of Islām and of the Muslims, the Rejuvenator of Justice in the Worlds, the Heir of the kingdom of the Kings of the Arabs and the Persians and the Turks, Shadow of God in His land, the Upholder of God's *sunnah* and of His Ordinances, the Alexander of the time, the Bestower [of that which is possessed by] the possessors of thrones and crowns, the Donor of provinces and countries, the Destroyer of tyrants and oppressors and unbelievers, Protector of the two sacred places (Mecca and Madinah), Possessor of the two *qiblahs* (Mecca and Jerusalem), the Unifier of the word of Faith, the Unfurler of the banner of justice and benevolence, the Master of the Kings of the time, the Imām of the pious, the Partner of the Commander of the Faithful: Abū al-Saʿādāt Faraj, son of the Sulṭān, the Martyr, al-Malik al-Zāhir Abū Saʿīd Barqūq; may God, the Almighty, through the length of days, give long life to his rule and may He give victory, through the passing of the ages, to his soldiers and armies and associates.

He is the one whose constancy and strength subdued the kings of the

(2) In the MS this word was pointed incorrectly, or to be more precise, incompletely, i.e., the *tā'* should have been a *tha'* and the *ʿayn* a *ghayn*. That it is *muthāghir* and quite properly so according to Mamlūk titulary, see Amari, *Diplomi Arabi*. (2 vols.; Florence: 1858), vol. 1 p. 165 wherein is given the titulary of Sulṭān Barsbāy in a document of 825/1422. Cf. the discussion on titulary in ʿAziz Suryai Atiya, "Egypt and Aragon, Embassies and Diplomatic Correspondence between 1300 and 1330 A.D.", *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XXIII, no. 7 (Leipzig: 1938), *passim*.

earth, whose [military] numbering and equipment rendered limit and description impossible, and whose fame and mention and repute spread to the distant horizons. And Victory surrounded him from every side. In the recurrence of battles, his victory and his conquest are recurrent. A seeker did not approach him with evil except that he returned a failure; and no one cast at him with cunning except that the arrow of his cunning turned back upon him unerringly. He did not desire the surmounting of a difficulty except to achieve in its surmounting the ingeniously miraculous. He did not attempt to effect a conquest except that the tongue of Victory spoke out to him, "Help from God, and a nigh victory". (61:13) His well-being through victory is ever assured, and the arrow of his happiness in every time r cites :

'Gainst a Victor, Oppression's warriors are worn;
Stratagems are useless, they work not his taking.
Who butts a rock all day ends not with its breaking;
So does the mountain-goat, and splintered is his horn.³

I was among those who looked into the books of history in their variety, and reflected upon the battles of wars in them with their different types; and upon that which the people of management among the chiefs [of wars] had arranged; and upon that which the opinion of every one of the *shaykhs* of war and its experts, '*ulam *', had prescribed; and upon that which the most learned of writers had cited in the recommendations to the leaders of the armies; and upon that which happened to the ingenious men of wars of the stratagems of the trickier, of the cunning of the cunning.

This prompted me to contribute to his treasure, may God make it prosperous, by the continuation of his rule and the lengthening of his life and the elevation of his luminous stars and the shining of his light, by a book which I composed about the management of wars and their organization; about the knowledge [accrued] about the conditions of fighting and their assessment, so that he who chances upon it of the [Sult n's] noble commanders and the leaders of his armies [might] be guided by it. He among them who did not experience the path of war, because of the youth of his age, can be guided by its [expert] informants. [But I did not compose it for the Sult n, for] he, may God

(3) These lines are by the Arab poet al-A'sh  (d. 8/629); see Rudolf Geyer, ed., *The Diwan of al-A'sh *. (Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, Vol. VI. London : 1928), p. 46.

make fixed the basis of his state and put the fate of his heretical enemies in his grasp, has gone through the wars and experienced them and has known, by exploits and battles, their conditions and their nature (lit., news). Good luck has served him and gave him after each battle a victory; fortune accompanied him and victory did not desert him, neither while afield nor in fixed abode. And victory is not except from God, the Mighty, the Wise.

I have entitled it "The Dispelling of Woes in the Management of Wars", and I have put its materials into twenty books.⁴

(4) There follows a list of book- and chapter-titles, which has been omitted, since they appear at the head of each book and each chapter.

BOOK ONE : About caution in time of peace when the ruler resides in his capital. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One : about the maintenance of caution generally.

Those knowledgeable in military affairs and their management hold that the ruler in time of peace [and] while residing in his capital should be in [a state] of extreme caution against and protection from the enemy; for, if any enemy moves against him, he would be sufficiently prepared; and, if the enemy does not move against him, the precaution will not have been wasted. Injury rarely occurs when precaution is taken, but rather occurs with the lack of caution, with negligence and complacency. God the Almighty, exalted be His Power, ordained caution when He said, "O believers, take your precautions; then move forward in companies, or move forward all together." (4:71). And He, Exalted is He, His Power is mighty, said, "Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses that you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy." (8:60)

It is related that the Prophet, the Blessing of God and His Benediction upon him, said, "Resolution is suspicion."¹ Of 'Antarat al-Fawāris it is recounted that he was asked about [the reason for] the great number of his victories in his wars and the lack of success of his enemies against him. He said, "I never disbelieved any report about my enemy, and I did not sleep except with caution about him."²

Generally, one must be suspicious of one's enemy, in every condition taking one's caution against him; exaggerating his condition to one's self; being ready for him with that which is beyond his power. Verily, if one has prepared for him [an amount] greater than [necessary] against him, and then found his power small, this does not injure one; and, if one found his [power] great, one would have prepared for him what is sufficient for him or more than is sufficient for him. Thus one gains mastery over him by preparedness; and victory is from God.

It has been said that one must not feel secure about one's enemy though he be far from one, nor should one advance carelessly to meet him should he approach one. Yet there should be no postponement of

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- (1) This saying of the Prophet could not be discovered in the relevant literature.
 (2) The bibliography appended to the article "'Antara'", *EI*, 2nd ed., p. 521 f., was exhausted without discovering the origin of this story; nor was it to be found in any of the standard editions of *Sirat Antar*; see article and bibliography "'Sirat 'Antar'", *EI*, 2nd ed., pp. 518-520.

meeting him, when his intention towards one is ascertained. Verily, he who neglects doing so at the right time, so that it (i.e. the right time) passes, would have wasted resolution. If fear enters one's spirit, exposing one's affair[s] to possible regret, the opportunity rarely repeats itself when [once] it has been wasted. Resolution means that one is prepared for the affair before its eventuality, so that one finds [resolution] when it is needed.

Chapter Two : is about precaution through the use of the walls and trenches of cities and fortresses, and the erection of mirrors in high places for observation [of the enemy].

As for walls and trenches: kings continued in every age to fortify cities and fortresses and citadels with high walls and encircling trenches filled with water. It is obvious what there is in this of great benefit for defense while undergoing siege, should the enemy storm the city or fortress unexpectedly. It has been maintained in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* that the Prophet had a trench dug around al-Madīnah on the day of *al-aḥzāb*, "the clans", and he participated in its digging.³ Had there not been in this complete benefit, then the Prophet would not have done it.

It has been seen in the long period of history that many cities and fortresses were attacked by great armies and were subjected to severe siege, but to no avail. The kings of the Age of Ignorance, *al-Jāhil'iyah*, were always aware of this and applied to [the art of fortification] the utmost application. Thus it is said that the walls of Antākiyah (Antioch) in the lands of the North (Syria) enclosed the city and its citadel; and its interior contained five mountains, so that there was nothing outside it higher than anything inside it, [no point] from which the enemy could prevail against it.⁴

- (3) Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (8 vols; Cairo: 1916), vol. V, pp. 187-89; Muḥammad b. Ismā'il al-Bukhārī, *Al-ṣaḥīḥ* (24 vols; Cairo : 1933), vol. XII, p. 128 f. Additional material on the trench around al-Madīnah will be found in Wensinck *Conc*, vol. II, p. 82 and in the article "Khandak", *EI*, vol. II, p. 899. *Sūrah XXXIII* of the Qur'ān is called "al-Aḥzāb" and speaks of this trench.
- (4) This is a somewhat misleading statement. The walls of Antioch went along the crests of the hills outside the city, rising to the highest point on Mount Silpius, on which the citadel of the city was perched. There were five main and many postern gates. The lower defenses of the city faced the Orontes and at one point merged with a fortified bridge over the river. E. S. Bouchier, *A Short History of Antioch*, (Oxford: 1912), p. 4, says: "Four mountains were partially enclosed by the walls, all of them off-shoots of the Casian range"; and in his discussion of Antioch, Guy Le Strange, *Palestine Under the Muslims* (London: 1890), pp. 366-77, mentions four hills within the city.

Dalūkah, known as *al-ʿAjūz*, “the Old Woman”, who ruled Egypt after the Pharaoh, *farʿun*, God curse him, [built] in the lands of Egypt a wall of unburnt bricks, extending over all of it : from al-ʿArish to Aswān, from the eastern side and the western side along the slope of a mountain [range]. She put castles along it and a watch tower for every three miles in which she set watchers who could hear one another. Thus, if on the side of one of them a single person made a movement, one would hear [of it] from the others until the news reached the palace of the queen, notifying her in the quickest and shortest time. The ruins of this wall remain until now in the eastern and western mountains and are called “the Wall of the Old Woman”, *ḥāʾiṭ al-ʿAjūz*.⁵

The wall of Cairo, when it was first built, was constructed of unbaked bricks. The palace of the Caliph [was] in the middle of it, in the [present] location of the Ṣālihiyah *madrāsah* and what is around it. But this [particular] wall was not a [salutary] fortification because it was built upon a low place. When al-Sultān Salāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf b. Ayyūb, may God the Exalted have compassion on him, ruled the lands of Egypt, he built the citadel of Cairo, *Qalʿat al-Jabal*, on a raised site, surrounding it and Cairo (the Fāṭimid city), and Miṣr (those parts of the city outside

The long stretches of wall were difficult to maintain adequately, and the city could be taken on its river side, if the enemy sent diversionary parties up along the walls or attacked any number of its gates simultaneously. For the Crusaders' tactics in capturing the city, see Steven Runciman. *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge: 1951-54), vol. I, pp. 213-235, most particularly the plan of Antioch on page 214 and Plate III, opposite page 220, showing the city from across the Orontes.

- (5) The original source for this story was probably Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, *Kitāb futūḥ miṣr*; see *Le Livre de la Conquête de l’Égypte*, ed. Henri Massé (Cairo: 1914), p. 24. It was repeated by al-Masʿūdī, *Les Prairies d’Or*, ed. and tr. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille (9 vols; Paris: 1861-77), vol. II, p. 398 f. He adds the words (tr. p. 398) :

“On voit aujourd’hui, en 332 de l’hégire, les ruines de cette muraille, qui est nommée Hait el-adjouz (mur de la vieille).”

But when al-Maqrizī, a contemporary of our author, comes to report the story, he makes no mention of any of the ruins. As for its extent, he says, “... s’étendait des frontières des Zings à l’Ifriqiya, aux Oasis et à la Nubie.” *Al-khiṭaṭ* ed. Gaston Wiet (Mémoires de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, Tome 46; Cairo: 1922). p. 60 f. and Makrizi, *Description Topographique et Historique de l’Égypte*, tr. U. Bouriant (Mémoires de la Mission Archéologique Française du Caire, Tome 17; Paris: 1895), p. 410.

All sources report that she accomplished this task in six months. She is a mythical character who is thought to have reigned sometime before the Greek conquest of Egypt.

the Fāṭimid wall, particularly Fuṣṭat), all of them, with a wall of stone. The ruins of the first wall remain until today, near the Bāb al-Ḥadid and other places.⁶

As for the erection of mirrors in high places for observation: the kings [of the era before Islām] were very particular about this in the cities along the frontiers, *al-thughūr*. Thus when Alexander built Alexandria, he erected in it a tall lighthouse, four hundred cubits in height and placed on its summit a mirror of [many] facets. If a man looked into it, he would see the region which is opposite to it, such as the islands of the sea, and [he would see] what is carried on in them of the building of ships and other things, thus ensuring preparedness against them.⁷

Matters other than these concerning preparedness engaged the attention of kings in the past. God, the Exalted, knows best.

Chapter Three : about the seeking of intelligence about the enemy in order that one might be prepared for him.

There is no doubt that seeking information about the enemy is among the most important and profitable of affairs. One learns by this the condition of one's enemy, and whether his intention is [to move] against one or to desist from doing so; so that one will know what his situation is. Hence, for the gathering of intelligence, when the quick arrival of reports is sought, there are methods.

(6) For an exhaustive discussion of the walls of Cairo, see K.A.G. Creswell, *Muslim Architecture of Egypt* (Oxford: 1952), vol. I, pp. 23-33 and 160-217; and for the plan of the caliphal palace, *ibid.*, pp. 33 ff. He translates *labin* as either "sun-dried bricks" (p. 21) or "mud bricks" (p. 31).

That part of the original walls survived until our author's day (the beginning of the 9th/15th century), cf. Creswell, *loc. cit.*:

"... fragments of Gawhar's wall existed in al-Maqrīzī's day, and the last surviving piece was destroyed in 803/1400-1".

Though Creswell notes the evidence of Nāṣir-i Khusraw that the brick wall of Jawhar had disappeared by the time of his visit to Cairo in 439/1047 (p. 118), he thinks al-Maqrīzī's word is valid (p. 181, note 5). He discusses, too, the extent of Saladin's work on the walls (pp. 182ff.), but finds that the Fāṭimid *wazīr*, Badr al-Jamālī (d. 487/1094), had already begun the splendid stone walls and gates which Saladin was to complete (pp. 160-217 *passim*).

A note that the ruins of Jawhar's wall were extant around the Bāb al-Ḥadid (the site of Cairo's present railway terminal) was added in the margin of *Yā'* in a hand rather like the scribe's. This note adds veracity to al-Maqrīzī's statement, *supra*, and gives the lie to Nāṣir-i Khusraw's.

(7) For a thorough coverage of the Arabic literature on the question of the lighthouse, see M. Asin Palacios, "Una descripción nueva del Faro de Alejandria",

The quickest of these is the kindling of fires on the summits of mountains; for, if something happened in an extremity of the kingdom, such as the movement of the enemy and similar matters, and there were high mountains: then, if it happened at night, fire [signals] can be lighted on the summit of a high mountain; while by daylight smoke signals can be sent from the top of one mountain to the one which comes after it. This is repeated until [the information] reaches the place for which it is intended.

In the beginning of the Turkish rule (i.e. of the Mamlûks), when war broke out between the rulers of the Egyptian lands and the Tatars (Tartars), men were stationed on the summits of mountains, paid for this work by arrangements with the Sultân (i.e. paid from his privy purse), and [concentrated] along a line from the Euphrates to Ghazzah. If any movement of the Tatars was noticed, the fire would be kindled and they would make smoke [signals], and this [information] would be relayed from the Euphrates to Ghazzah in the shortest time. Thus it would be known, generally, that an incident had occurred. Then pigeons would be sent from Ghazzah to Egypt. News of this event would be known in one day. The achievement of peace between the Tatars and the rulers of the Egyptian lands obviated this [mode of communication] and its [various] components fell into desuetude.⁸

Al-Andalus, I (1933), pp. 241-300, particularly the reconstruction of the lighthouse based on these sources, pp. 293-300. For materials available subsequent to Palacios' study, see E. Lévi-Provencal, "Une description Arabe inédite du Phare d'Alexandrie", *Mélanges Maspero III* (Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, Tome 68; Cairo: 1943), pp. 161-171; and Gabriel Ferrand "Les monuments de l'Egypte au XIIe siècle d'après Abū Hamid al-Andalusī" *ibid.*, pp. 57-66. The latter source mentions that the mirror was made of "fer chinois" and could concentrate the rays of the sun on any approaching vessel and so set it afire (p. 58).

Most of the authorities agree on a height of four hundred cubits. Al-Maqrizī assigns various heights at various times, but believed that it attained a height "près de 400 coudées"; but that time, earthquakes, and rains had diminished its height considerably: *op. cit.*: text Wiet, pp. 113-125; tr. Bouriant, pp. 444-451.

- (8) Al-'Umārī, *Al-ta'rif bi a'-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf* (Cairo: 1894), pp. 199-201. Cf. M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks* (Paris: 1923), pp. 258-261; and J. Sauvaget, *La Poste aux chevaux dans l'empire des Mamelouks* (Paris: 1941), pp. 39-41. It is the conclusion of the latter that the men on the signal towers were paid by the Sultân and that they, and all personnel of the intelligence and postal services, were under his direct surveillance and were sustained by him out of his own income (p. 40 and note 178.)

Less speedy is the arrival of news by pigeon, and that is [because] the pigeon travels from only one country to another. If in one of the countries which have pigeons an incident took place, letters are written and attached to the wings of pigeons and sent off. The pigeons would seek the tower which is in their country, and arrive in the shortest time possible. But it is not possible by this method to obtain [complete] information, rather the necessity of the matter is merely noted, vital information alone being cited.

It is obvious that pigeons are among the fastest means of communication because the pigeon covers the distance of twenty days' walking in less than a day. Ibn Sa'īd recounts in his book *Ḥayā al-maḥl wa janā al-naḥl* [a story] about the *wazīr* Abū al-Faraj Ya'qūb b. Killis, the *wazīr* of al-'Azīz, one of the Fāṭimid Caliphs. Al-'Azīz said to him, "I have never seen Ba'albak cherries and I would like to see them." The *wazīr* had pigeons from Damascus and in Damascus were pigeons from Egypt. The *wazīr* wrote a message and dispatched it by one of the pigeons to Damascus. He ordered them in Damascus to attach to each wing of the Egyptian pigeon berries of Ba'albak cherries. The pigeon arrived with this [message] and they attached the berries to the wings of the bird, immediately, as he had instructed them and they headed it towards Egypt. The *wazīr*, upon its arrival, went up to the Caliph with [the cherries] on the same day that he ordered them. This astonished him greatly.⁹ But perhaps the pigeons took more than this time in passing [over] this distance.

The author of *al-Rawḍ al-Mi'ṭār fī Khabar al-Aqṭār* relates that pigeons used to be sent from Egypt to Baṣrah, and it is further than Baghdād to the East: a distance of more than twenty days.¹⁰ Ibn Sa'īd also relates

(9) This is part of a lost work of Ibn Sa'īd, and is not listed in either H. Kh. or *GAL*. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, quoting al-Qalqashandī, reports the story exactly as it appears here, *op. cit.*, p. 252 and note 3.

(10) The author of this work is listed in H. Kh., v. I, III, p. 490, number 9557, as Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥimyārī. But his death is given as happening in the year 900/1494-5, which would be impossible as a source for our author. Lévi-Provençal believes that this was a mistake on the part of Flügel and that it should read 700/1300-1. However, he believes that the author might have been a certain Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Sinhājī al-Ḥimyārī who died in 776/1374. Al-Ḥimyārī, *La Péninsule Ibérique au Moyen-Age d'après le kitāb ar-rawḍ al-mi'ṭār fī khabar al-aqṭār*, ed. and tr. E. Lévi-Provençal (Leiden: 1938), pp. xiii-xviii. It was from this same work that he published the extract about the Alexandria lighthouse, *supra*.

Though nothing but the materials on Spain and Portugal and the bit about

in his book *al-Mughrib fī Akhbār al-Maghrib* that the *wazīr* al-Yazūri al-Maghribī, the *wazīr* of al-Mustanşir al-Fāṭimī, the Caliph of Egypt, dispatched pigeons from the city of Tūnis in Ifrīqiyyah of the regions of the Maghrib. They went to Egypt.¹¹ Reliance for all these stories is upon them (i.e. the authors cited).

The pigeon towers in the kingdom of the Egyptian regions at that time extended from the Citadel in Cairo to Qūs, and to Aswān and ‘Aydhāb, and to Alexandria and Dimyāt and Suways (Suez) on the Pilgrimage route; and likewise to Damascus and Ḥalab and the rest of the administrative districts, *al-niyābāt*.¹² That this method had value in speeding the dispatch of news is quite clear to a thoughtful person.

Less swift [than pigeons] in the dispatching of news is the postal relay, *al-barīd*. It is the one which conveys lengthy written dispatches and detailed information. The *barīd* reduces twenty days’ distance to three days, an example of which is reducing the distance from Damascus to Egypt to this period. Perhaps it took more time than this, for some of the relays have gone from Ḥalab to Egypt in four days. The *barīd* had been in existence even in the time of the Kosroes’, the kings of Persia, and the Caesars, the rulers of Rūm, for they appreciated its importance.

Then, in [the period of] Islām, Mu‘āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, one of the Companions of the Prophet, established it in the days of his caliphate, and it remained after that into the days of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs and the Umayyad Caliphs, continuing uninterruptedly [for some time] and was suspended in other [times] as conditions dictated. Assigned to it were mules with docked tails, as a sign that they be known [and treated accordingly] as mules of the *barīd*. The rulers of Islām in most of the [Islāmic] regions maintained this system except the Zankids, the rulers of Syria, and the Ayyūbids, rulers of Egypt, in that they chose excellent swift camels for this [service]. The situation continued thus until their regime disappeared and the Turkish regime (i.e. the Mamlūks) took over.

the lighthouse have been published from this work, the piece of information reported by our author is repeated by al-Qalqashandī and reported by Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *op. cit.*, p. 251 f.

- (11) *Ibid.*, p. 253, where, on the basis of al-Qalqashandī’s account, the name is given as ‘Bazouri’. That it is ‘Yazūri’, see article ‘Yazūri’, *EL*, vol. IV, p. 1172 f. Cf. *GAL*, I, p. 410 f. for MSS.
- (12) Al-‘Umari, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-199. For the routes of the pigeon post and of optical signals, see Sauvaget, *op. cit.*, p. 36-39, particularly fig. 6. For other pigeon-stations see Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *op. cit.*, p. 253 f.

When al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, may God have mercy upon him, established his authority and had united the lands of Egypt and Syria and Ḥalab up to the Euphrates for himself, he wanted information of the kingdom to reach him continuously. He established the *barīd* in the Egyptian lands and the Syrian regions. Relay centers stretched from the "well-guarded Citadel" (of Cairo) to Alexandria and to Dimyāṭ and to Qūs; then from Qūs the dromedaries were ridden to Aswān and 'Aydhāb. Relay centers were stretched also from the Citadel to the rest of the Syrian possessions until it was connected with the Euphrates.¹³ Of that which is established and known [concerning this system], there is no need to mention [such material] here.

Less speedy than [the *barīd*] are couriers. They are ones who speed on foot and travel by circuitous routes, *al-mulaṭṭafāt*, when it is difficult for the *barīd* to reach a certain part. This [service] is one of the most important facilities of the Sulṭānate and the most difficult. Ibn al Athīr has reported in his history that the first of the rulers to employ couriers was Mu'izz al Dawlah b. Buwayh, the first of the Daylamite rulers of Baghdād, [sometime] after 330 A.H. The reason was that he was in Baghdād and his brother, Rukn al-Dawlah, was in Iṣfahān, and Mu'izz al-Dawlah wanted his brother to have quick knowledge of recent events. So he organized a courier service. In his days two couriers grew up whose skill had reached [a point] where each of them could run in a day more than forty *farsakhs*.¹⁴

Slower than [couriers] are informers and spies. [This service] is of all the slowest [in the dispatch] of information in that they have to seek information and follow up its traces. I will speak of this [in more detail] in Book Two, God willing.

(13) The fullest discussion of the subject of the *barīd* is to be found in Sauvaget, *op. cit.*, in which the points stressed by our author are to be found. A less systematic analysis, but one which provided the impetus for Sauvaget's work, can be found in Gauderoy-Demombynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-249. These works are in turn based for the most part on the relevant sections of al-'Umarī, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-196; and al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā* (14 vols; Cairo: 1922), vol. XIV, pp. 371-404, who discusses all phases of the Mamlūk postal and intelligence systems.

(14) Ibn al-Athīr, *Chronicon*, ed. Tornberg (13 vols; Leiden: 1851-83), vol VIII, p. 425. The swift couriers were named Faḍl and Mar'ūsh, and the people of Baghdād became partisan about these two champions; one was the hero of the Sunnis, the other of the Shi'ites.

BOOK TWO : about agents and spies and what is pertinent in this [matter]. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One : about the qualifications which agents and spies should possess.

Spies should conform to [certain] conditions whose fulfilment is necessary. Among them are: that his counsel and veracity be trusted, for, if he be suspected in his [general] advising and be sent to the enemy, his information will not be useful, even though it is truthful; because, though he reports exactly, he will be suspected about it; thus one cannot rely on his word. The counsel will be unavailing for this reason. If he were insincere he would cause harm to his dispatcher because he would be an informer against him rather for him.

That he be a master of unerring conjecture, a keen judge, possessed of excellent insight in order to perceive by [mere] observation with the fullness of his intellect and the soundness of his conjecture the conditions [obtaining among] his enemy, and what the enemy avoided in conversation, deducing some matters from others. If he employs insight in a certain matter, and then another supporting conclusion becomes apparent to him, the former matter becomes strengthened in his opinion and he believes it by having one conclusion fortified by another.

That he be well-endowed with shrewdness and perspicacity and craftiness; for, by his shrewdness, he can attain all ends, and by his cunning, he can penetrate all entrances. He achieves his goal by any method available to him. For, were he deficient in these qualities, perhaps the enemy might discover him or he might [have to] return without having achieved his goal.

That he be well-traveled and thoroughly acquainted with the countries to which he is dispatched so that he need not ask questions about them and their people. For, if he asked questions, the enemy may become aware of him [and the purpose of his presence]. This will be the reason for his perishing. Or perhaps he might be tortured, and reveal the condition of his dispatcher. Then he would become an informer against him after having been an informer for him.

That he be conversant with the language of the people of the country to which he is dispatched, for he may pick up some of the talk of those whom he hears among the enemy having intercourse with him. But he should not be of the same race as the enemy. Verily, race inclines

towards race by nature, and the affair could be disastrous for the dispatcher.

That he be patient about that which perhaps incurs punishment for him, in case the enemy seizes him, so that he would not reveal the conditions of his dispatcher and indicate a weakness in him or in his army; [for not even this could] protect him from the hand of his enemy or defend him against [the enemy's] ill-treatment.

If one finds among spies and informers he who fulfills these conditions, he would be worthy to be sent on missions to, and for the gathering of information about, [one's] enemies.

Chapter Two : about what is necessary [by way of] honoring agents and spies and capturing their hearts.

The ruler and commander of the army, if he employs an agent or a spy, should evidence affection and sincerity towards him, honor him with gifts, promise him rewards, and shower favors upon him on every occasion before indicating need of him for [a mission]; increase his honors while he is dispatched on important missions; and take care of his family by benefactions in his presence and his absence. In this way one possesses his heart and eases his mind, and he will not notice the meanness of his position and the smallness of his power, if he be lowly, because the matter with which he is involved is great.

If the person whom one sends to the enemy should be condemned to death or should the enemy seize him, one should honor those whom he leaves behind of his family and treat them, by way of benefaction, as one would have treated him had he returned, as an incentive to giving good advice. Should it happen that [an agent] returns without having accomplished his aim, and if he were one of those whose word was trustworthy, do not display to him one's disquiet and do not criticise him for this or upbraid him; but accord him fairness and treat him honorably. Verily, if he does not accomplish anything for one on this occasion, he will accomplish it on another.

Chapter Three : about what one should do in the management of one's agents and spies.

As regards the commander of the army: no one of his army should be acquainted with any of his spies. Verily, this is among that which assists the spreading of information and its discovery. But if he can

avoid having an intermediary between himself and one of his spies, he should do so; and if he cannot, then for each one of [the spies] he must detail one of his personal retinue, *khawāṣṣ*, to conduct [the spy] to him alone.

And [the commander of the army] must also guard against his spies being acquainted with one another; for, if they know one another, they might consult about an affair, arrange it [in their own favor], and thus report it. When they return, they might reach an agreement to help the enemy and incline towards him; which is the opposite of the case if they do not know one another. For then each one of them submits a report individually, and the true and the untrue will appear by the circumstances of the case, [wherein] the defection of some to the enemy is not like the defection of all.

He must pay heed to what each of his spies and agents brings him, though their reports vary, and adopt the most cautious [course of action] of those upon which his judgment is brought to bear. He should not consider their divergence a fault in any one of them; [for], though their reports have varied, each one of them is truthful in what he says, because each one of them has observed something different from that observed by another and heard something other than he heard.

Should [the commander of the army] happen upon a flaw in one of his trustworthy and reliable spies, [he should] conceal it from him, and should not seek requittance of it from him or upbraid him, unless he see in reproof an advantage. Then he should reprove [the spy] in private, remonstrating with him about this in easy concourse. Verily, this is the best means towards his correction.

If the spy presents himself before [the commander of the army] to inform him about the enemy, the latter should display self-possession and continued calm without manifesting to the one who brings the report any [particular] joy at what he has presented to him of news about his enemy, or any delight in the report; yet not in such a manner as would make him appear light-hearted about [the news]. Nor should he display any inattentiveness which might cause him to miss the essence of the advice. He should not display to his spy any displeasure at what he has imparted to him of disagreeable news. For [the correct demeanor] calls for the concealment of secrets from [one's spies], [secrets related] to disquieting reports [and whose discovery] might lead to harm.

It is related of a king that he used to be more bountiful towards those who brought him disagreeable news than to those who brought him good news, saying. "He who brings me the disagreeable matter awakens me to my advantage." Know that the commander of the army is not able to protect his army from the spies of his enemy; so he must take precaution against them by concealing secrets as much as possible.¹

(1) For the treatment of spies, see Mājid Khaddūri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: 1955), p. 107 f.

BOOK THREE : about envoys and what is specified about the characteristics of a well-qualified one, and that which he who strays from correct procedure deserves. In it are two chapters.

Chapter one : about their qualifications.

The wise men, the commentators on the conduct of rulers, have mentioned that the envoy of the ruler must be sagacious of intellect, sound of body, clear-sighted about affairs [of state], aware of conditions, and apt in the usages of words. Ardashir b. Babak, one of the kings of Persia, used to say, "How much blood the envoy has shed without justification; how many armies have been routed as [a result of] this and the greater part of them slaughtered; how many forbidden actions have been committed and property plundered and pledges broken because of the perfidy of the envoy, and the lies reported by him!"¹

In the envoy of the ruler [certain] conditions must be fulfilled. Among them are: that he be truthful and not too covetous. It has been recounted that Alexander dispatched an envoy to one of the kings of the East. He returned with a message. Alexander doubted a word in it. He said to [the envoy], "Woe to you! Verily, kings are not devoid of those who would set them straight if they deviate. You have brought me a message exact in wording and clear in meaning. Yet I discover in it a word which changes its [meaning]. Are you certain of this word, or do you doubt it?" The envoy said, "But I am certain that he said it."

Alexander ordered that the words be written letter by letter and returned to the king by another envoy, so that it would be read and translated to him. When the letter was read to the king, he came across this word and denied it. He said to the interpreter, "Put my hand on this word", and he put it. He ordered a mark [to be put there] and it was placed on [the offending word]. This king wrote to Alexander a letter, saying in it, "Verily, the veracity of the language of the envoy is the foundation of the kingdom; for it is by his tongue that [the ruler] expresses himself; and it is to his ear that [responses] are confided."

When the envoy returned to Alexander, he summoned the first envoy and said, "What led you [to use] a word by which you aimed at the discord of two kingdoms?" He replied that he had done this

(1) This is an exact repetition of the lines in al-Jāhiz, *Kitāb al-tāj*, ed. Ahmed Zaki Pasha (Cairo: 1914), p. 122 and tr. Charles Pellat, *Le Livre de la Couronne* (Paris: 1954), p. 142.

because the king had not given him his due. Alexander said to him, "I see that you had acted for yourself, not for us. When that for which you hoped, but did not deserve from the person to whom you were sent, escaped you, you made this [a cause] of a feud which you wanted to raise in important and lofty spirits." Then he ordered that his tongue be pulled out from behind.²

That he be bold and daring; for should he be cowardly, [his cowardice] will prevent his taking bad news to the ruler to whom he had been dispatched, in fear and dread of him. Among the best [examples] which have been handed down about this [qualification of an envoy] concerns Mu'āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, one of the Companions of the Prophet. During his Caliphate he sent an envoy to the king of Rūm and offered him the blood-wit of two men, *diyyat rajulayn*, if he would, when he had given the message to the king and concluded his discourse with him, raise his voice in the *adhān* in front of him.

When [the envoy] arrived at the court and had given the message, he raised his voice in the *adhān* in front of him. The "patricians", *al-baṭāriqah*, rose to slay him, but the king forbade them. He said, "This is not of his [doing], but of Mu'āwiyah's; for he wants this envoy to be killed, so that he can slay all of the Christians enjoying security, *al-musta'minīn*, in the lands of Islam and demolish all the churches therein." Thereupon he showed honor to the envoy and sent him back to Mu'āwiyah. When he had returned to Mu'āwiyah, the latter saw him and laughed. He told [Mu'āwiyah] the news and reported what the king of Rūm had said. [Mu'āwiyah] said, "By God, I did not wish other than what he said."³

That he be well-versed in the proprieties of address and response: [skill in] address because, if he be well-versed in its proprieties, he can say the right thing in the right [place and time] and can establish the case [of his master] against the one to whom he is dispatched. An example of this is recounted of the Prophet when he sent Diḥyah al-Kalbī, may God be pleased with him, to Heraclius, king of Rūm, [then] in Syria. He said to Heraclius, "I beseech thee, by God, do you know that Christ used to pray?" [Heraclius] said, "Yes." Diḥyah said, "I ask you then to whom did Christ pray?" Notice the convincing speech whose argument is conclusive, for the Christians believed that Christ

(2) *Ibid* : text, p. 123; tr., p. 143 f.

(3) The source of this story could not be discovered.

is God. But God does not pray to other than Himself, and only the servant prays. When [Dihyah] made him admit the praying of Christ, he forced him to admit that Christ, upon whom be peace, was the servant of God.⁴

[Skill in] reply, for, if he be well-versed in its proprieties and a question were put to him, he can reply to it with that which refutes the opponent and checks him. An example of this is recounted of Khātib b. Abī Balta'ah, may God be pleased with him, when the Prophet sent him to al-Muqawqis, ruler of Egypt. [The latter] asked him about the fortune of the Prophet in battle, and whether he had defeated his people (i.e. the tribe of Quraysh) or had they defeated him. He replied that the war between him and them was a draw, [victory] sometimes to him and sometimes to them. Al-Muqawqis said to him, "The Prophet defeated !"; and Khātib said to him "God crucified !" Al-Muqawqis became silent. This was because al-Muqawqis desired to set up a strong argument against Khātib b. Abī Balta'ah [by indicating] that [the Prophet] might be defeated in war, and such a thing, in his opinion, is not worthy of a Prophet. Khātib b. Abī Balta'ah controverted him by the fact that the Christians asserted that Christ was a God and they say that the Jews killed him and crucified him and this is among that which is not consonant with the dignity of God. For, if he were God, as they assert, the Jews could not have had mastery over him by killing and crucifying, according to their assertion.⁵

If the envoy of the ruler fulfils these conditions and that which is intended by them, he would be worthy to be sent on important missions and to carry correspondence between rulers. When one of these conditions is unfulfilled in him, he must not be employed at all as an envoy.

- (4) This story and the following one about the envoy to al-Muqawqis do not appear in any of the standard accounts of the envoys dispatched by the Prophet in the year 6/628-9. In his translation of the *Sirah*, Guillaume substituted al-Ṭabarī's account of the deputations for the part omitted by Ibn Hishām. Alfred Guillaume, *The Life of Muḥammad* (London : 1955), pp. 652-59 and note 3, p. 653.

In the bibliography appended to the article "Dihya". *EI*, vol. I, p. 973 f., two corrections should be noted. The first entry after "Ṭabarī" should be changed from "i. 1755 et seq." to "i. 1560 et seq.". The entry for Ibn Ḥajar should be changed from "no. 2378" to "no. 2386". The latter source places the meeting between Dihyah and Heraclius at Hims. Ibn Ḥajar, *Kitāb al-isābah fī tamyiz al-shihābah* (8 vols; Cairo: 1853-1907), vol. II, no. 2386.

Further references to this and the following deputation will be found in Muḥammad Hamidullah, *Corpus des traités et lettres diplomatiques de l'Islam à l'époque du Prophète et des Khalīfes Orthodoxes* (Paris: 1935), numbers 14-16 and 37-40.

- (5) See article "Al-Mukawkas", *EI*, vol. III, pp. 712-715 and note 4. *supra*.

Chapter Two : about the management of the affair of the envoys and what should be relied upon in their affair.

The commentators on the conduct of rulers said of the ruler that he should examine his envoy a long time before dispatching him on an embassy so that he knows the truth of his character. Then he would be certain concerning him; he can rely on him about that which he sends him. It used to be the practice of the kings of Persia in by-gone days that, if they desired the dispatching of a person on an important mission, they first gave him an examination by sending him to one of the special officers of the king, *khawāṣṣ al-malik*, one who was [in] an established [part] of his realm, on some important matter. Then he set on him an informer [to report] on that which he had sent him, but without his being aware [of it]. If the envoy accomplished his mission and returned with its results, the king would question the one whom he had sent in [the envoy's] tracks about his appraisal of [the mission]. If the latter's report tallies with that which the words of the other conveyed to him, he became privileged with the king because he would be an envoy for him to [other] rulers.⁶

Ardāshir b. Bābak, one of the kings of Persia, used to speak about the cunning ruler. If he sent an envoy to a king, he was followed by another. If he dispatched two envoys, he dispatched two others after them. If possible, he would not group his envoys on the same road. To be cunning [the ruler] must, when the envoy brings him a message or letter which has in it good or ill about which he is suspicious, do nothing about it until he sends another envoy to the sender with the [sender's] letter or message, letter by letter, meaning by meaning. For it may be that the [original] envoy missed some of that which had been conveyed to him and had fabricated the writing and changed what had been related to him orally, instigating by this [action] the sender against the recipient, and this results in a strong dissension; as has been related in the story of Alexander in the first chapter of this book.

(6) Al-Jāhiz *op. cit.*; text, p. 122; tr., p. 142 f.

BOOK FOUR : about deception and stratagems which obviate war.
In it are three chapters.

Chapter One : about the instigation of deception in war and the stratagems [to be used] in it.

There is no disputing that deception and stratagems in war are required by law and by reason. As for law : it has been cited in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*, according to the *ḥadīth* of Abū Hurayrah and Jābir b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Anṣārī, may God be pleased with them, that the Prophet said, “War is deception.”¹

As for reason: there is no disagreement among men of intelligence that victories which have occurred through excellence of stratagem and grace of ingenuity, with the self safe and the armies preserved and with no expenditure of effort, are the best, more salutary and higher in value and degree; because he who goes out to engage the enemy and engage [his] cavalry in duels, even if Victory helped him and Conquest accompanied him, then in his dangerous adventures involving hateful calamities and the biting of swords and the pain of wounds and the severity of wars and the contention of warriors is the extreme of hardship and the limit of peril, for he does not know whether the victory, after the hazarding of these hardships, will be to him or to his enemy.

Among the best of what is recounted about this matter concerns al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, may God the Almighty have mercy on him. In the latter part of his reign, after the peace with the Tatars (Tartars), he used to treat them kindly, maintaining relations with them and bestowing gifts, both large and small, upon them so that he even used to give [presents] to old women in their houses; [thus] breaking discord and quenching the fire of war. One day he heard some of his personal retinue. *khāṣṣakiyah*, conversing together. Some were saying to others that the Sultān gave gifts to the Tatars out of fear of them. He upbraided them and said, “That which I bestow upon the Tatars, all of it, does not equal the cost of the shoes of your horses when going out to do battle against them.” They submitted t his opinion and admitted the truth in this [matter].²

(1) Wensinck *Conc*, vol. II, p. 12; Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 143 and al-Bukhārī, *op. cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 32 f.

(2) This story does not appear in any of the Mamlūk sources, not even the rather full account of his life by al-Malik al-Nāṣir’s personal friend, the prince-historian

Chapter Two : about the manner of [working] stratagems and deceits.

This [matter], though it is [a subject which] a book cannot [fully] investigate, yet the basis of it is politics, *al-siyāsah*, and the apparent capture of hearts and the exercise of thought [in devising stratagems] for breaking up the ranks of the enemy and instigating differences among them and the “leaping” of some upon others through the most cunning of stratagems, the best of deceptions; and to act in each situation in accordance with what reason dictates.

Among the best of the opportunities in this [matter] is to perpetrate [among] the enemy [various] machinations and [thereby] bring about misfortunes. [Another is to] correspond with [the enemy’s] chiefs about that which will incline their hearts and their minds and bring about their [possible] disaffection of obedience to their commander by promising every reward to them, encouraging their hopes for attaining every desire; [promising them] pardon and forgiveness for their transgressions if they lean towards one [after] forsaking their commander and repairing to one’s side; to extend security to all who ask it from among them, encouraging them in every way encouragement dictates, letting them know that if they remain in opposition until one is victorious over them, one will visit upon them the strongest chastisement and disgrace and contempt. Then one calls upon them to rise against their commander if they can, or to secede from him or fly from him if they do not have any power to leap upon him.

Among that which they (i.e. those learned in the usages of war) found useful in this [matter] is that letters be written to some of them (i.e. the enemy) as though in answer to letters sent by them to one’s self and that the letters be written in their tongues. These letters are then thrown in places where it is expected that they will reach their

Abū al-Fidā, *Kitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī akhbār al-baṣhar* (4 vols; Cairo: 1907), vol. IV, pp. 41-134 *passim*. On his accomplishment of peace with the Mongols after their crushing defeat by the Mamlūks at Marj al-Saffār in 702/1303 and during the remainder of his reign, see Gustav Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen* (5 vols; Mannheim and Stuttgart: 1846-62), vol. IV, pp. 299-312 *passim*; and Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar* (7 vols; Cairo 1867), vol. V, pp. 430-32.

Zetterstéen calls him “a better diplomat than soldier”; that he sustained successful diplomatic relations with both of the main branches of Mongol hegemony in the West, viz., the Golden Horde on the Volga and the Il-Khāns in Persia, was no small achievement: article “Al-Malik al-Nāṣir”, *EI*, vol. III, pp. 864-66.

For an analysis of the *Khāṣṣakiyah*, see David Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army, I”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XV, pt. 2 (1953), pp. 213-216. He translates the term as “bodyguard, select retinue, pages.”

chief. Thus, if their chief notices some of these letters, his thought will be aroused against them, placing them, in his [eyes], under the pall of suspicion. This, then, will be a reason for the dividing off of their counsel, and the separation of their company and the changing of their minds about their chief or the changing of his mind about them. If he should leap upon one of them, or kill him, or spill his blood, fear of the chief would possess them and alarm grip them, prompting them to flight from their leader to one's [side]. But should their leader be careful and patient, certainly disquietude would remain in the soul of any one of them.

Chapter Three : about the citation of interesting cases of deception and stratagems which were employed by people [conversant with] the management of wars.

[The subject of] this book is one of those without limit. [Examples] of it [drawn from] the books of histories and the biographies of the kings in the Age of Ignorance, *al-Jāhiliyah*, and [in the period of the dominance of] Islām would fill registers to overflowing.

Among the best and most salutary of these occurrences, with respect to origin, is what Ibn Ishāq relates in his *maghāzī* about the Prophet on the day of *al-Aḥzāb*, "the Confederates". The Quraysh and the *banū* Ghatafān left Mecca and its surroundings and went to Medina, the Ennobled, in order to do battle with him. The *banū* Qurayzah, the Jews of Medina, had agreed to fight him [in their company]. Their hemming in and besieging of the Muslims was in accordance with what God reported in His saying, "When they came against you from above you and from below you, and when your eyes swerved and your hearts reached your throats." (33:10)

While the Prophet was in this [condition], lo ! Nu'aym b. Mas'ūd, one of the *banū* Ghatafān, came to him and said, "O Messenger of God ! I have become a Muslim, but my family do not know about me." The Messenger of God said to him, "Go and convince those whom you can to forsake [going into action] against us. Verily, war is deception." Nu'aym b. Mas'ūd went out until he came to the *banū* Qurayzah, the Jews of Medina. He had been their boon companion in the Age of Ignorance. He said to them, "You know my friendship towards you and I am a sincere advisor to you. The Quraysh and Ghatafān have come from their city to do battle against Muḥammad and his Companions, and you have agreed with them to fight him. But it is

you who dwell in this city, in it are your wealth, your women, and your sons; while their wealth and their women and their sons are far off. If they see an opportunity they will make the most of it. [But if things go badly] they will go back to their own land and leave you to face the man in your country and you will not be able to do so [alone]. Thus do not do battle against [Muḥammad and his Companions] until you take hostages from their chiefs who will remain in your hands [as security that they will fight Muḥammad with you until you make an end of him].” They said, “You are sharp of opinion.”

Then he departed to the Quraysh and the Ghaṭafān and said, “You know my affection for you and that I have left Muḥammad. I have brought you good counsel, but regard it as confidential. The *banū Qurayzah* have regretted opposing Muḥammad and have agreed with him against you and promised him that they would take from among you a hostage of your chiefs and would deliver them to him so that he might kill them. So do not deliver to them a single man from among you.”

When the Quraysh and Ghaṭafān sent to the *banū Qurayzah* asking them for assistance, the latter requested of them the hostage of some of their men. When [the Quraysh and Ghaṭafān] heard this from them, they said “Nu‘aym b. Mas‘ūd was correct in what he said.” They refused to give them hostages. Thus a breach was occasioned amongst them. They were routed and victory was to the Messenger of God and his Companions.³

Al-Jāhiz recounts in one of his works that Bahrām Gūr, one of the kings of Persia, upon succeeding his father, Yazdagurd, had some of his frontier areas conquered by the enemy. He feigned inattention in the affair of the enemy and lightness towards it until the power of the enemy became strong and marched against him. The ministers assembled and discussed the matter with Bahrām Gūr. “Leave him be,” he said, “I am more aware of his weakness than you.”

When the enemy had entered his realm, [the ministers] entered unto him to inform him of the event. When he understood what they had come about, he took two hundred of his slave girls, appareled them in crowns and beautifully dyed cloths, and made each of them ride a stick, *al-qaṣabah*. And he also wore a dyed garment and rode a stick. He went out thus [arrayed], with the slave girls singing in front of him,

(3) Guillaume, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-60 Ibn Ishāq’s account is fuller, but the main facts and the motive are identical.

and he also was singing with them. When the ministers and the great men of the State saw him, they despaired of him and left him and went away angry.

He entered immediately after into his apartments and shaved his head and dressed in woolen cloth and waited until nightfall. With his bow and arrows he departed and reached the area adjacent to the scouting party of the enemy. He lay in a place above the road. He was an expert shot, so that there did not pass a bird in the sky or a wild animal in the brush at which he did not take aim and hit, until there gathered to him a great amount of quarry.

While he was so engaged, the general commanding the scouting party of the enemy passed him. He noticed the catch and its number astonished him. He said to [Bahrām Gūr], "Who are you ?" He said to him, "If you grant me security, I'll tell you." [The general] said, "You have security". He said, "I am a page, *ghulām*, a groom, *sā'is al-khayl*. My lord was angry with me and pulled off my garment and shaved my head and dressed me in this garment and starved me, after he had been good to me. I profited by his carelessness and [am now out] to seek something to hunt and eat. This has so engaged me that I shot this quarry with all of the arrows which were with me."

The general of the scouting party seized him and carried him to his ruler and related to him the story. [The ruler] said to [Bahrām Gūr], "Shoot before me." He shot and his arrows would fall in any part of the game the ruler designated. The ruler was amazed by this and his astonishment increased. He said to him, "Is there in this kingdom any who can shoot as well as you ?" [Bahrām Gūr] laughed and said, "O king ! I am among the weakest in shooting." The ruler said to him, "Your king is ignorant. Doesn't he know that I have approached his realm?" [Bahrām Gūr] laughed and said, "If the king grant me security I will counsel him." He said, "I have granted you security." [Bahrām Gūr] said, "Our king allowed this, despising you and in contempt of your affair, so that you will proceed further into his country until you cannot avoid his grasp. He has one hundred thousand archers, all of them finer shots than I." When the ruler heard this speech of Bahrām, he said, "You have counselled well." He commanded the general of his army to prepare for returning to his country.

Bahrām returned to his capital by night. When it dawned, he sat [in public audience] for the people. His ministers and the great men of his State entered unto him. He questioned them about news of the

enemy. They informed him of the [enemy's] departure. He laughed and told them the story.⁴

Al-Jāḥiẓ also related that Kisrā Abruwīz, one of the Kings of Persia, dispatched one of his *amīrs* to engage the King of Rūm in battle. He rebelled against him and fled to the King of Rūm and incited him against Abruwīz. The King of Rūm set out to fight Abruwīz with four thousand [men]. When this [news] reached Abruwīz, he resorted to a letter, which he wrote to the *amīr* who had rebelled against him, in the land of Rūm, saying in it, "When this my letter reaches you, burn the lands of Rūm, and you and I will rule Rūm on such and such a day." He bore a hole in a stick and placed this letter in the hollow of it and summoned a Christian, who was his prisoner and who had evinced affection for [Abruwīz]. He revealed to him the matter of the letter which was in the stick and handed the stick to him, saying, "Go to my *amīr* So-and-so in the land of Rūm and give him this stick and tell him about the letter which is in it."

The Christian departed and came to the lands of Rūm. He heard upwards of ten thousand [church] clappers striking. The ardor of Christianity seized him and he inclined towards his religion. He came to the King of Rūm and asked permission [to enter] unto him. Permission was granted him and he presented this stick to [the King] and told him of the letter. He drew it out and read it. Distressed by it, he turned against this *amīr* who had defected to him from the side of Abruwīz, and he swore that if his eye fell upon him he would kill him in the most awful manner. When this reached the *amīr*, he fled to save himself, and the King of Rūm returned to his realm. Upon hearing this news, Abruwīz, the ruler of Persia, said, "A word which routed four thousand men ! Its power is great indeed."⁵

When there was war between the people of Syria and al-ʿIrāq at Ṣiffīn, and the war had lengthened between them, the people of al-ʿIrāq were about to defeat the others, and success and victory and conquest loomed for them. The people of Syria knew that they were surrounded by them and prepared themselves for the [inevitable] rout.

(4) Al-Jāḥiẓ, *op. cit.* : text p. 177 f.; tr., p. 143 f.

(5) Al-Jāḥiẓ, *op. cit.* : text, pp. 180-85; tr., pp. 196-202.

Then some of the people of Syria quickly raised the pages [of the Qur'ān] aloft on spears. Difference of opinion broke out among the people of al-'Irāq because of this; some of them saying, "We will fight them", and others saying, "We will not fight those who raise to us the pages [of the Qur'ān]." By this [action] the fire of war was quenched and this is the reason for the victory of the people of Syria over the people of al-'Irāq.

The stories about this [matter] are numerous; their citation would lengthen [this discussion].

BOOK FIVE : about consultation in the matter of war. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the inducement to seek consultation about war.

There is no disputing that consultation about the matter [of war] itself is desirable. It has been related that the Prophet said, "He does not fail who seeks light from God, and he does not regret who seeks advice."¹ There is no doubt that in war it is most necessary. God had ordered the Prophet about this [matter], though he was the most gifted of men in intelligence and the purest of heart among them. He said, exalted be the Sayer, "Hadst thou been harsh and hard of heart, they would have scattered from about thee. So pardon them, and pray forgiveness for them, and take counsel with them in the affair." (3:159) Many of the commentators hold that what is meant by this is consultation about wars.

It is recounted of the Prophet that he often sought counsel about his wars. Ibn Ishāq relates in his *Sīrah* that when the Prophet arrived at Badr in order to meet the Quraysh and fight them, al-Ḥubāb b. al-Mundhir said to him, "O Messenger of God ! Is this a place which God has ordered you to occupy, so that we can neither advance nor withdraw from it, or is it a matter of opinion and war and strategy ?" The Prophet said, "It is a matter of opinion and war and strategy." [Al-Ḥubāb] said, "This is not a place to stop. Rouse the men so that they will go on until we come to the water nearest the enemy and we will alight there. Then we will stop up that which is behind us of *qulūb*, (that is, the wells). And we will construct at [that point] a cistern and we will fill it with water. Then we will fight them, for we will be able to drink and they will not be able to drink." The Messenger of God said, "You are right of opinion." Then the Messenger of God roused those men with him. He marched until he arrived at the water nearest to the enemy and alighted there. He then ordered the wells [behind them to be stopped up]. He built a cistern over the well at which he had alighted. He fought [the Quraysh] and victory was to the Muslims as God had reported in His saying, "And God most surely helped you at Badr, when you were utterly abject." (2:11)²

Al-Wāqidī relates in his *Maghāzī* that when the Prophet alighted

(1) Al-Suyūṭī, *Mukhtaṣar sharḥ al-jāmi' al-ṣaghīr* (2 vols; Cairo: 1954), vol. II, p. 245.

(2) Guillaume, *op. cit.*, p. 296 f.

at Khaybar, [in order] to invest it, he stopped among the palm trees near the fort. Al-Ḥubāb b. al-Mundhir said to him again, "O Messenger of God ! If you alight here and if it be by an order [from God], command it and we will not dispute; but if it be by opinion, then we will dispute [it]." The Prophet said, "It is by opinion." [Al-Ḥubāb] said, "O Messenger of God! You draw nigh the forts and alight among the palm trees. The arrows of the enemy will reach us quicker because of [the enemy's] height in their forts. Since I do not trust their night raiding against us, through which they can enter the shelter of palms, shift, O Messenger of God, to a place free of swamps and pestilence. Thus we place the stony tract of land between them and us so that their arrows cannot reach us and we will be secure from their night raiding and free of the swamps."

The Messenger of God said, "You are sharp of opinion." Then he summoned Muḥammad b. Musrūq and said, "Look for a place removed from their forts which is free of pestilence and in which we will be secure from their night raiding." This he did and the victory was again to the Prophet.³

Chapter Two : about the correct procedure, *ādāb*, of consultation about war.

The experts in the matter of wars have stated that matters consulted upon be of two types. First : that the matter to be consulted upon be such that its manifesting is advisable [when solicited] and whose dissemination is not undesirable, such as consultation about the matter of the apparent enemy who [is to be] faced by design. The most important aspect is that the advice of the men of intelligence and learning be presented. One of the learned had been asked, "Which things are the strongest support to the ruler and which are the most harmful to him ?" He said, "The strongest support to him [comes from doing] three things : consulting the experts, his becoming experienced in affairs, and his being thoroughly briefed [about any matter at hand]; and the strongest in harm comes upon him from three things: stubbornness of opinion without [seeking] advice, neglect [of affairs] and

(3) J. Wellhausen, *Muhammad in Medina*, tr. of al-Wāqidi's *Kitāb al-maghāzī* (Berlin: 1882), pp. 267 f. and 273 f. Later the Prophet ordered this palm grove leveled, but was dissuaded by Abū Bakr after four hundred trees had been felled; article "Khaibar", *EI*, vol. II, p. 869 f. The fort was called al-Natāḥ.

precipitancy [in acting upon them].”

It was said to a man of the *banū* ‘Abs, “How often you are in the right !” He said, “We are one thousand men and among us is one decisive person. We consult him and we become as though we were one thousand decisive men. If proper judgment does not appear to him in the opinions of great men [of the tribe], he seeks the opinion and the consultation of all the highest and the lowest [in the tribe]; for [true] opinion may be found where its discovery is not thought possible.”

Al-Ḥasan said, “The Prophet used to consult even the women. Should [one of them] demonstrate to him [the truth] of a thing, he accepted it, saying, “The decisive of men ceases not consulting those sound of opinion, even the foolish slave girl.”⁴ How marvellous is the person who said :

Despise not what is soundly sufficient

Thought uttered by the roundly deficient.⁵

Second : that the matter consulted about be one whose divulging is not advisable, such as : if the consultation be about a secret [matter] which requires concealment from the people, exclusive of one’s special retinue, *al khāṣṣah* — for example, intending to raid the enemy in their lands suddenly, etc; one imparts it privately to the persons whom one chooses from among one’s special retinue and advisors, and one’s blood relations whom one trusts.

If one chooses one single person, one does not inform others about the matter. It has been related that one of the kings of India consulted his *wazīrs* about a matter. One of them said to him, “May God lead the king aright ! Verily, in the maintaining of secrets is the gaining of desire and safety from disorder. For this, our secret, two tongues and four ears only are suitable.” — that is, the consultants be two. The king took him aside and talked to him privately.

Should one desire to consult a group of one’s special retinue about [a matter], one should consult each of them privately, without informing him that one has revealed the matter to any one else. This assures the concealing of the matter and prevents its divulging; for each of them will be wary of revealing it; thus causing its [controlled] dif-

(4) This saying of the Prophet could not be discovered in the relevant literature.

(5) The source of this line of poetry could not be found.

fusion for it is his belief that no one else knows it.⁶

If the revelation of this secret be not advisable, or [it is not prudent] to consult any one at all, because of the gravity of the matter, the proper procedure is to compare it with its analog from [past] affairs and gauge it by the correspondences [thus discovered]; and harken to that which occurs in the speech of the people about this [matter] without revealing [one's] motive in listening. It has been related that al-Manṣūr b. Abī 'Āmir, the ruler of al-Andalus (Spain), in one of his raids, entered the lands of the infidels of al-Andalus and penetrated deeply into them. Winter closed in upon him and the enemy surrounded him and he feared the destruction of himself and the Muslims. He went disguised among his army and encountered two men playing chess and beside them another man. One of the players said, "Checkmate ! as al-Manṣūr b. Abī 'Āmir is checkmated." The man beside them said, "He is not checkmated, and neither is al-Manṣūr b. Abī 'Āmir." He continued watching the person supposed to be beaten until he won.

Al-Manṣūr came before [the one who had passed the latter remark] and the man did not recognize him. He said, "You have said that he wasn't checkmated and your words were true and that al-Manṣūr b. Abī 'Āmir was not checkmated. What is the method of his deliverance ?" The man said to him, "The method for this is for him to cut trees and collect stones, making it apparent that this place is the most wonderful for settling and that he intends to remain in it, to build and cultivate and not to depart from it. If the enemy hears this, he will not like [al-Manṣūr's] being neighbor to him. He will vacate the road [for al-Manṣūr's retreat] and open the mountain passes so that he can leave." Al-Manṣūr left him and returned to his royal abode [within the camp] and afterwards sent for this man. When he came before him, [al-Manṣūr] made himself known to him and said, "Have you any opinion other than the one you reported to me [beside the chess game] ?" The man said, "No." So al-Manṣūr did as he had been advised. When [his actions] reached the enemy, it troubled him and he feared to have al-Manṣūr settle as his neighbor. So he opened the passes for him and his road [of retreat] became clear and al-Manṣūr departed safely.⁷

(6) For a discussion of the same type of discretion and checking on those privy to a royal secret, see al-Jāhīz, *op. cit.*: text, p. 94 f.; tr., p. 119 f.

(7) Ibn al-Athīr records this ruse but without any reference to a chess game, *op. cit.* vol. VIII, p. 498 f. Dozy recounts the story from a Christian source and again without any mention of a chess-game, but with details missing from Ibn al-Athīr's account :

BOOK SIX: about the qualification[s] of the general of the army and those of his troops and how he should handle them. In it are four chapters.

Chapter One : about the qualifications of the general of the army.

The experts in the matter of war and trained in its affairs said the general of the army must be perfect of intelligence, strong of heart, full of courage, greatly vigilant, very cautious, strong in resolution; perceptive about the rules of wars and the occurrence of opportunities in them, aware of stratagems and deceptions and tricks [practiced] in them; informed about the management of armies and the organization of troops; experienced [with regard to] roads and watered places and water sources, and the conditions of way-stations and camping grounds, and the times during which marching and camping are proper; painstaking about the maintenance of morale among his soldiers; disinclined

“Once, for instance, [Al-Manṣūr] penetrated a hostile region through a narrow defile between two lofty mountains; and although his troops ravaged and pillaged in all directions the Christians did not venture to resist them. Upon retracing his steps, however, Almanzor (al-Manṣūr) found the pass occupied by the enemy. As it was impossible for the Moslems to force it, their position was hazardous; but their General instantly conceived a bold design. After selecting a place suitable for his project, he caused sheds and huts to be erected, and ordered a number of prisoners to be decapitated and a rampart to be constructed with their bodies. Then, after his cavalry had scoured the country without finding provender, he collected instruments of husbandry and set the soldiers to work at tilling the ground. Greatly perturbed at operations which seemed to imply that the Moslems had no intention of quitting the country, the Christians proposed peace on condition that the enemy would abandon their booty. But Almanzor rejected the proposal: “My soldiers,” he replied, “prefer to remain where they are: they recognize that it is scarcely worth their while to return home, for the next campaign will begin almost immediately.” After further negotiations the Christians ultimately agreed to allow Almanzor to depart with his booty, and their dread of him was such that they even undertook to provide him with beasts of burden to carry it, to supply him with provisions as far as the frontier, and to remove the corpses which obstructed the route of his army.”

Reinhart Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, tr. F.G. Stokes (London: 1913), p. 524 f. The source is Rodrigo Ximenez de Toledo's *Historia Arabum*, which is appended to Thomas Erpennius' *Historia Saracenicæ* (Leiden: 1625). The latter work is a translation of extracts from the chronicle of al-Makīn (Jirjis b. al-ʿAmīd).

to give battle through favoring stratagems whenever possible; prepared in the science of the various stages of battle and the investment of fortresses and of repulsing [such] investment; patient about the [possible] lengthening of battle and of siege; capable about retreat after the accomplishment of the purpose [of the campaign].

In addition to these [qualifications] he should be knowledgeable about horses and their brands and their apparatus and the superintending of their needs; of the types of weapons, of that which is preferable among them and that which is suitable to be donned among their types at any given moment in war. [All this is] beside being noble of conduct, pure of heart, clean of soul, good intentioned, generous in bestowing bounty, cheerful whenever [bounty] is asked of him, preferring forgiveness to punishment, and forbearing in retaliation. If he makes a promise, he must fulfil it; if he says a thing, he must do it. If he makes a treaty of peace, he must carry out [its provisions] and adhere to it. If he exchanges [a pledge] of security, he must abide by it within the keeping of the law, the maintenance of pride and the manifestation of prestige.

If he satisfies all these qualifications and that which is intended by them, he is worthy of the command of the troops, [and of being] entrusted with the affairs of the armies and of war.¹

(1) Cf. Khaddūri, *op. cit.*, p. 87 f.:

“The duties of the special command are included in the general and may be summarized as follows :

1. The leading of the army, including taking care of individual warriors, the inspection of horses and equipment.
2. The conducting of fighting and the encouragement of the army in fighting.
3. Application of military skills and techniques, in accordance with the Prophet's saying that “war is trickery”, so as to protect the army from sudden attack and to win victory. The commander has also to choose the best possible strategic position for attack.
4. Observation of military duties such as patience and perseverance in fighting the enemy, and to see that no jihādīst deserts the army. The jihādīsts, on the other hand, are under obligation to obey the commander's orders and to accept his decisions in cases of personal conflict.

The general command includes the foregoing duties together with a mandate to negotiate and sign peace treaties and direct division of the spoils of war.”

Chapter Two: about the qualities of the troops [in general] and of the men of the army in the cavalry and infantry who are suitable for meeting the enemy and engaging him in battle.

It is required of one of the army who seeks to go out to meet the enemy and engage him in battle that he be brave, dauntless, trained in the art of war, familiar with its affairs, greatly patient with [being] distant [from home] and with the hardships of marching, [capable of] withstanding dangers without anxiety or annoyance or slacking or negligence; being, in addition to this, strongly attached to the person he is serving, counselling him, painstaking in assisting him, preferring his life to one's own life, attending to that which he needs by way of service, giving him his due service, obeying him to the extent of his power and his capability.

And, too, he should be knowledgeable of horses and their apparatus and of some parts of the blacksmith's [trade], so that he can put a nail in the hoof should one fall in the road, and [be capable of] repairing that which needs repair of the apparatus of his horse and of his weapon when necessity calls for such actions. If he be a cavalryman, he should be trained in riding horses and in their movements in war, and in what the cavalryman needs [to know] at the time of meeting [the enemy] with regard to facing and engaging in combat and constancy should he be in need of them; and of wheeling around in battle and feinting when necessity bids them;² and of evasion and renewed attack when need invites them.

If he be an infantryman, he should not mind long marches, and be aware of the positions of attack and [how to find] cover from it, and of mutual affliction of harm by infantries, and of the chasing of cavalry, and of [how to] check them, and of [how to] scatter horses and startle them and other than these of the affairs incumbent upon the cavalryman and the infantryman.

(2) This is the classic Arab mode of fighting, fashionable in pre-Islamic Arabic, called "karr wa farr" :

"... a sudden attack by the full strength of the army on the enemy followed by a quick retreat. This was repeated during the battle and it often inflicted damage and confusion in the enemy ranks while the Muslim forces remained intact. In these operations the cavalry usually played a more important role, for they were quicker and more effective." *Ibid.*, p. 92.

Chapter Three : about the knowledge which the commander of the army should have about his officers.

The men of experience in wars said that the commander of the army should know those whom he can of his officers and his army one by one, each in his particularity, and of what type of warfare he is expert, and what is particular to him of courage and cowardice and the rest of his qualities; and that he should know [a variety of] types of courageous men and what distinguishes each of them in his courage. For among them is the courageous person [who is] the steadfast one, the persevering in his post, determined against his adversary. Among them is the courageous [person who] attacks and withdraws, he who retires and then returns [to battle]. Among them is the courageous [one] who roves among his opponents, the one who does not choose a specific adversary but who seizes an opportunity when it presents itself. Among them is the one who excels in battle as a cavalryman, and the one who excels in battle as an infantryman, and the one who excels in thrusting the lance, and the one who excels in shooting arrows. And among them is the cowardly, who imitates the courageous in their external apparel; and the cowardly who is obviously cowardly, and other than these of the qualities of courage and cowardice.

Thus the commander, if he knows each one of these in his qualifications, will put him in his [proper] position in battle and will establish him where his position will be most appropriate; producing from him the desired result. If he be a coward, [the commander of the army] will dismiss him from any of the battle stations and deflect him from them; for, if he did not know his condition as to courage and cowardice, he would not know where to place him or in which post to put him.

And, along with these [considerations], it is incumbent upon [the commander of the army] to know the qualities of the rest of the people of his army and the possessors of the offices, *arbāb waẓā'if*, of his state, *dawlah*, and what each one of them possesses of high virtues, so that each be appointed to that for which he is [best] fitted and be placed in a position which is proper to him. And he should know the possessor of sound opinion among the highly-placed of his state, *arbāh dawlatihi*, making him the nearest of people to him and the most privy of them to him. Verily, [correct] opinion is the strongest benefit in the affair of wars; it is even preferable to courage. Suffice it to quote Ibn Abi Tammām al-Ṭā'i :

The men of opinion, not those of courage,
are finer :
Their place is prime; the others' place
is minor.³

It is told of Muhallab b. Abī Šufrah, the *shaykh* of wars and their *imām*, that a man of the people of his army, named Bayhas, departed from it. [Muhallab] said, "It does not please me that there be in my army one thousand courageous [men], should Bayhas desert me." He was told that [Bayhas] was not of the highest rank in courage, and he replied, "Yes, but he is strong of resolve, clear of intelligence. Were a thousand courageous men in his place, I would not feel safe about them."⁴

Chapter Four : about the method [of control] to be exercised by [the commander of the army over] his army and of the management of his troops and how he should handle them.

The first [thing] that he must do in this [matter] is to place each one of them in his [proper] place, directing [him] to a station fitted to him, rendering him his just due of honors, acquainting himself with the importance of what he has done of that which is expected of [the man's] peers. Then [he should] reward the benefactor for his benefaction, and punish the evil-doer for his mischief, and forgive the lapse of one who seeks to be cleared of guilt. He should lead his army and his followers in comradeship and helpfulness and mutual assistance, extracting rancor from their breasts and drawing bitterness from their hearts. For, verily, good relations are most conducive to victory and [bring one] closer to the attainment of an objective.

And [the commander of the army] should prevent any of [his men] from molesting any who pass by [the army] of the people of obedience

(3) This line is not by Abū Tammām, but by al-Mutanabbī, *Diwān* (4 vols; Cairo: 1936), vol. IV, p. 174.

(4) This Bayhas was most probably the Khārijite Bayhas b. Šuhayb, whom Muhallab encountered during his successful campaign against Nāfi' b. al-Azraq in 65/685. The source of the story is al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, ed. W. Wright (3 vols; Leipzig: 1864-81), vol. I, p. 673. But our text has "yaghibu" whereas Wright has opted for "badala", in the meaning of "in exchange for" or as "a substitute for". This is more sensible, for it simply means that Bayhas, obviously fighting on the Khārijite side, was the equal in al-Muhallab's eyes of one thousand courageous men in his own ranks.

and submission [to the ruler], and from stretching hands to a thing of their property, and from molesting their women. And he should promise them recompense for that which they [would otherwise] have obtained from their enemy, if they triumph over him.

If one among them should commit an offense, he should be held responsible for it and have meted out to him the equal of what this offense enjoins. Among [such treasonable acts] are indicating to the enemy the weak points of one's companions-in-arms or informing him of their concealment; for, verily, the one who does this is an enemy in reality, because he provides the enemy with that by which he can prevail over one's companions; and he would have conveyed to the enemy what [the enemy] would not have obtained except for him.

Among them are [acts] deserving punishment such as hiding the captive so that he escapes or describing one's companions in terms of [their] weakness, or betraying the men [while engaged] against the enemy, or advancing with [the enemy]. For the one who undertakes such actions is weakening the army and alarming the hearts of the men.

And among them are acts deserving chiding and reproach, such as delaying one's arrival on the day of battle without excuse, or being apprised of a report about the enemy and not forwarding it to the commander of the army. For the delay of a report by one hour may result in a year's disaster.

And among them are acts demanding reproof, such as, having been entrusted with something of the activities of the battle, to be remiss about it, or to be remiss about one's formation without excuse, or describing the enemy as powerful, and such like.

And among them are acts requiring drawing the [special] attention [of the commander of the army] to them, such as one's travelling along any but one's [appointed] path or standing in any but one's own post, or camping in any but one's [proper] area.

To sum up : these [matters] are entrusted to the judgment of the commander of the army; where prudence deems action necessary, he acts; and where it advises non-action, he complies. For each case, there is a rule special to it.

BOOK SEVEN : about the explanation of when it is necessary to encounter the enemy and do battle against him. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about what [must be done] if the army is strong and the enemy is weak.

Under these circumstances, opposing the enemy, being prepared for him, and raiding him in his own country are necessary. God had commanded His Prophet to fight the unbelievers and treat them roughly, when He said, exalted be His power, "Struggle with the unbelievers and the hypocrites, and be thou harsh with them." (9:73) And He ordained engaging those of the unbelievers who were near neighbors of the Muslims when He said, exalted be the Sayer, "Find the unbelievers who are near you; let them find in you a harshness." (9:123)

The 'ulama' have said that the least that has been enjoined of raiding of this type is once each year.¹ The Prophet went forth to fight, *ghazā*, twenty-eight times and conquered most of the country of the Arabs before his death, may God have mercy upon him and grant him peace. Abū Bakr, the Trustworthy, *al-ṣiddīq*, may God have mercy upon him, fought after him, in his caliphate, the people of apostacy, *al-riddah*, who turned away [from Islām] after the Prophet's death, and refused to pay the *zakāt*. He said, "Were they to refuse a poor tax (*ʿiqāl*) which they used to give to the Messenger of God, I would fight them for it."² He conquered Buṣrā (Bosra) in the land of Syria in his caliphate, and it was the first city to be conquered in the land of Syria.

After him, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, may God have mercy on him, conquered Damascus and the rest of the land of Syria, and beyond this to the East until his conquests reached to Khurāsān and the lands adjacent to it. And, likewise, in his reign some of the cities of Syria and Egypt and Barqah and other places were conquered. In the

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- (1) For an analysis of war as a legal institution of Muslim society, see Khaddūri, *op. cit.*, p. 51-82. But one misses in this discussion any clear-cut distinction between *jihād*, which required the initiation of the call by an orthodox caliph, and *ghazw*, systematic raiding into the areas adjacent to the *dār al-Islām*. It is after the Saljuq expansion into Anatolia that one witnesses the prominence of the *ghāzī* over the *mujāhid*, or, more accurately the merging of the two concepts. Cf. Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: 1938).
- (2) Al-Balādhurī, *Kitāb futūh al-buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: 1866), p. 94; and tr. Philip K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Islamic State* (New York: 1916), p. 143 and note 1.

caliphate of 'Uthman, may God have mercy upon him, Kirmān and Sijistān and Fārs and Ṭabaristān to the East were conquered; and, to the West, Ifriqiyah, that is, the land of Tūnis; and Cyprus among the islands of the sea.

Mu'āwiyah in his reign raided Constantinople, the capital of the king of Rūm, and put it under heavy siege. After this, the raids of the Caliphs and their conquests succeeded one another in the days of the Ummayyad power and in that of the 'Abbāsids following it. It is even said of al-Mu'taṣim, one of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphs, that he heard a noble lady being tortured by the lord of 'Amūriyah (Amorium), in the lands of Rūm. The woman shouted, "O Mu'taṣim !" The lord of 'Amūriyah said to her, "Al-Mu'taṣim cannot accomplish your deliverance except on a piebald horse, *ablaq*." [Al-Mu'taṣim] directed his army to ride piebald horses, *bulq*. He set out to liberate her, and in the vanguard of his army [alone] there were four thousand piebald horses. He rescued her and returned [to his lands].³

- (3) This is a variation on the famous story of the storming of 'Amūriyah by al-Mu'taṣim in 223/837-38, after the Byzantines had captured and razed the fortress city of Zibaṭrah on the upper Euphrates. Abū Tammām celebrated the event in his famous *qaṣidah* rhyming in *ba'* on this campaign, see *infra*. The most complete bibliography on the event can be found in al-Ṭabarī, *The Reign of al-Mu'taṣim* (833-842), tr. and annotated by Elma Marin (American Oriental Series, Volume 35; New Haven: 1951), pp. 58-76 and note 293 for the relevant sources for the female captive calling out to the Caliph for help.

The novelty in the present account is the appeal to the piebald horses. Most of the sources simply say that al-Mu'taṣim mounted a *dābbah* and dragged behind him an iron shackle, ostensibly for the Byzantine emperor Theophilus. Lane, vol. I, p. 253, explains *balāq* and *bulqah* as "blackness and whiteness together [generally in horses] or the extension of whiteness in the hind-legs of a horse as high as the thighs ... any color with which white is mixed"; and *ablaq* as "applied to a horse ... black and white ... or white in the hind legs as high as the thighs." Mercier, p. 90, translating Ibn Hudhayl, gives another possibility:

"Si les balzanes dépassent ce point pour atteindre les avantbras et les crisses, le cheval est qualifié *ablaq musarwel* (pie culotté) soit balzanes haut chaussées ou cheval pie, selon les cas."

For an example of a white-footed mount, see the horse ridden by the Ottoman Sulṭān Sulyaman in C. Blochet, *Musulman Painting* (London: 1929), plate CLXXXIII and accompanying text.

In the margin of *Ya'* is a line from Abū Tammām's *qaṣidah*:

Zibaṭrah's call I hear
And sleep no more;
And kiss no maid
On lips so moist, so near.

Likewise the great conquests of the kings of Egypt continued [the above trend]. The Victor, al-Malik Salāh ad-Dīn Yūsuf b. Ayyūb, may God have mercy upon him, [and] his brother, al-ʿAdil, conquered those portions of Syria which the Franks had conquered, namely, Jerusalem and the coast land and Anṭakīyah,⁴ and, too, some of the regions of the Euphrates. Then the Franks conquered some of these again until the Turkish rulers (i.e. the Mamlūks) retrieved them from [the Franks] by the continuous warfare of al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars and others [after him] until finally [the Franks] were ousted from the coastlands of Syria by the hand of al-Ashraf b. Qalāʾūn in the year 690 (1291 A.D.).

Chapter Two : about what [must be done] if the army is weak and the enemy strong.

Under these circumstances, procrastination and the absence of haste in meeting the enemy and the eschewing of presenting one's self to him are necessary should he appear; using in this case stratagems and tricks and deception whenever possible. Confronting him at the very outset, while he is in this condition [of strength] is not permissible. To do so is comparable to one's stirring a serpent from its lair [while] one is unarmed, in order to oppose and defeat it; thus presenting one's self to peril and courting death by one's own hand. Some of the learned have said, "By delaying the battle, [you] do that which benefits you"; and others say this means "as long as you are on the safe side."

In general, the one seeking to do battle against the enemy should not move to engage him, but should accept safety and peace as long as they are granted to one. The Prophet said, "Don't seek to encounter the enemy; rather ask safety of God. They [can] conquer just as you can conquer."⁵ If you have met them, stand fast. One should not become disgusted at the procrastination of one's enemy, for in the interval of waiting is the grasping of [possible] advantage and acquiring knowledge of the enemy's circumstances and [that which has been] concealed of their affairs; and one does not seek victory by engaging

Abū Tammām, *Diwān*, ed. Muhammad ʿAbduh ʿAzzām (Cairo: 1951); vol. I, p. 67.

(4) Neither Saladin nor Al-ʿAdil took Antioch. It fell finally to Baybars in 666/1268.

(5) Al-Suyūṭī, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 355.

him so long as victory can be attained through stratagems. For going out against the enemy involves exposing one's self to danger, and the endangering of one's wealth, and being distant from [one's] country, even if only to the frontiers of it. Considering what may be in this going-forth of expectation of the perishing of self and the courting of dangers and the bearing of afflictions, it may be that stratagems can do that which battle cannot, as has been mentioned in the chapter on deception and stratagems.

And one should devote most of one's energies to bringing one's enemy into obedience and submission to one, to the end that this will be preferable to one rather than booty. Verily, the greatest booty, according to those possessing intelligence, is the submission of the enemy and his entering into obedience. Should this occur, [one's] aim has been accomplished. For if nothing were gained by obedience but security of self and property, one should cease killing and shedding blood [as soon as] one is able, if one trusts one's enemy in this [matter]. There is no profit in killing those in obedience. Perhaps someone saved from killing will become of assistance to one after having been of assistance against one.⁶

(6) Cf. Khaddūri *op. cit.*, pp. 96-101 on the invitation to enter into obedience to Muslim rulers and the usefulness of negotiations.

BOOK EIGHT : about the scouting party and the organization of its activities and what these [activities] encompass. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the nature of the scouting party and a description of its horses and men.

As for the scouting party (*al-ṭalī'ah*; pl. *al-ṭalā'i'* : used interchangeably) : it is defined as a cavalry group which precedes the army for the collection and discovery of information [about the enemy]. It is so called because of its advanced gathering, *iṭlā'*, of news of the enemy. And it is also called "*al-kashshāfah*", because of its discovering, *kashf*, of news [about the enemy].

As for its men : it is said that it is necessary to choose for the scouting party men of counsel and courage and wise in the experiences (affairs) of wars. For when victory is achieved by the scouting party, it is victory for the army as a whole; and, too, the men of the army rejoice if victory has fallen to the scouting party. It is necessary, too, to place over the scouting party a general, *al-muqaddam*, to whom they have recourse and at whose word they stand fast (obey), [else] confusion will confound them, and the interest [they seek] would escape them.

As for their horses : it is necessary that their horses be race-horses, sound of back, securely shod; and there be not among them a stubborn one, nor one that is sexually restive. The purpose of the scouting party is the swift dispatch of news and should there be [in the party] a stubborn or sexually restive horse, or one of like qualities, the purpose of the scouting party will not be achieved.

Chapter Two : about the regulations pertaining to the scouting party and what is encompassed by these.

The first of that which must be adhered to in the matter of the scouting party is that none of them should have a breast-plate (or coat of mail), or shield; and that in the quiver of each there should be twenty arrows, or nearly that number. There should not be with any of them anything which might encumber him at all; because this [thing] might prevent the speedy [dispatch] of the news, and it has been pointed out that the speedy [dispatch] of the news is the purpose of [the scouting party].

It is preferable that their advance be over level ground in which, if possible, there is no dust; because [the dust] will catch the attention of the enemy. Should the matter entail ascending to a high place of a mountain or something akin to it, some should ascend while the others remain on level ground.

And the scouting party in the expedition should not proceed further than two thirds of the distance between them (i.e. the army's encampment) and the enemy. Nor should they hasten to the vicinity of the enemy or stray too far towards their side. Rather their scouting should proceed easily and with [frequent] pauses to scout right and left.

If the enemy should evidence rout at the hands of the scouting party, the [latter] should not follow him; for there might be [in the place to which the scouting party has followed the supposedly routed enemy] an ambush which would be sprung against them, particularly if the rout of the enemy's scouting party happened in a place other than the vicinity of the enemy's [main] forces: for example, when the enemy is located to the south, and his scouting party flees in another direction. In most cases, such a thing is not done by the scouting party of the enemy except to spring an ambush against [the army's scouting party] in the direction (i.e., of the enemy's fleeing scouts). This is among that which has overtaken many scouting parties and caution must be taken against it.

Further, if the scouting party were but a single horseman, he reconnoiters and reports back. If there were two, one remains [to continue] investigating and the other reports back. Or if there were three, one carries back the information and two remain to complete the investigation. If there were more than this, the general of the scouting party details some of them to carry back the report and [others] to remain to reconnoiter, in accordance with his estimate [of the situation].

The one who returns with the report from the scouting party must be intelligent and truthful. If he returns and arrives where he can see [whether] the army is encamped or marching, he should reduce the galloping of his horse gradually until he reaches the army and enters it calmly. He should inform the commander of the army about what he saw and should not reveal this to any other person.

It is necessary that there be between the commander and the one who brings the report a signal (sign, token, code) by which the commander of the army would understand the news [when] the publicizing of the news is not advisable. It is told of the Prophet that he sent [a

party] to discover the situation of the *banū Qurayzah*. He said, "If you see something favorable [to us], reveal it; if you find something unfavorable, speak enigmatically, [and] I will understand; but don't weaken the ranks of the Muslims"; meaning don't inform them of anything which might upset them (prove harmful to them).¹

Likewise, it is necessary for the one carrying the news, should some obstacle occur between him and the army, which has shifted [its position] or some other change [has occurred], that there be [pre-arranged] signs between him and the commander of the army, by which the contents of his message will be understood, such as : the camping of the enemy or his marching, the greatness or smallness of his numbers. Thus the man's alighting from his horse is a sign of the enemy's camping; and walking to one side is a sign of the [enemy's] marching in that direction; and galloping his horse is a sign of a raid (predatory incursion) by the enemy, etc.

(1) Guillaume, *op. cit.*, p. 453 and note 1.

BOOK NINE : about the explanation of [matters] which require cautiousness when departing and of what must be done in the circumstances of travelling (marching). In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about cautiousness while in the process of departing.

Those experienced in the affairs of wars said that the commander of the army should not permit any one of his entire army to depart until after its mobilization; its organization; the mounting of the cavalry and the donning of their coats of mail, *lāmat al-ḥarb*; and the assignment by the general of the army, charged with its mobilization and organization, of his men to the various divisions of the army with their arms and provisions. When they accomplish this, the men begin loading and departing, while the horses surround them on every side; until, having finished, they march at the time after the commander of the army has notified each *amīr* or *qā'id*, of the *amīrs* (Ar. pl. *umarā'*) and *qā'ids* (Ar. pl. *quwwād*), and the generals of the various divisions, and those assigned [specific] tasks of the duties which each one of them should perform in his field, and of that which is his business, in accord with what is appropriate in each situation and with what is needed.

The circumstances concerning being on guard during departure will vary in different places and times. It is no secret that marching at night demands stronger guarding than marching during the day, and [the same] for places possessing various roads [as against] those in which there is but one road.

The commander of the army should not permit any one of the men of his army to precede the scouts of the army under any circumstances. It may be that the one who precedes will be hit, and this will be a reason for the boldness of the enemy towards the army; causing great damage which is impossible to rectify. Verily, [proper handling of] affairs is [determined] by their beginnings.

Chapter Two : about the explanation of what must be done in the circumstance of marching.

The first thing that is incumbent upon the commander of the army is to [order] his scouting party to precede the army in order to reconnoiter the enemy according to what preceded in the book before [this one]. Then, after the scouting party, he should assign a man from among those possessing bravery, with keen vision and expert about

roads, in the company of trusted men of his army; and assign [these] men for repairing roads and cutting trees and building bridges and barrages over rivers and attending to the rest of the necessary [activities] of roads. In so doing, he makes easier the passage of the army along the road, and removes fatigue when there is crowding of the army; for, perhaps [the bad road] would occasion a slackening in the march or a delay in arriving at the goal, which one desires in a fixed time.

Then, the first [group] which he advances of his army is the vanguard, *al-muqaddamah*, of the army, and it is [composed of] the cavalry which should be in the forepart of the army and the rest of the army should be behind these, in set order, back to the *sāqah*, and it is the rear [echelon] of the army. [This] will be according to an explanation which will be given of the arrangement of the ranks, God willing.

[The commander of the army] should order some of his scouts to proceed beyond the place in which his vanguard have alighted, to discover what is beyond the place, as the situation demands. Then news of this and of the alighting of the vanguard of the army should be relayed to him, so that he will be aware of these [facts] before he reaches it. Should there be any procrastination about sending him the report, or should doubt enter his mind about the situation in front of him, he should dispatch someone to investigate it, ascertain its truth, and send the report to him. If a report reaches him which upsets him, he must not appear fearful or anxious, for this would trouble the hearts of his army.

If the commander of the army should come upon a narrow place or mountain pass or river or similar things along the line [of march], he himself must pause until the army, to the very last [man] of it, has passed [safely]. If he doesn't do this, perhaps each one of them would demand precedence for himself over his fellows, and confusion will occur and disagreement among the army will be occasioned, leading to the stirring up of sedition. It was related of al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī that, when he entered the land of Rūm and conquered Qaysāriyah (Caesarea) and was returning, it was he who supervised this matter himself and paused at the narrow places and at the river fordings until the army has passed one by one.¹

(1) This took place in 675/1277. The main pass was the so-called Cilician Gates. None of the sources mentions specifically this estimable piece of military wisdom;

[The commander of the army] should entrust the rear of his army to a man of those who consult him and who would carry out his orders exactly, with a group of officers. [This man] would detain the soldiers and the *ghilmān* (sing. *ghulām* : orderlies, royal pages), preventing any of them from retiring to the rear of the army; nor would he permit one of them to tarry behind the army. For when one of them retires or remains behind the army, he might report about the army something which happened to it, which should not be revealed; or he enlarges upon it, or diminishes it, thereby increasing the confusion of the thoughts of the people.

but Mufaḍḍal b. Abi Faḍā'il gives a day by day description of Baybars' retreat from Rūm and his sense of detail in the management of his troops, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks*, ed. and tr. E. Blochet (*Patrologia Orientalis*, Volume 14; Paris: 1920), pp. 427-433.

BOOK TEN : is about the explanation of that which is necessary of precaution while camping and [the period when the army] remains in the camp. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the choosing of the site for camping.

Men of experience in the affairs of war said that the place in which the army alights must possess water and pasturage and firewood and other things upon which the [sustenance of the] army depends. And the place in which the camping occurs should be such that, should the army desire to advance [to meet] the enemy, this would be possible; and should it desire to delay [engaging] him, out of prudence, should circumstances require it --- this, too, would be possible.

[The commander of the army] should strive to place the rear [echelons] of his cohorts against mountains or hills or rivers or that which is equivalent to these, to insure against sudden incursions and ambushes and night raids on the part of the enemy. If he cannot find, behind his army, a mountain or a hill or a river or anything which will afford protection to its rear, he should post behind his army [a group of] watchers comparable to the scouting parties, observing what takes place behind [the army] so as to be secure from surprise attacks by the enemy against [his camp]. This is done because, should the enemy attempt to confront [the army while it is encamped], it ensures the men of the army's [being prepared] to march to engage him, armed to repel him with that which their resources provide of defense. But should [his attack] be upon the rear of the army, and should there be nothing there to protect the rear, perhaps the enemy will attack the army at a time of negligence about him.

Chapter Two : about the arrangement of the army in the camp and that which requires caution in [this matter].

As for the arrangement of the army in the camp : it is necessary first that the alighting of the army be according to a strict arrangement.¹ To each one of the *amīrs* and important functionaries, *arbāb al-waṣā'if*, a specific place must be assigned within the camp of the

(1) Cf. the classical Roman camp described by Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, tr. Peter Whitethorne (originally published in London in 1588; republished Albany: 1815), Book VI, *passim* and sketch of camp opposite p. 123.

A Muslim encampment and its diagrammatic explanation can be seen in Wüstenfeld's "Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner" which is the same one described and drawn in the *Nihāyat al-su'l* (note 8 Introduction *supra*).

commander of the army; for, if each officer, *ra'is*, [were assigned] a specific place, the need to consult with him could be accomplished more readily and locating him would be made easy. Were a single one of the beasts to stray, and its brand were known, its return to [its owner] would be hastened.

As for caution in [the matter of] the camp : if there is fear of an attack by the enemy, it is necessary, when each one of the army has [been assigned and] takes [his] station [within the camp], that they dig a trench around the army [camp], putting upon it two entranceways, or more if the army is a large one. Archers and cavalymen should be posted at the entranceways of the trench, ready [against any attack]. Commanders of armies in by-gone times, when they alighted for camping, used to equip the outer reach of the moat with iron-tipped poles, known now as *al-zaqāzīq*. The iron on each stave was pointed so that no matter how it was thrown on the earth one of its points projected from it. In this way, it was like a wall for the army; because, should the enemy attack it, the points entered the hooves of the horses and the feet of the infantry, impeding their movement.²

When the army has alighted [and] made camp, the commander of the army should dispatch scouts from his army by day into the roads and dangerous places and establish a cavalry group beyond his army in high places and at the narrow passes about the entranceways to the army until sunset. When night descends, others should be established in their place un'til sunrise.

[The experts] thought it desirable to post by night a cavalry group behind the troops, close by, who would raise their voices in the *tahlīl* ("There is no god but God") and the *takbīr* ("God is greatest") to awaken the army and petition victory from God. This cavalry group is called *al-darrājah*. [Other] guards should be placed beyond these at a distance of half a *shawt*,³ who would ride all around the army quietly, so that they might discover anyone hidden or lying in ambush to perpetrate

(2) The word "thalāth" is written in the margin of *Fā'*, indicating that there were three iron points on each stave.

(3) Lane, vol. I, p. 1619, defines this as the distance of a heat in any race, usually horse-racing, which was generally reckoned as the length of the *maydān*, which was a cleared area for military training and sports, particularly polo.

a trick. Thus, it would not be objectionable at this time to set up an ambush beyond the watch and the guards, and to light fires on every side of the army, to frighten the enemy from afar and [by the fires] to expose [themselves] to [the patrol] by the clearness of light if they drew near.

Should it happen that the enemy approaches by night from one of the sides of the army. the ambush would be sprung upon them, and the cavalry group and watch, who are outside the army, would engage them. Thus the enemy, who had approached them, would be hemmed in between the army and those who went out to engage [them]. The men of the army in this case should be kept in their places and not one of them should leave his place, as long as this is feasible; and no one of them should speak, except the men on the side from which the enemy has come. These men should utter three *takbirs*, one after the other, during the approach of the enemy, so that it will be known that the enemy has approached from their direction. If the enemy abandons that quarter and approaches from another, or a party of the enemy other than the first reaches the other side, the men on that side also should raise the cry in order to arouse the rest of the army to support them.

BOOK ELEVEN : about the explanation of when mobilizing and arranging the troops is necessary, and what is required in the matter of mobilizing at this time. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the explanation of when the mobilizing of the troops and their arrangement is necessary.

Men accustomed to war and experienced about its events said that the men of the army, if they are to engage their enemy, should be, both in their marching and camping, mobilized [in proper ranks] and that this mobilization is [as] necessary in a state of security as it is in the state of danger, unless necessity requires the abandoning of this [ranking]; and that this [mobilization] should be maintained as long as possible. It has been recounted about one of the men of resolution that he headed out of Syria towards the East, seeking battle. He made a trench about the first place in which he alighted beyond Syria, with proper mobilization, [his troops drawn up] correctly. This he continued doing until he reached the place of his destination and conquered his enemy. It has been reported that this was the practice of Muhallab b. Abi Šufrah, the *shaykh* of wars and their *imām*.¹

Others maintain that the mobilization should be maintained only when the enemy is a short distance away. Some of these estimate this [distance] at five stages, *marāḥil* (i.e., about five days' march). The import of this is that only then is [ranking for battle] necessary and [only then] could the [general battle] circumstances be verified. In general, it is required that there be readiness during the marching and alighting and establishment [of camp]; [that there be] a ready taking to arms at all times; for, when it (i.e., the army) is remiss about preparation, or ignores it, [the army] might expose itself to events that it is not able to handle.

Chapter Two : about the explanation of what is required of mobilizing at this time.

The experts in the affairs of war and its conditions said that if the warrior (i.e., the commander of the army) is not far distant from his

(1) For al-Muhallab's recourse to trenches in his campaigns, see al-Tabarī, *Annales*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (15 vols. in 3 series; Leiden: 1879-1910), ser. II, pp. 585, 826, 857, and 875; and al-Mubarrad, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 686-87 and 692.

enemy, he should not march except in [the condition of having] a vanguard, *muqaddamah*, a right flank, *maysarah*, and a left flank, *maymanah*, and a rearguard, *sāqah*; ² [all] with unsheathed weapons, their standards and banners unfurled, so that each one of them can be sure about his station and position within the army, and marching under their [various] ensigns. They should take their battle arms and ready themselves for meeting the enemy, aware of their positions in their marching and their camping, and be in their going forth and settling down according to their banners and flags and in their [proper] stations.

Each *qā'id* or *amīr* should know his men, adhering to positions on the right or left flank or center or rear-guard or scouting party; seeing that they are not remiss about what they are called upon to do, nor negligent about that with which they have been entrusted; so that the troops will be in every place they reach and in each distance they cover like a single army in their [possible] joint action against the enemy. [The officer] should handle [his men] with firmness, seeing that their marching is under their [proper] banners, and their alighting is in their [proper] stations, and that they know their positions.

(2) This marching formation is related to the famous army organization and battle order called "al-khamīs", which goes back into pre-Islamic Arabian military theory. The use of proper standards (or ensigns or flags) is a reminder of the time when "the tribal unit was preserved in each division of the army, and each tribe had its own standards", Khaddūrī, *op. cit.*, p. 89. For a discussion of the origin of this term, see Harold W. Glidden, "A Note on Early Arabian Military Organization", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LVI (1936), pp. 88-91.

BOOK TWELVE : about the explanation of the method of mobilizing while threatened in marching and the protection of the treasuries. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : is about the explanation of the method of mobilizing when threatened in marching.

Men knowledgeable about the management of wars said : when a threat [of attack] while marching becomes evident to the commander of the army and the threat [comes from] in front of the army, he should place half of the left flank in front of the ranks in the march, and half the right flank in its tracks, then the center after it, then half of the left flank after [the center], and half of the right flank in the rear of it. If the threat be from the side of the right flank, he should place the march of the right flank in front of the ranks, then the center, then the left flank. If the threat be from the side of the left flank, he should place the march of the left flank in front of the ranks, then the center, then the right flank. Should the threat be "unknown" (i.e., the direction from which it will be launched is not known), he should scatter scouting parties and horsemen on all sides of the army, and muster the men according to their [battle] ranks and stations. The commander of the army should be in the middle of the center [section of the army].¹

Chapter Two : about the protection of the treasuries and the baggage.

As for the treasuries: [the experts] said that the commander of the army should deputize [to guard] his treasuries a man who is a wise counsellor and trustworthy, and [assign to] him a group of cavalry who will accompany the transport of his treasuries, alighting when they are put down, surrounding them in marching and alighting, in order to protect them from the depredations of the enemy, and to guard them from the approach of treacherous men. He should order all the troops to keep away from them and to maintain distance from them while

(1) Cf. Smail, *op. cit.*, for the skirmishing encountered by the Crusading armies while on the march; and, p. 80, for Muslim tactics forcing the Franks to fight on the march. The Muslims concentrated their attack on the rearguard of a marching column.

marching and alighting, except those who are selected for this [duty] and assigned to it. If there is no one deputed for the treasuries from among the people who would preserve them and overpower those who wish to plunder them, perhaps the enemy will come upon them or the soldiery will hasten towards them and fall upon them, leading to the plunder of the army and the incitement to discord. Verily, the people of discord and those evilly disposed and those inclining towards infidelity are many and their haste towards doing good is far-fetched.

BOOK THIRTEEN : about the description of the method of night attack on the enemy if the opportunity appears. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the description of the time in which it is propitious to attack the enemy by night and a description of the men who are best fitted for this [action].

As for the time in which it is propitious to attack the enemy by night : it is necessary to select for this the dark night and the windy night. If this be done during the rustling [of the wind] or the dripping of [rain] water, so as to prevent the discovery of the night prowler who is attacking the enemy, it is better. Further, if the enemy whom one wishes to raid by night were large [in size and numbers], one chooses for [the raid] that part of the morning nearest to dawn, while they (i.e., the enemy) are arising at break of day; then the army will take them. God has praised the steeds for attacking swiftly in the morning in His saying : "By the snorting chargers, by the strikers of fire, by the dawn-raiders blazing a trail of dust". (100:1).

As for the men who are best fitted for this: [the experts] have reported that those who are chosen for night raiding should be of two types. The first type are men of experience in wars and resolute, because they are those by whom the job is most profitably carried out, since it cannot be executed profitably at that time except by those who are known for resolution and patience in combating warriors in straitened times. The second type are those who are submissive to one who knows more about this [type of operation]; because they become like a tool to the one knowledgeable about war, used profitably by him as an instrument of war, as the sword or spear or other weapons are used. But they must have in addition to obedience the qualities of bravery and patience and firmness and endurance of that for which they are delegated. Yea, the harm of the cowardly in this place is greater than his usefulness.

Chapter Two : about the method of night raiding.

Men, practiced in war, have deemed it advisable, should one desire to raid the enemy by night, to have a group of the army attack by aiming at the middle of the enemy's [formation], while the remainder [of the army] covers them. Then the group which had aimed at the

middle of the enemy should shout; for, if they shout in their midst at a time [when the enemy is] unaware [of the raiders' presence], confusion and ruin will overtake the enemy. And should the latter seek to use the extremities of their army, they will find that the remainder of the [attacking] army between them [and their middle components] have surrounded them and taken those who are outside [the regular formation] by shooting arrows at them from beyond [the formation]; for, this action, carried out in the night and in great darkness, has a great effect on the combatants.

And if they (i.e., the raiding party) are able to hamstring the beasts of the enemy's army and wound them with spears, having [already] cut their halters and shackles, they should do this; for, if their halters and shackles are cut, and steel [weapons] smite them, they will run amok about [the enemy's] army, because of the pain visited upon them, besides being terrified and startled by the loud voices.

It is advised in this matter that the group which is attacking the enemy by night, when they fall upon the enemy, should not confine themselves to a single place but should increase their movements within [the enemy formation]; for [such movements] magnify the terror, greatly increase the injuries and the [consequent] weakening of the enemy. Further, it is necessary that they be given a battle cry which they shout to one another, such as "May God gladden", or "May God grant victory", or similar cries, in order that they may be distinguished from the enemy.

BOOK FOURTEEN : about the selection of positions of the battle-rankings and the time [to carry this out].
In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the selection of position of the rankings.

[The experts] have preferred that the position of the battle-rankings be such that the men of the army, ranked for battle, will have their backs against a mountain or river or hill; so that, with respect to their backs they will be secure from an attack by the enemy against them, and [from] the springing of an ambush behind them; [rankings] similar to those which preceded about the [army's] camping while en route [to battle] according to the explanation which was given in Book Ten. Should nothing like this be available, [the commander of the army] digs trenches and fortifies himself by setting up ambushes to spring against the enemy, should he be moving against the rear of the army.

[The commander of the army] should see to it that the position of the center of the army is on a mountain or on a solid, raised place in which there is no dust. The commander of the army should be in the middle of them (i.e., the center group of the army), in order to be raised above the two armies and to see what takes place in his cohorts and the enemy's by way of lucky opportunities and the plugging of gaps and such matters.

If he finds nothing but a depressed area in which he cannot see the two armies, and if the engagement is unavoidable, he should leave behind in the center formation as deputy one experienced in war, resolute, and skilled in the management [of troops], while he passes on, under protection to the right flank which is adjacent to the center wing. Should he find there a raised place, he should ascend it; if he does not find one there, he seeks it on the left flank. If he cannot find one [anywhere], he should, if possible, erect in the center something upon which he can stand, so that he can overlook the two armies from [its height].

Chapter Two : about the choice of the time for [battle] ranking.

The commander of the army should strive to effect the ranking at a time when the sun and wind are coming from behind the rear of his army. As for having the sun come from behind : this is done because, if it comes from in front, its rays fall upon the burnished blades of the swords and [upon] the helmets and other [metallic paraphernalia of

battle]. And [too] its rays reach the eyes, dimming the sight; causing, perhaps, the total deprivation of sight of some of [the men]. As for having the wind come from behind : it is so that the [warrior] will be protected from what the wind throws in the eyes of dust and sand; for, when the wind raises the dust and sand to the eyes, this induces the lowering of the eyelids against what threatens [the eyes]. It has been deemed foolhardy to lower the eyelids in war, [particularly] while engaged in battle, even though one were to see the sword almost enter one's eye; because, by lowering the eyelids, the warrior would become [comparable] to one who is blinded, and the blind man is useless in war.

If it is not possible to have the wind come from the rear, its approach should be such that it sweeps in from the end of one's right flank towards the left flank of the enemy, thereby occasioning the sharing by the enemy's army with one's own of the [wind's] detriment. Thus he sustains [of disadvantage] the like of that which is sustained by the men of one's own army. If it prove possible, [the commander of the army] should so maneuver that the wind will come from a direction such that the enemy takes [of the wind's disadvantageous direction] his full share. If it is not possible and the enemy persists in seeking battle at this time, or if the wind changes while he is in formation, the commander, *apropos* of the rankings, should order the cavalry to dismount from their horses, and fight as infantry, crowded together as though they were one man; for the wind's pressure against the cavalry is stronger than its pressure against the infantry, because of the cavalryman's eminence about the ground, and the infantryman's "lowness" through standing upon it.

BOOK FIFTEEN: about the explanation of the setting up of ambushers and the management of their affairs. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the account of the qualities of the men of the ambush, and of the horses for it, and the place in which to spring the ambush.

As for the men of it : it is necessary that they be among the most courageous of the cavalrymen of the army, the most experienced in war, the most adept in exploits; for they will be isolated from the army and will be in a place in which none of the men of the army can help them or relieve them, because of their distance from them. Besides this, [the commander of the army] must place over them an officer who is knowledgeable of the affairs of wars, experienced in their battles, expert about the proper places for concealment; for this will be more helpful in the accomplishment of the aim of the ambush relative to its concealment, when concealment is called for, and its springing forth when this is ordained.

As for its horses: it is necessary that they be firm-footed, sound of back, free of stubbornness and sexual restiveness, according to what has preceded about the horses for the scouting party. And there should not be in their temperament anything by which they can be recognized during the time of ambush, such as neighing or the like. It is imperative that their horses be all stallions or all mares; for, if stallions and mares are grouped together in the same party, it may prove a clear evidence [of the party's presence] by their neighing or snorting, thus giving [the enemy] knowledge of the ambush, and perhaps this will lead to the visiting of injury upon all of the army. In general, the commander of the ambush should remove anything which would reveal that which he wants to conceal.

As for the place in which to conceal the ambushers: it is necessary that it be secret, hidden and that establishment in it be bearable if the need calls for long standing; and that there be in it water and pasturage and the rest of what the men of the ambushing party need, as far as possible.

Chapter Two : about the management of the affairs of the ambushers.

The first thing incumbent upon the men of the ambushing party is that they establish for themselves a watchman, *daydubān*, to scout for

news of the enemy and the latest [situation] in the affairs of the army and acquaint them about them. It is necessary that this watchman be one of those who are trustworthy and whose counsel has been proven. For, if he were of the opposite stripe, he might incline towards the enemy and reveal the ambush and they would be taken at his indication [of the place].

The ambushers should avoid hunting birds or wild beasts from the surrounding area; for, this induces the flight of the birds and beasts and, perhaps, one of the people of the shrewdness about war sees the flight of the hunted [bird or beast] and concludes that it was frightened by a frightener, and he connects this [fact] to his knowledge about ambushes, and [the ambushing party] would be captured.

It is required that the time of the springing of the ambush be at a time of inattention [on the part] of the enemy, this being the period of the oncoming morning (between dawn and sunrise); or while the enemy alights from their beasts and sets them to rest, during the hottest hour [of the daylight] in summer or the coldest hour of the day in winter. Further, their going out from the ambush against the enemy must be in separate squadron formations, *kurdūsah*, pl. *karādīs*,¹ not far distant from one another; and they should hasten their return to their place of ambush if they do not accomplish their objective. If they should meet the enemy, then they should engage him and each one of them should exhibit what he possesses of strength and valor.

(1) The Umayyad Marwān II, during the years 128-29/745-47, effected a change in the battle formations of the Arab armies from the straightline formation to fighting by movements of close-packed regiments and/or squadrons. These latter were called *karādīs* (sing. *kurdūs* or *kurdūsah*). The word *kurdūs* came to replace *al-khamīs* as the word for the army as a whole. See Ibn Khaldūn's discussion of the methods of warfare, *The Muqaddimah*, tr. Franz Rosenthal (3 vols; New York: 1958), vol. II, pp. 73-85; and Glidden, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

It is interesting to note that by the 8th/14th century both these terms were incorporated into military nomenclature. A *khamīs* contained 8192 men and was itself composed of two parts, each a *jaysh* of 4096 men. The *kurdūs* contained but 128 men. Thus, in a sizable ambush party, the men would spring forth in squadron (*kurdūsah*) formation. See glossary in *Nihāyat al-su'l*, pp. 145-149.

BOOK SIXTEEN: about the description of the method of arraying the soldiers when they are mobilized for battle. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One : about that which [should obtain] if the opposing army [arrayed for battle] were small and this is related to a difference of degree of smallness [of numbers on both sides].

Should there be but one person girding for war, one engages his adversary [face to face] in battle, and no other action but this is possible for him. If two combine against one, he draws to one side and tries to defend himself against each of them. If the opponent [girded] for war be three, one of them will be in the center, one of them on the left flank and one of them on the right flank. Some maintain [however] that when there are three gathered [to fight], they are not arranged in this manner, but rather each of them protects the back of his companion. This is a great chapter in war; [only] those experienced in wars have practiced it.

If the persons girded for war be nine, three are in the center, three on the right flank, and three on the left flank.

If there be but two readied for battle, the back of each is placed to that of his companion [if] the enemy separates to strike against them. Otherwise they can face him if he comes from one direction.

If there are four poised for battle, three array themselves as center, right flank and left flank as has been explained, and one of them retires to the side, so that if an opportunity [to attack] the enemy appears, he can seize it; or if his companions need help, he can assist them. This is preferable to mixing with them, except when they are mounted as a cavalry squadron, [in which case] the four should attack *en masse*.

If there are six poised for battle, they should be arrayed according to what has preceded: two in the center, two on the right flank and two on the left flank. If there are eight, it is best to arrange six in the manner described above, and employ the remaining two in ambush, because springing unexpectedly from concealment while the battle is taking place can cause a great tumult.

Some warriors hold the opinion that, if the opposing enemy's battle strength be generally small, the army should not array themselves [as has been described], but rather should attack the enemy as a single cavalry division. Massing is better for them. In general, the procedure for this is dependent upon the diligence of the combatant to the degree that the situation demands.¹

Chapter Two : about that which [should be done] if the [numerical strength] of the enemy, poised for battle, were great.

[The experts] have judged it proper, if the [numerical strength] of the enemy were great, such as that of the great army, to put the army in five lines. The first line will be the vanguard of the army and [much] depends upon it. It is necessary that the cavalymen in it be outstanding for strength and courage and conquering spirit and experience in war, for they will be at the throat of the enemy, and those behind them of the [other] lines depend upon them.

[The experts] judged it proper to divide the vanguard into three parts: a center, a right flank and a left flank. The center is the one which is in the middle and they mean by it the center of the [entire (?)] army. The right flank is that which is to the right of the center and the left flank is that which is to its left. And to each of the three is a role special to it. They call the right and left flanks *al-mujannabatain*, "the two advanced guards", and the right and left flanks are [also] called *al-janāḥain*, "the two wings". Thus one says "the wing of the right flank" and "the wing of the left flank". Perhaps each [part] of the

(1) There is an ambiguous quality in this entire chapter insofar as the numbers indicated do refer to individual combatants. It seems highly unlikely that an entire army would be poised for battle simply to engage anywhere from one to nine combatants. Further, where single combat is referred to in the text, the more technical term *mubārazah* is employed. It might be that our author was thinking of ranks or squadrons of combatants, each acting as a unit and to be opposed by a comparable unit. It is the lack of any noun, e.g., *mubāriz*, *kurdūs* or *askar*, associated with the given number which causes the ambiguity.

For the fighting arrangements of a massed battalion in Roman military theory, see, Machiavelli, *op. cit.* Book II, *passim* and the accompanying sketches of the arrangements.

right flank and of the left flank is called *janāḥ*, "wing".

All of the center and of the right flank and of the left flank are divided into three parts according to what has preceded. Thus one arranges the center [of this vanguard] as a center, a right flank and a left flank. The same is done to the [vanguard's] right and left flanks. Over each of these sections one places a general, *al-muqaddam*, making nine such in the vanguard of the army, so that there will be close supervision of their (i.e., the sections') activity. Verily, the great number of the generals of the cavalry in the sections of the army is among that which strengthens the sections and prolongs their steadfastness, especially if with each general there is a section of the army [under his direct command].² [Experts] say it is necessary to place between the [various] wings of the center and of the right and left flanks a clear path, sufficiently wide between [any] two of them to permit the easy passage of the horses and officers [bound] for single combat (*al-mubārāz ih*).

The second line will be behind the first, and will be arranged in three parts: a center, a right flank and a left flank, corresponding to the ranking of the first: center behind center, right flank behind right flank and left flank behind left flank. [The experts] have stipulated that this line should contain celebrated cavaliers, sufficiently comparable to those who are cognizant of the management of war and the execution of its important affairs, patient about its events and clear-headed when its difficulties are manifested.

The third line will be behind the second and it is placed for the

(2) Cf. Machiavelli on the need of many supervisory officers, *op. cit.*, p. 101 f.: "Cosimo. Though I believe all the officers in your battalion may be necessary, yet I should be afraid that so many would create confusion.

"Fabrizio. That might be the case, if they were not all under the command of one person; but as they are, they rather serve to preserve and promote good order; and indeed, it would be impossible to keep it up without them; for a wall that is weak and tottering in every part, may be better supported by many props and buttresses, though they are but feeble ones, than by a few, be they ever so substantial; because their strength cannot be of much service at any considerable distance. For this reason there ought to be a corporal over every ten soldiers in all armies, who should be a man of more spirit and courage, at least of greater authority, than the rest, in order to animate them both by his words and example, and exhort them continually to keep firm in their ranks, and behave themselves like men."

protection of the baggage. It has been explained that there can be no operation of the army without its baggage. The baggage must be encompassed by those who fear the stain of running away more than they fear death, for there is no sustenance possible for the army without its baggage.

The fourth line will be behind the third, and its role is to protect the rear of the baggage. It has been stipulated that the horsemen of this line be light troops, *khifāf anjād*, from among the people of exploits on battle fields, [who are capable of quick support].

The fifth line will be behind the fourth line, and it constitutes the rear guard of the army. [The experts] have stipulated that this line should have men of boldness and intrepidity, upon whose sufficiency [the commander] can rely, should he need them. Upon this line and the fourth depends the protection of the rear section of the army and the prevention of predatory incursions against the rear of the army insofar as they are able, for the enemy will be emboldened [to strike] against the extremities of the army.

Chapter Three : about the description of the forms of the rankings [should] the enemy be of great numerical strength.

[Experts] have differed about this. Most of those versed in military affairs hold that the best ranking is that of the straight line, whose parts are joined to each other. It is reported that this was the conventional [method] of the Persians in ancient times. God had commended this method in His Honored Book [when] He said, exalted be His power, "God loves those who fight in His way in ranks, as though they were a building well-compacted." (61:4)³.

Some of those experienced in war prefer the ranks to curve out from

(3) This is the famous "closed formation" which Ibn Khaldūn praises, *The Muqaddimah*, vol. II, p. 74 :

"Fighting in closed formation is more steady and fierce than fighting with the technique of attack and withdrawal. That is because in fighting in closed formation, the lines are orderly and evenly arranged, like arrows or like rows of worshipers at prayer. People advance in closed lines against the enemy. This makes for greater steadiness in assault and for better use of the proper tactics. It frightens the enemy more. A closed formation is like a long wall or a well-built castle which no one could hope to move ... A tradition says: 'One believer is to another believer like a building of which every part supports the rest.'"

the wings and in towards the center; thus strengthening the center of the rankings and weakening the wings. He who does this will delegate for each of the wings a squadron of supporting cavalry as compensation for the bending in towards the center.

They disapprove the curving out of the rankings from the center and in towards the wings, for this weakens the center and strengthens the wings. Thus he who arranges his ranks like this, will station people of bravery and valor on the right and left flanks so as to strengthen the center.⁴

The Mongols from among the Turkish people accustomed their people [to fight as] a single squadron of cavalry, so that they struggled together against the enemy. Retiring [from the battle] and returning [to it] was denied to each of them. They gained from this great experience which was not [duplicated] by others.

(4) These are no doubt the two variations of the crescent formation, *hilālī*. For this and other battle formations, see *MF*, pp. 70-72; *Nihāyat al-su'l*, Lesson XI, *passim*; and Wüstenfeld, "Das Heerwesen der Muhammadaner", pp. 29-39 and text. In the first case, when supporting cavalry are sent to strengthen the wings, we have a formation termed *al-mujannah*.

BOOK SEVENTEEN : about what should be done while encountering the enemy and fighting him. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One : about [what should be done] when the army marches out against the enemy before the enemy marches out.

If the soldiers take the initiative in marching out against the enemy, their march should be from a high place, elevated above the ground so that the army will be higher than the enemy. Their going forth should be steady and cautious and slow. There should be in front of the cavalry those of the infantry who will defend it and protect it from the infantry of the enemy. When the infantry of the army have put the enemy's infantry to flight, it may happen that the cavalry of the army will follow upon them in the work of routing. If the infantry of the enemy is routed, and falls back upon their cavalry, it causes their horses to panic and their pursuit by the infantry of the army might be continued. This will be the cause of the break-up of the enemy and his rout.

If the center is required to march out against the enemy, its men should proceed slowly, little by little, without rushing or haste. If haste in movement towards the enemy occurs, perhaps those behind the [center's] ranking will think that they have arrived at the enemy's [position] and that they will be [engaged] with him. They will become disturbed because of this and will be affected by it.

If a troop of men attack the enemy and then are required to retire to their [original] station, they should avoid anything unseemly or hurried in their retreat, for such would indicate fear and anxiety. Rather their retreat should be the most ordered and steadiest of retreats. The unseemliness of their retreat could enhance the covetousness of the enemy towards [the army]. He will pursue it, and rout will ensue.

If the men who attacked the enemy were those of the center in their totality and they are compelled to retreat, they should retreat to a place behind their backs, swerving and looking sideways, some inclining shoulders and heads, and [with] chests in the direction of the chests of the enemy. They should not cease doing this until they reach their [original] positions. While doing this, they [must] display power [by] calling for victory, exhorting steadiness and conquest, so that their companions hear [this call]. This gives notice of the presence of the center and of its power in such cases where the hearts grow faint. If

one of the men of the center attacks and takes advantage of an opportunity against the enemy (i.e., for individual combat) and then has to retire, he should incline leftwards and towards the left flank or towards what is between the wings of the center and left flank.

If those who attack are men of the right flank, they should retire, [if forced to], by walking backwards to their [original] positions. Should one of the men of the right flank attack and take advantage of an opportunity [against] the enemy and [then] wishes to retire, he should incline leftwards towards the center or towards what is between the center wing and right flank. This latter method is easier in retreating than retiring towards the left flank and its vicinity would be.

If all of the left flank attacks, they should retire [by] moving backwards to their positions, as has been noted for the right flank. And if one of the left flank attacks, then retires, he should incline [in retreating towards] the left. If the warrior of the left flank, after the attack, moves towards the area of the center, it [will be] easier for him than [a motion] towards the right flank.

And among that which attentiveness demands is the knowledge that the return of the horseman after the engagement to his station, from which he sallied forth, is most salutary, if it be possible; so that he will be in the position established for him, [making him easier to find later on]. If it isn't possible, he should stand in its vicinity. There should be no altercation about this, because the object is simply that he remain in his [proper] ranking and not [necessarily] in that particular place.

It is required of the warrior [charging] against the enemy that he does not exhaust himself in rushing his horse and that he does not pursue his adversary beyond a third of the distance between him and the enemy. Thus there would be between him and the army a third of the distance, and between him and the enemy two-thirds. To go beyond this is heedlessness.

“For the heedless, no praise
E’en though he come through safe.”¹

(1) The source of this hemastich could not be found.

[Though] the enemy be put to rout before him, the attacker should not feel secure, because this [rout] might be like a stratagem such as [to enable] the springing of an ambush and the like; unless, of course, the failure of the enemy and his defeat are apparent. In the latter case pursuing the enemy is necessary, but the warrior should not hasten to thrust [too] deeply into the army of the enemy, even if the latter's failure is apparent and his horses are delayed [in retreat], until the men of bravery and patience from his own army join him and the battle-cavalry have come together once more.

If the enemy simulates flight and raises dust, the attack against him should not occur until this dust has settled, for fear of an ambush. If the enemy turns his back and his rout is certain, the entire army should not follow him, rather some of the army should pursue him while others plunder, and the remainder are employed to cover these operations. For the army, as a whole, to pursue [the enemy] is judged blameworthy.

Should the enemy remain standing after his [apparent] defeat, the standard bearer (or flag commander), *ṣāhib al-liwā'*, should advance a little distance, while the cavalry, who are chosen and prepared for that [eventuality], attacks. In this circumstance, it is incumbent upon the army to make every effort to surround them from every side. The commander of the army should set out [towards the enemy] with the largest standard, *al-band al-a'zam*, and all of the cavalry should surround and protect him. Verily, in all this there is dread and fright brought upon the enemy, especially if they have [already] tasted the edge of iron. When the enemy dallies at this point, it is the onset of victory, God willing.

If a combatant from the army rides out for single combat,² his position should be at a point one third of the distance between his comrades and the enemy. Should the latter simulate flight, he [can proceed] to two-thirds of the distance, but he must not go beyond that. Indeed some have said that he should not exceed a third of the distance between his comrades and the enemy under any circumstances.

Chapter Two : about what [should be done] when the enemy marches out against the army before the army takes the field.

(2) The term for the combatant or duellist is *mubāriz*, here employed in the technical sense, and lends weight to the argument noted in Book XVI, note 1, *supra*.

Men of exploits in wars hold that if the enemy attacks the army before it can attack the enemy or before its organization and mobilization for battle can be carried out thoroughly, the men of the army should kneel on one knee and point their spears from the upper part of the chest, concealing themselves behind leather shields and cuirasses, arrayed in a single ranking, assisting one another until the enemy is repelled or until [the cavalry's] mounting and engagement have been effected. Those experienced in war say that [this] is the hour of adversity for he who is not accustomed to its like.

Should the attack of the enemy occur after the tightening of the battle array of the soldiers, the infantry of the army should engage them and point their spears from the upper part of the chest and remain fixed in their places; and the archers of the army should assist them by shooting [arrows] at the faces [of the enemy]. If the infantry is unable to stand [the attack] in this manner, the cavalry will then respond.

Patience is most beneficial at this time. None but the people of strength and valor and he who has the practice of battle engagement is firm in this [quality of] patience. [Beneficial, too,] is cautiousness against the army's crumbling during the first attack of the enemy in the first moment [of battle]. The cowards will vacate their positions, and this will be a reason for the break-up [of the army's formation]. Should this happen, the correct procedure is to order their control by placing with them experienced warriors who will stand firmly with them, so that they will be made constant by their constancy, strengthening that which had softened their hearts.

If it happen that one of the men of the army should retire because of his fear of battle or the suffering of wounds, no other person of the army should obstruct him by standing in his way or should send him back to [his] position among the warriors; but rather he should be treated gently and be placated until he attains the rear of the battle-rankings.³

(3) It is interesting to note here the humane psychology in the treatment of the cowardly and the wounded. Cf. the attitude of Ibn Khaldūn, on the need of cohesion in the lines, vol. II, p. 75 :

“[the closed formation] makes it obvious what great wisdom there is in requiring that the lines be kept steady and in forbidding anyone to fall back during an attack. Battle lines are intended to preserve order, as we have stated.

If the enemy overwhelms [a group] of the army and they fail to repulse his assault, they should return to the [main ranks] of the army, maintaining their zeal until they close ranks, and regroup their cavalry and their infantry and protect themselves with [their] weapons and send to seek assistance and the hastening of it. If ranks are closed and the assistance they sought comes to them, they can join battle again to the degree that the situation demands.

If the enemy gives battle to the army right up to the trenches, the men should be prepared for this in the completest manner possible, and they should attack the enemy in a single foray, observing the footsteps of the enemy rather than their faces. Should the enemy hold forth to meet them at this time, nothing remains for them but to descend upon [the enemy] with swords and pointed maces, *al-dabābīs al-muḥarrafah*,⁴ and battle axes. And when the army has taken of the battle-field a distance from that held by the enemy equal to the length of [the hurl of] a spear, and this happens again and again, the men of exploits count it among the beginnings of victory.

It is necessary that the men of the army hold to their positions with solid rankings [within the area] where the enemy had aimed at them and that they do not cease pointing their spears from their chests or to shoot [arrows] at them from every side. Should the enemy protract [his efforts] and remain patient [under attack], the men of the army should not become disquieted or anxious, because the suffering [of the encounter] is shared by both factions. God pointed this out in His saying: "If you are suffering, they also are suffering as you are suffering, and you are hoping from God for that for which they cannot hope," (4:104)

Should the right flank of the enemy enter the other parts (reserves?) of the army, no one of the men of the army should leave the ranks unless

Those who turn their backs to the enemy bring disorder into the line formation. They are guilty of the crime of causing a rout. They somehow cause the Muslims to be routed and enable the enemy to gain power over them. This is a great sin, because the resulting damage is general and effects Islam in that it makes a breach in the protecting fence. Therefore, it is considered one of the great sins."

(4) For illustrations of various maces, none of them termed *muḥarrafah*, see 'Abd al-Rahmān Zakī, *Al-silāḥ fī al-Islām* (Cairo: 1951), p. 26; Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 f. and 37 f.; and *MF*, p. 64.

he is confident that he can defeat his equal before returning to his battle position, for holding fast in his place and repulsing the enemy [from there] is better than being diverted from it; for he who is cut off from his place cannot foresee what his situation will be, unless he knows that the enemy who is advancing on him cannot escape [defeat]. Then engaging him [elsewhere] is permitted at this time.

Chapter Three : about what is required of cautiousness at the time of meeting the enemy.

Those accustomed to and experienced in wars say if a group of enemy's cavalry comes upon the army from the rear at the time of mobilization [for battle], or should spring an ambush upon them at that time, the commander of the army should establish a group of cavalry, which he sets aside for this purpose, to repel [the enemy] away from the army. If he has not done this, he should choose horsemen from the left flank to frustrate them and prevent them from [succeeding] in this action.

[The experts] say that it is incumbent upon those who go out against the enemy that they do not retreat except at the command of the commander of the army, and that they do not proceed beyond the limit set by him for them, because he knows better what he is directing them toward. In these circumstances, he is like the physician for the sick.

If night covers them and battle has not abated, it is necessary that the infantry and cavalry do not leave battle-stations until their enemy retires from the battle; after which they should retire [to their encampment] in their rankings according to their battle-array, one [ranking] after the other. In this circumstance, cautiousness against sudden attack by the enemy and the entrance of his spies is necessary.

When the men have entered their stations [in the camp], the cavalry officers retire to their posts. They close up the entrance-ways over the trenches. The night patrols and the [detailed] officers go round about with the corps commanders, *ru'asā al-ajnād*, [visiting those] on watch duty until morning arrives.

If the rankings are arrayed for battle, and night descends and there is no escape from passing the night [in battle formation], the ranks of the left flank should bend towards the middle part of the center and the

edge of the right flank should bend until it is linked to the left flank. The [entire] army will wheel about, the baggage being at this time in the middle [of the formation] and the cavalrymen will surround it.⁵ In the darkness before the dawn they [all] return to their regular positions.

There should be shrewd men on all sides of the army who can look upon the faces of people and scrutinize them. He who sees a suspicious person, or imagines one to be such, should seize him and inquire about his business. The nature of a suspicious person is apparent from his face, and the shrewd men, those skilled in physiognomy, will know him as such. If he doubts the outward appearance of a person, and moves to arrest him, he should be wary of him at this moment, for perhaps [the suspect] thinks himself able to kill and hastens towards killing the one who had seized him in order to save himself or to take vengeance before being slain [himself]. Similarly, it is necessary to control those who have sought safe-conduct, *al-musta'min*, and [any] captives and to bind them after the terms given them have been fulfilled.⁶

Know that the conditions of war do not run according to a single plan but vary and change, and perhaps the commander of the army or some of his deputies, having disposed of a matter [in a certain way,] find that circumstances call for another method. He must do at that time what his opinion thinks necessary and his judgment will lead him to it.

It has been related that a fleet of ships, *ufrūṭah*⁷ *min marākib*, of the Franks sought [to capture] the city of Sabtah (Ceuta) in the lands of the Maghrib. An opposing force went out to engage it and a great battle ensued between them. Victory went finally to the Muslims. The Christians raised the sails of their ships and sailed away. But one large ship was delayed because of the difficulty in maneuvering it.

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- (5) This is probably the formation known as *al-kurah*; for sources see Bock XVI note 4 *supra*.
- (6) For the treatment of spies and prisoners and those bearing safe-conduct rights, see Khaddūrī, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-108 and 163-169.
- (7) The origin or meaning of this word could not be ascertained from any standard lexicographical source. It was not included in the most comprehensive study of Mediterranean naval terminology : Henry and Renée Kahane and Andreas Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant* (Urbanat 1958).

The archers of the Muslims gathered to do battle against it. [The Franks] shielded it with leather shields and cuirasses. One of the Muslim shaykhs called out to the archers, "Look you to the rope of the Christians. Shoot at it." They did and the arrows became entangled in it and its flow through the pulleys was stopped, because of the arrows entangled in it. The Muslims overtook [the ship] and captured it.⁸

(8) The source of this story was not discovered. The Portuguese captured the city in 818/1415. Before that the Genoese had helped to blockade the city at the instigation of the Muwahhid, al-Rashid, who reigned from 630 to 640/1232-1242. Between 708-716/1308-1316, Jaime of Aragon lent over fifty ships and a number of cavalry to the local ruler of Sabtah to use against a variety of pretenders; see article "Ceuta", *EI*, vol. I, pp. 836-838. For the later attempts of the Aragonese, in league with the Catalans, to wrest the littoral opposite Gibraltar, see J.A. Robson, "The Catalan Fleet and Moorish Sea-power", *English Historical Review*, LXXIV, no. 292 (July 1959), pp. 386-408.

BOOK EIGHTEEN : about what should be done while putting the enemy to rout. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about that which is related to the completion of the battle when the enemy has been routed.

The managers of the affairs of war said that when the rout of the enemy and his flight are certain, following them and riding in their footsteps, taking up this matter with haste and diligence, are mandatory before they (i.e., the enemy) are able to close their ranks and reassemble their divided cavalry. [It should be done] with caution against ambush and vigilance against its eventuality. It may be that the apparent rout of the enemy is a stratagem or trick similar to that which has been discussed; whereas a real routing can hardly be concealed from the vigilant; yet it may be concealed even from [the vigilant] because of the running out of luck.

Should it prove to be a thorough rout, [the commander] must detail the right flank and the left flank only to seek the enemy. The commander of the army and his banners should be in the center, the standards unfurled, going forward at a gentle pace, little by little. When he arrives at a place in which he prefers to halt, those with him of the center should halt, while the right and left flanks continue [further on] to seek the enemy, but only to the degree that they do not become hidden to the sight of the commander of the army. If the cavalry have to be dispatched to hunt them down, it is necessary to have the infantry attack the enemy so that they might divert the enemy's infantry from hindering the [pursuing] cavalry. If the commander of the army sees this (i.e., the hindering of his cavalry), and if the numerical strength of the enemy after the rout is still feared, the commander of the center (obviously the commander of the army himself who is with the center group) orders the men of the right and left flanks to march (retreat) towards him but without exposing their backs; rather their retreat should be in a swerving motion, moving in a deviating fashion with their chests in the direction of the enemy, as has been discussed.

Among that which attentiveness requires concerning those put to rout of the enemy is that no man of the army should attempt to get in front of them, nor should they be shunted from their path of flight, nor should they be denied access to water if they seek it. Verily, the routed warrior, when his destruction is apparent to him, attacks with his full strength, fighting a strong battle, in order to purchase his safety. Rather,

immediate fears should be dispelled from them; then they may be surrounded, so that they can be seized from all sides. In general, standing in the direct path of a routed warrior is not sagacious.

Chapter Two : about that which is related to the matter of booty.

Among that which should be considered first in this matter is that, if the rout of the enemy actually happens, the men of the army should not divert from the matter of the battle to seek plunder and booty. If the rout be a true one, the booty will not escape them; if it be a trick of the enemy, it may lead to some villainy which will overtake the army on the heels of the trick. An example of this occurred to the Companions of the Prophet, the blessing of God upon them, all of them, in the raid on Uhud. God had reproved them about this matter: and it concerned the Prophet's ordering some archers to guard a certain place; appointing them to it especially. When the rout of the polytheists had taken place, those archers, whom the Prophet had ordered to protect that place, hastened to the plunder. A great misfortune befell the Muslims because of this. God sent down [the following verses] because of this [defection]: "... after He had shown you [what] you longed for. Some of you there are that desire this world, and some of you there are that desire the next world." (3:152)¹

The division of booty is mentioned in the books of jurisprudence, *fiqh*. For he who is concerned with the matter in this place [suffice it to say] that the *madhhab* of al-Shafi'i, the blessing of God upon him, holds that the infantryman be awarded one portion and the cavalryman three portions, for the horse in this matter is equal to two portions; and that the *madhhab* of Abū Ḥanīfah, the blessing of God upon him, holds that the infantryman be awarded one portion and the cavalryman two portions — here the horse being equal to one portion.² There is no further need to discourse upon the rules of this matter here.

(1) Guillaume, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-379. In the article "Ohod", *EI*, vol III, p. 970 f., it is stated that they were to prevent a flank attack by the enemy. Khālīd b. Walīd, commanding the flank of the Quraysh, noticing their running to plunder, attacked and routed the Muslims.

(2) A complete discussion of this difference in awarding booty will be found in Khadurri, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-125. For the origin of the distinction between the two methods, see Joseph Schacht, *Origins of Muhammedan Jurisprudence* (Oxford: 1953), p. 108 f. and 205.

BOOK NINETEEN : about the description of the practice of taking fortresses and the method of accomplishing this. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One : citation of the types of fortresses and that which each one of them needs of special treatment in order to capture it.

Know that "fortresses", *al-ḥuṣūn*, in the language refers to anything in which a fortifier entrenches himself, such as citadels and walled cities and mountain forts and trenches and caves and subterranean caverns and thickets of trees and reedbeds and upon the waters and beaches and similar phenomena. For each of these there is a special method for investing and capturing. There may be gathered in any one fortified place a number of the familiar types, such as a citadel on a hill in the interior of a walled city, and about the latter a circumferencing moat; and in the fortress there may be subterranean caverns for concealment and such things. Each of these types requires operations special to its [proper] functioning and management to the degree that its nature demands.

And among them are [types] which call for procrastination and endurance and building of fortifications against them and remaining to besiege them for a prolonged period, such as walled cities and citadels filled with provisions and engines of war. Others for which the merest trick and a few days [of siege] suffice. And between these types of strength are various categories of conditions. Each of them needs special war engines and proper management for investing and offense.

Chapter Two : a description of the method of facilitating the capture of fortified places.

The men of exploits, relative to this matter of the most profitable of actions in the capturing of fortified places according to their differentiation, said that the commander of the army should arrive before [the fortress] at a time of inattentiveness on the part of its inhabitants; and if it chance that this takes place when the gates are open, it will be most opportune. This good fortune happened to al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, may God have mercy upon him, in capturing the city of Anṭākiyah (Antioch) in the region of Ḥalab (Aleppo). Its conquest

was among the easiest of conquests in spite of its impregnability.¹

When this (i.e., the gates being open) does not happen, then a trick will accomplish the submission of those who are in the fortress and their entering into obedience. Or gaining the assent of those who are amenable among them, so that they will be an aid against the others before the melee, will be preferable. If [the commander of the army] finds no one who will convey this report to them, he should write letters aiming at the stirring up of sedition among them such that it is apparent that some [of those] in the fortress are with him [in secret]. These [letters] he places on arrows and shoots them into the fortress.

He should make apparent to the people within the fortress [his guarantee] of justice and faithfulness, the continuing bounty and respect for those who would descend to him and [the promise] of kind treatment for them. If he should gain a reputation [for these qualities] and it is confirmed by him, it will quicken their submission to him and make more conducive their entering into obedience to him. If they seek safe-conduct, he should bestow it upon them.

If there comes out to him from among them one who seeks safe-conduct, he should give him gifts, out of piety, as he is able to do with caution without letting him feel this [caution]. Should a criminal come out to him, he should quiet his fears and promise him every benefit. If he is able to attract the close associates of the commander of the fortress, so that they would turn against [the latter] or save [him the trouble of dealing with the commander], this would be among the most beneficial actions [in] capturing [the fortress] and among the most important.

If their obedience and submission are not secured, he should attempt a trick which will bring about the sallying forth of the people within

(1) This story is apocryphal. Baybars had to lay siege to the city and take it by storm. Its citadel capitulated after negotiation. He had captured the Constable, Simon Mansel, in a foray, and used him to mediate the surrender of the city. This proved unavailing. See Claude Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades* (Paris: 1940), p. 716 f., where al-Nuwayrī is the source. Also, article "Anṭākiyah", *EI*, 2nd ed., vol. I, p. 517; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, vol. V, p. 388 f; Mufaḍḍal b. Abī Faḍā'il, *op. cit.*, vol. XII, p. 509 ff. Cf. these accounts with that of al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk*, ed. M. Muṣṭafā Zīādah (Vol. I, 3 parts; Vol. II, 2 parts; Cairo: 1934-42; Vol. I, part 1, 2nd ed. revised; Cairo: 1956), Vol. I, pt. 2, p. 567 f. For the ease with which Antioch could be taken, see Book I, note 4, *supra*.

the fortress to battle, such that they are emboldened to defeat him; or to turn away from them, or to seem to be departing from them, so that they will come forth in pursuit of the army. If they do come out, and [the commander of the army] can elude them and enter the fortress suddenly, this would be most helpful in gaining the objective.²

Chapter Three : about the method of investment.

People experienced in the investment [of fortified places] say that the first of the things done in the action of investment is that one's men, from the moment of their alighting, surround them (i.e., the people in the fortress) so that no one of them is able to leave and no one can enter to them; nor can they hear from anyone a single word, nor can they see from anyone a sign (or signal), nor can the shooting of an arrow reach them. It may be that a report about the army can reach them by word of mouth had they been able to hear the speech of anyone; or one might make a signal to them about the army which they would understand, or one might write them a letter and place it on an arrow and shoot it to them, thus causing them to take caution [on the basis of any one report relayed to them by these methods].³

Great care must be taken about their messengers, and the commander should not entrust a single one of his army to approach them except those who are conversant with diplomatic exchange, its forms and its techniques. Care [too] should be taken that no one of them (i.e., the enemy's messengers) should gain a single word or more than this. A single word can open a door fastened against evil.

One's emissary to those [within the fortress] should be from among those whose counsel and piety and integrity and sound management are trusted.

[The commander of the army] should know the conditions of the fortress, the inaccessible places and those with ease of access; the impossible and the possible places for [military] action; the positions of the fording-places and caves, of the pontoon and vaulted bridges which he must cross to reach the place he chooses from among [the possible] positions [of entrance] to the fortress. Further, he should know the positions for mining [the walls] and for scaling ropes, siege ladders

(2) Cf. Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, Book VII, pp. 256 ff.

(3) Cf., *ibid.*, for other ruses by which information is gotten into and out of a place under siege.

and grappling irons.⁴ Similarly [he should be conversant] with the erection of mangonels and the directing of the stones used in them; of the positions for the archers, the slings and the naptha-throwers, and of the method of operating these machines and using them. He who has erected them for battling against the fortress should place them in a position which enemy [fire] cannot attain. In this matter, he should do the most convenient things first.

[The commander of the army] must assemble all types of warriors and workmen, that which he requires of iron and wood and similar materials, and the craftsmen of all engines related to war. These craftsmen should begin the construction of the machines and armaments. [The commander] should not neglect this matter or delay it, and the construction of these should be apparent to the people within the fortress. It should not be concealed, because, by doing it [openly], fright and terror and weakening of their hearts occur.⁵

He should also supervise the raising of the mangonels and their firing, for by so doing dread is visited upon the people of the fortress. Whenever an opportunity presents itself [to use the mangonels], he should seize it and he should hasten to do so, without warning the people in the fortress before doing so. In delay is respite for them and their taking to arms and the consolidation of opinion amongst them; such delay merely benefits the objective of the enemy [within] and that which redounds to his interest. Verily, for every thing there is a right time; to exceed it is to lessen its degree of usefulness.

When the investment is under way, there should be no pause in the discharging of the mangonels against them, and there should be no abating [of the amount of mangonel fire] in any hour of the day or night. To desist in attack against them is among that which cools their fright and strengthens their hearts.

(4) Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir mentions that one of Baybars' enemies had recourse to what the translator calls 'iron pegs', *sikak ḥadid*, for scaling the walls; *op. cit.*, text, p. 121 and tr., p. 239.

(5) Cf. Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

"The besieger[s]... should endeavor by all means to appear as powerful and as formidable as they can, and take every opportunity of making the most ostentatious display of their strength ..."

And when the armed attack takes place, it is necessary that [the men of the army] fight with the most convenient [of arms] first and then the next most convenient, delaying the use of the largest of the machines [of war] to the last of those [implements] which they employ in attacking. [In this manner] it becomes apparent to the people in the fortress that each [successive] implement is a little more powerful than the preceding one. [This procedure is employed] except when necessity calls for beginning [the investment] with the most powerful weapon; then the commander begins with this one.

If the people of the fortress opt for a strong initial action of attack, [the commander of the army] should counter their design and handle them by procrastinating [in engaging them in quick battle], because they would not have opted for quick action unless they had been disquieted. And if they opt for procrastination, he should treat them to quick attack, though procrastination in war is the chief stratagem, and it is the one which requires cool resolution. In general, the foundation of battle is opposition to the design of the enemy.

And among the most laudable actions is that the commander of the army or one of his army whom he deputed should circumambulate the fortress every day or two, consulting the people of judgment on the matter of its capture or about the work [to be done] in taking it. This will frighten [those within].

It must also be stressed that the besieger of the enemy is also besieged in the sense that he is not secure from their going out against him and their hastening to do so when the opportunity, during the day or night, presents itself to them; for they desire victory as much as the besieger desires it over them. Hence it is incumbent upon the commander to be cautious with respect to himself and those of the army with him as much as possible. He should use trenches if there is need of them, and their construction is possible; for this is among the strongest [factors] of resolution and conquest.

And he should put, at the distance of an arrow-shot from the gate of the fortress, some cavalymen, posted about [this position], who will observe those who leave it; thus they will be in the position of scouts for the army. When they see someone leave the fortress, they will hasten to become informed about him, so that the soldiers of the army can take care of him, or some of their own number will offer opposition to him.

When the besieger of a fortress accomplishes its capture and gains mastery over it, the aims of rulers have varied about [the matter of the fortress' future]. Some insist upon destroying and demolishing the fortress, so that it cannot become a refuge for that one among the enemy who would fortify it another time. Thus the Turkish rulers (i.e., the Mamlūks) destroyed the cities of the coast of Syria, such as Ṣūr (Ture), 'Akkā (Acre) and 'Asqalān and others of the leading cities,⁶ fearing that the Franks would gain possession of them and refortify themselves within them. This was the method also of the Tartar rulers, such as Hūlākū and Ghāzān and those after them.⁷ They had demolished many of the cities and fortresses, some whose rebuilding ensued, and some which remained as they were. Other rulers did not desire the razing of the fortresses, because the object in building up the land is not its destruction; for the king who rules over that which he demolished among the fortresses will need to build them anew. This entails the extreme of difficulty and expense.

(6) Baybars razed the walls of Antioch and Tripoli; and Jerusalem lost her walls sometime after the battle of Ḥiṭṭīn. The latter were rebuilt by the Ottoman Sulṭān Sulaymān in the latter half of the 10th/16th century. See appropriate articles on the cities named in the text and these others in *EI*, and the discussion of the fates of the Frankish strongholds captured by the Muslims in Runciman, *op. cit.*, vol. II and III, *passim*.

(7) Ibn 'Abd al-Zahīr gives a sample of the destruction of the Mongols in Syria by the armies of Hūlākū, *op. cit.*, text, p. 31 and tr., p. 117 f.:

"When the Mongols (may God defeat them) occupied Syria, they began to destroy the forts and walls. They demolished the walls of the fort of Damascus, and the forts of Ṣalt, 'Ajlūn, Ṣarkhad, Buṣra, Ba'albak, Subaibah, Shaizar and Shumaimis. When the sultan took charge of affairs and God established him as the support of the Faith, he took an interest in the reconstruction of these forts and the completion of the destroyed buildings, because these were the strongholds of Islam. All these were repaired during his time; their fosses were cleared out, the flanks of their walls were broadened, equipment was transported to them, and he sent mamlūks and soldiers to them."

It is Sulṭān Baybars who is referred to here.

BOOK TWENTY : a description of the method of the defense of fortified places and of their protection. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about that which the commander of the fortified place must do by way of preparing for the attack of the enemy before the investment of the fortress.

Men of exploits, investigators of this matter say that the first thing which the commander of a fortress needs to do vis-a-vis its condition of security before the enemy falls upon it unexpectedly is to strengthen its fortification and assign positions to its defenders, and to see that it has a sufficiency of men and of all war implements and equipment for a long siege and for vexing the enemy during the attack. By making apparent the readiness of all this, of that by which the enemy, alighting against the fortress, will know that the commander of the fortress is alert against him who attacks it, he will be ready for the siege. This will be a reason for [the enemy's] retiring from the siege and his returning [to his own country].

Among the matters of caution which [the commander of the fortress] should oversee is its unceasing readiness for the enemy at all times; for, if the enemy aims at him, he should find him ready. Neither should he be remiss about any of the matters of defense against the enemy in the period before the investment, nor in any detail of operation and management lest there be involved some weakness or defect. He who delays doing a thing or misses the proper time [for doing it] can reproach no one but himself.

One thing which dashes the hopes of one who seeks to take the fortress is what he sees of the maintenance of precaution. Among the most important matters relative to the incipient investment is the presence of [sufficient] water and food and those necessities which benefit the besieged group. The presence of these favors procrastination which will vex the enemy, and it may be a reason for his retiring.

Chapter Two : about that which the commander of the fortress must do at the time of the actual investment.

[The experts] said that the first thing a besieged [commander]

must do is to exhort his companions-in-arms to constancy, informing them of all the rewards of patience, warning them about the enemy and that which they will receive at his hands should he conquer them; promising them every good upon their victory and the retirement of the enemy from against them; with safety for themselves and their wealth, to the amount which would satisfy their souls and enlarge their hopes.

He should know the extent of his enemy's arming and the extent of his injury, so that his actions will be relative to these amounts; for he who knows the extent of that which is with his adversary, builds his power relative to the certainty of what he knows. He should employ those machines which counter the operation of the adversary and defend the fortress, and which abrogate [the effect] of the enemy's machines. He should not use any arms or projectiles other than those he is confident will injure the enemy; for, the weapon, when it has gone from the hand of its wielder, without effecting thereby any injury to his enemy, has lost its use to the wielder, notwithstanding his urgent need of it. Perhaps the enemy may gain it and make it part of his battery against the one who threw it in the first place.

[The commander of the fortress] should not indulge in rushing the enemy and sallying forth to battle except out of necessity and the need to defend himself; nor should he engage in battle so long as he has resort to trickery and stratagem. He must have recourse to procrastination and [other means of] defense. If the investment continues, he must seize the day and the hour and the moment to effect the stratagem prepared [against the enemy], and be aware of the happenings of the time and whatever relief comes forward. The Verified Truthful One, [The Prophet], has recounted that victory is with the patient.

In general, it is necessary that [the commander of the fortress] possess the hearts of the common people through justice and beneficence; for the reach of the desire of the common people is for naught but these. He who practices justice and good works, his subjects will be among the most sincere of his soldiers, because of the tranquility of their hearts towards him. They may hold fast to their places when the

army of the ruler is absent from them until the coming of one whom the ruler deputizes from among the trustworthy for this [duty of defense].¹ But God knows best.

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- (1) This book and the preceding one should be compared to the analogous discussion in Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, Book VII, *passim*. However, his discussion makes more of the besieged condition than of the reverse. The concluding sections of Machiavelli's discussion are given over to some general apothegms on military discipline and theory, and both in tone and motive, they read very much like the relevant sections of the *Tafriḥ al-kurūb*. Both works partake of what might be called the "classical" attitude to war, and the disjunction between the theoretical exposition and the practical application of these rather "bookish" theorems remains to be clarified.

A PRELIMINARY GLOSSARY OF MUSLIM MILITARY TERMS

عمود 'amūd	mace; war-club.
عربة 'arabah	cart drawn by animals to carry arquebusiers and light artillery.
أرباب الخيل arbāb al-khayl	cavalry officers.
أرباب سيوف arbāb suyūf	ranks of the Mamlūk commands :
مقدم أو أمير الألف	1) <i>muqaddam</i> or <i>amīr al-alf</i> : commander of up to 1000 horsemen in ranks of 100 each.
أمير الطليخانة	2) <i>amīr al-ṭabliḡhānah</i> : commander of up to 80 horsemen.
أمير العشرة	3) <i>amīr al-ʿashrah</i> : commander of 10, or sometimes as many as 20 horsemen.
أمير الخمسة	4) <i>amīr al-khamsah</i> : commander of 5 horsemen.
المماليك السلطانية	5) <i>al-mamālīk al-sulṭānīyah</i> or <i>aʿṣam al-ajnād</i> : the royal mamluks; those nearest the Sulṭān.
أجناد الحلقة	6) <i>ajnād al-ḡalqah</i> : non-Mamlūk cavalry.
عرادة 'arrādah	a type of mangonel used for casting stones long distances.
عرصة الحرب 'arṣat al-ḡarb	battle-field.
عروسك 'arūsak	a small machine for throwing stones, inflammables and other missiles.
عسكر 'askar	army; or as 'askarī عسكري, soldier.
العسكر الأنظم al-'askar al-aẓam	an army of 16,384 soldiers.
عس 'ass	night patrol.
أثقال athqāl	baggage; materiel.
عيار ayyār	one who shoots stones from slings.
بلطة balṭah	battle-axe.

بارود	bārūd	gunpowder; inflammables.
بيادة	bayādah	foot soldier.
بيات	bayāt	night raiding or night-attack.
بيطرة	bayṭarah	veterinary science.
بندق	bunduq	bullet or pellet; later forms :
	بندقية	1) <i>bunduqīyah</i> : hand gun, rifle.
	بندق الرصاص	2) <i>bunduq al raṣāṣ</i> : arquebus.
	قوس بندق	3) <i>qaws bunduq</i> : arquebus.
بنود	bunūd	(sing. <i>band</i> بند) lance-exercises; jousting.
برج	burj	siege-tower of wood, covered with iron and leather sheets.
برج متحرك	burj mutaḥarrik	mobile siege tower.
دبابة	dabbābah	testudo; "rat", i. e., a structure designed to protect troops manning the ramming devices.
دبوس	dabbūs	mace, club, cudgel.
دبداب	dabdāb	small war drum.
دبش	ḡabr	siege-machine; testudo.
دالاق	dālātī	light, swift troops.
درقة	daraqah	leather shield .
دراجة	darrājah	cavalry guard placed beyond the encampment; upon discovering any trouble, such as from probable ambushes, they shout to alarm the camp.
ديدبان	daydubān	roving scout for an ambush party.
درع	dir‘	breast plate or coat of mail; used interchangeably with its plural, <i>dirā‘</i> دراع .
فصيلة	faṣīlah	smallest unit of infantry or cavalry.
فيلق	faylaq	an armed body of 5,000 men.
فرسان الحرب	fursān al-ḥarb	battle-cavalry; "heavy cavalry" (?).
حجار	ḥajjār	man responsible for the missiles used in the mangonels.
حرية	ḥarbah	short spear; comparable to the "pilum" of the Greeks.
حسك - حسكة	ḥasak or ḥasakah	grappling iron; as <i>ḥasak al-muthallathāt</i> حسك المثلثات three-pronged caltrops for

هلال	hilālī	keeping off cavalry, made into the shape of a prickly plant; made of wood with an iron tip having three or six points.
انقلاب	inqilāb	crescent-shaped battle formation.
أصهبد	iṣbahbad or iṣpahbadh	retreating in order to flee the battle-field.
جعبة	jaʿbah	cavalry commander, or, sometimes, the commander of the army.
جبخانة	jabkhānah	quiver.
جحفل	jaḥfal	magazine for arms and ammunition.
جامكية	jāmikiyah	division of the army containing 256 men.
جاویش	jāwīsh	military pay and/or allowances in the Mamlūk period.
جوشن	jawshan	foot soldiers.
جیش	jaysh	coat of mail; or protective covering made of leather or iron or hair.
جسر	jīsr or jāsir	division of the army containing 4096 men; or the army as a whole in more common usage.
جرج	jurkh	bridge, embankment, pontoon, dam.
ككببة	kabkabah	arbalest for shooting arrows and inflammables; the general sense of an instrument for projectiles.
كبش	kabsh	division of the army containing 512 men.
كمين أو كمينة	kamīn or kamīnah	battering ram.
كشافة	kashshāfah	ambush.
كتيبة	katībah	scout, scouting party.
خميس	khamīs	squadron; detachment of cavalry; a group of foot soldiers numbering between 500 and 800 men.
الحيل المقومة	al-khayl al-muqawwimah	classical Arabic battle-formation; a division of the army containing 8,192 men.
		supporting or reserve cavalry; in numbers matching those they are replacing.

خفاف أنجاد	khifāf anjād	lightly armed troops, probably cavalrymen.
خوذة	khūdhah	helmet.
خطاف أو خطيف	khattāf or khatīf	grapnel or iron hook; used for scaling fortress walls or bringing an enemy ship alongside for boarding.
كنانة	kinānah	leather quiver.
كلب	kullab	pot-hook; spur; talon of a hawk; thorns of a tree; "grappling-iron".
كلتة	kulutah	"kulota"; head covering worn by the <i>amīrs</i> and soldiers of the Ayyūbid armies, and in the period of Qalāwūn; angular cap wadded with cotton.
كرة	kurah	circular battle formation.
كردوس	kurdūs	a division of the army containing 128 men; a squadron of cavalry; cohort.
كوس	kūs	kettle-drum.
لامة الحرب	lāmat al-ḥarb	coat of mail.
لجام	lijām	bit or bridle.
لواء	liwā'	standard; flag; banner; applied as a name to a brigade of infantry or cavalry. Cf. <i>rāyah</i> , راية <i>band</i> بند <i>dirafs</i> درفس 'alam علم 'uqāb عقاب
منجنيق	manjanīq	mangonel, ballista; machine for casting missiles.
مسبك	masbak	foundry for cannon.
ميمنة	maymanah	right flank.
ميسرة	maysarah	left flank.
مدفع	midfa'	cannon; other names, mostly short-lived :
مكحلة النفط	mukḥulat al-naft.	
صواعق النفط	ṣawā'iq al-naft.	
صواريخ النفط	ṣawārikh al-naft.	
آلات النفط	ālāt al-naft.	
هندم النفط	hindam al-naft.	

مغفر	mighfar	helmet; head covering worn under the helmet; a protection for face and neck during battle.
مقلاع	miqlā'	sling.
مقنب	miqnab	division of the army containing 64 men.
مزراق	mizrāq	javelin; demi-lance.
معين	mu'ayyan	rhomboid or diamond-shaped battle formation.
مبندق	mubandiq	arquebusier.
مبارز	mubāriz	duellist; one engaged in single combat.
محماة	mu' māt	red-hot molten iron used in bullets.
مجنح	mujannah	winged battle formation with center bending inward.
مكحلة	mukḥulah	culverin; used interchangeably with <i>midfa'</i> for cannon.
مقدم	muqaddam	general; commanding officer of unit of the army, e.g., scouting party, vanguard etc.
مربع	murabba'	quadrangular battle formation.
مصاف للقتال	muṣāff'li al-qitāl	battle ranking; mobilization for battle.
مشاة	mushāt	infantryman.
مستطيل	mustaṭil	wedge-shaped battle formation.
مثلثة	muthallathah	three-pronged piece put on the top of poles, then stuck in the ground so as to deter cavalry charges near the trenches.
نبلة	nablah	arrow, more generally employed in the plural, <i>nibāl</i> نبال
نفير	naḥir	brazen trumpet; fife or flute.
نفط	naḥṭ	naptha, "Greek-fire".
نعل	na'l	horse-shoe.
نقب أو نقوب	naqb or nuqūb	mining. Cf. <i>laghm</i> and/or <i>lighām</i> .
نشاب أو نشابة	nushshāb or nushshābah	arrow or arrows.
قذاف	qadhdhāf	catapult, ballista; engine for throwing stones or darts.
قفع	qaf'	siege-machine; type of testudo made of

قهقرا	qahqarā	wood under which the infantrymen approach the walls of a fortress. movement backwards; fighting while retreating.
قائد	qā'id	senior officer; deputy of the commander.
قنطرة	qanṭarah	vaulted bridge; barrage.
قرايغا أو قرايغرار	qarābughā or qarābughrār	war-engine; "throwing-machine".
قوصى	qaws	bow.
قنبلة	qunbulah	bomb; shell; container of naptha and other explosives; fire-pot.
رئيس الأجناد	ra'is al-ajnād	captain of a troop.
صف المقاطر	ṣaff al-maqāṭir	a file of 16 armed or 8 unarmed soldiers.
صاحب اللواء	ṣāhib al-liwā'	standard-bearer; flag-officer or flag-commander.
سهم	sahm	arrow.
ساقة	sāqah	rear guard of the army.
سرى	sarī	a kind of armament for the horse's head.
سرج	sarj	saddle.
سوابق	sawābiq	swift horses; race horses trained for scouting.
شليل	shalīl	garment worn under a coat of mail.
شعار	shi'ār	sign, signal, military pass-word, insignia.
ستارة	sitārah	curtain or thick net covering siege machine to protect the warriors within.
سلم	sullam	siege ladder.
صور	ṣūr	war trumpet; clarion; horn.
طبر	ṭabar	battle-axe.
تعبية	ta'biyah	mobilization for battle; ranking an army in proper positions for battle.
طبل	ṭabl	war-drum; generally sounded for mobilization and in times of stress from the roof of the <i>tablkhānah</i> adjacent to the Citadel in Cairo.

تهليلة	tahlilāh	withdrawing from one's opponent in single combat.
طائفة	ṭā'ifah	division of the army containing 2,048 men.
تجفاف	tajfāf	breast-plate or coat of mail for the cavalryman; or, alternatively, placed upon the horse.
طليعة	ṭalī'ah	scout, scouting party.
تعليق	ta'liq	scaling or grappling with regard to the walls of a fortress. (It is not clear whether the word refers to the action itself or the devices by which the act is accomplished.)
تقاطر	taqāṭir	proper filing of the battle rankings.
طارقة	ṭāriqaḥ	cuirass.
تسريح	tasriḥ	disengagement from battle.
تيشة	tīshah	battle-axe or halbert.
طوب أو طوبة	ṭūb or ṭūbah	cannon; artillery.
تفكجي	tufakjī	soldier armed with a rifle or arquebus.
عصبة	uṣbah	two files of armed, or four files of unarmed men: a total of 32 men.
وردیان	wardyān	a guard; a look-out.
زبطانة	zabṭānah	a weapon shooting small pellets and used in hunting; later becomes another word for arquebus.
زغفة	zaghfah	breast-plate of either metal or leather; a long coat of mail.
زحافة	zahḥāfah	siege-machine manned by arbalestiers; rolled against the walls of a fortress.
زنبورك	zanbūrak	cross-bow, arbalest; subsequently a small gun carried on the back of a camel.
زقازيق	zaqāzīq	iron-tipped staves placed about the trench of an encampment. Cf. <i>muthal-lathah</i> (مثاللة).

زرد	zard or zarad	coat of mail.
زردخانه	zardkhānah	Royal Arsenal in Mamlūk usage.
زارق	zāriq	javelin; demi-spear.
زراق	zarrāq	naptha-thrower; in early times inflammables were attached to short spears or javelins called <i>zarrāqah</i> (زراقة).
زيارة أو زيار	ziyārah or ziyār	a type of bow; arbalest.
زمره	zumrah	division of the army containing 1,024 men.

وينتظر حوادث الزمان وما يقع من الفرج . وقد أخبر الصادق المصدوق صلعم^(١٢) أن النصر مع الصبر . وبالجملة فإنه يجب عليه أن يملك قلوب الرعية بالعدل والإحسان ؛ فإنه ليس غاية مراد الرعية إلا ذلك . ومن عانى^(١٣) العدل والإحسان كانت رعيته من أنصح الجند له لطمأنينة قلوبهم إليه ، وربما ضبطوا مكانهم^(١٤) إذا غاب عنهم جند الملك إلى حين حضور من يثق به الملك من المندوبين لذلك . والله أعلم .

(١٣) « عان » في ف .

(١٢) « المصدق » في ي .

(١٤) « مكانه » في ي .

به الحصار وجود الماء والمأكل وما ينتفع به المحاصر مما لا بد منه ؛ فإن وجود ذلك مما يحتمل المطاولة التي قد يضجر العدو منها فيكون سبباً لانصرافه .

الفصل الثاني : فيما يجب على صاحب الحصن فعله حالة (٣) الحصار .

قد قالوا إنه أول ما [ينبغي أن] (٤) يبدأ به المحصور هو حض (٥) أصحابه على الثبات وإعلامهم [بجميع عواقب] (٦) الصبر ، وتحذيرهم من العدو وما يلقونه منه إن ظفر بهم ، والوعد بكل خير عند نصرتهم وانصراف العدو عنهم ، مع سلامة أنفسهم وأموالهم ، إلى غير ذلك مما تسكن إليه نفوسهم ، ويفسح ما لهم .

وعليه أن يعرف منتهى سلاح عدوه ومدى نكايته ، ليكون عمله على قدر ذلك ؛ لأن من علم غاية ما عند خصمه بنى (٧) أمره على يقين ما علم . وعليه أن يستعمل من الآلات ما فيه إفساد لعمل الخصم ، ودفع عن الحصن ، وإبطال آلات العدو . وأن لا يستعمل من السلاح ولا يرى إلا بما يوثق (٨) بنكايته ، لأن السلاح إذا خرج عن صاحبه ، ولم يقع نكاية به في عدوه ، فقد عدمه الراعى به من غير نفع مع شدة الاحتياج إليه ، وربما ظفر به العدو فصيروه عدة له على من رمى به أولاً .

وعليه أن لا يناهض عدوه ولا يناجزه للقتال (٩) إلا عند الضرورة والحاجة (١٠) إلى الدفع عن نفسه ، ولا يقاتل ما وجد إلى الحيلة والخديعة سبيلاً ، وعليه بالمطاولة والمدافعة . وإن دام الحصار يغتم (١١) اليوم والساعة واللحظة لتهيأ له الحيلة ،

(٤) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٦) ما بين الحاصرتين « بجميل قوائد » في ي .

(٨) « يليق » في ي .

(١٠) ناقص في ي .

(٣) « حال » في ي .

(٥) « حظ » في ف .

(٧) « بنا » في ف .

(٩) « بالقتال » في ي .

(١١) « يقيم » في ي .

الباب العشرون

في بيان كيفية المدافعة عن الحصون وحفظها

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فيما يجب على صاحب الحصن من الاعتداد لحرب العدو قبل طروق الحصن .

قال أهل التجربة والبحث عن هذا الشأن : أول ما يحتاج إليه صاحب الحصن في حال أمنه قبل أن يفاجئه العدو أن يكون قد حصن حصنه وأحكم مواضع المقاتلة ، وأن يكون مشحوناً بالرجال وبكل آلة وعدة تعين على طول الحصار وتنكر^(١) في العدو وعند المناهضة ؛ فإن في ظهور الاستعداد بذلك ما يعلم به العدو النازل على الحصن أن صاحبه متيقظ لمن ورد عليه مستعداً له ، فيكون سبباً لإحجامه ورجوعه عنه .

ومن شأن الحازم أنه^(٢) لا يزال متوقعاً للعدو في كل وقت ؛ فإن قصده العدو وجده مستعداً . وعليه أن لا يقصر في شيء من أمور مدافعة العدو في وقت من الأوقات قبل الحصار ، ولا في شيء من عمله وتدييره إلا أن يكون عليه في ذلك وهن أو خلل . فإن من أضاع شيئاً في وقته أو أخره عنه فليس المعلوم سواه .

ومما يزيل طمع الطالب ما يراه من دوام الاحتراز . ومن أجل ما يستعان

(٢) « أن » في ف .

(١) « ينكل » في ف .

صور وعكا وعسقلان وغيرها من المدن العظام خشية أن يملكها الفرنج فتتحصن^(٣٧) به . وهذه كانت طريقة ملوك التتر^(٣٨) من هولاكو وغازان^(٣٩) فمن بعدهم ؛ فقد خربوا^(٤٠) كثيراً من المدن والحصون ، منها ما أعيدت عمارته ، ومنها ما بقي على ذلك . ومن الملوك من لا يرى تخريب الحصون لأن المقصود عمارة الأرض لا خرابها ، وقد يملك الملك ما خربه من الحصون فيحتاج إلى عمارته ثانياً ، فيقع ذلك في غاية المشقة والكلفة .

(٣٨) « التتر والتتر » في ف .

(٤٠) « خرب » في ي .

(٣٧) « فيها » في ي .

(٣٩) ناقص في ي .

وإن مال^(٢٧) أهل الحصن إلى المناجزة في القتال عاكسهم في مرادهم ، وأخذهم بالمطاوله ، لأنهم لم يميلوا إلى المناجزة إلا وقد أخذهم الضجر . وإن مالوا إلى المطاوله أخذهم بالمناجزة ، على أن المطاوله في الحرب هي رأس المكيدة ، وهو الذي يقتضيه الحزم . وبالحملة فبنى^(٢٨) الحرب على مخالفة غرض العدو .

ومن محاسن المحاصرة أن يطوف صاحب الجيش أو من يستنهضه من عسكره في كل يوم أو يومين بالحصن ، ويظهر لأهل^(٢٩) الاجتهاد في أمر فتحه والعمل في أخذه ، فإن في^(٣٠) ذلك إرهاباً لهم .

وما ينبغي أن ينبغى أن ينبه^(٣١) له أن المحاصر للعدو هو محصور أيضاً^(٣٢) [في المعنى]^(٣٣) لأنه لا يأمن خروجهم عليه ومناجزتهم له متى أمكنهم الفرصة في ليل أو نهار ، لأنهم يرومون الظفر كما يرومه المحاصر لهم . فينبغى أن يحترز على نفسه ومن معه من العسكر ما أمكنه ، ويتخذ الخنادق إن احتاج إليها وأمكنه عملهم ، فإن ذلك من أشد الحزم والاستظهار .

وأن يجعل على قدر رمية سهم من باب الحصن فرساناً مرابطة له ، منتظرين من يخرج منه ليكونوا بمنزلة الطلائع للعسكر ؛ فإذا رأوا أحداً خرج من الحصن بادروا بالإعلام به ليلاقيه^(٣٤) العسكر أو من يقاومه منهم .

وإذا ظفر المحاصر للحصن به واستولى ، فقد اختلفت مقاصد الملوك في ذلك ؛ فمنهم من يرى بهدمه^(٣٥) الحصن وتخريبه حتى لا يكون ملجأ لمن يتحصن به [من العدو مرة أخرى]^(٣٦) . ولذلك هدم ملوك الترك مدن سواحل الشام من

(٢٨) « فنى » في ف .

(٣٠) ناقص في ف .

(٣٢) ناقص في ف .

(٣٤) « لملاقاته » في ف .

(٣٦) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٢٧) « قال » في ف .

(٢٩) « لأهله » في ف .

(٣١) « ينتبه » في ف .

(٣٣) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٣٥) « يهدم » في ف .

ما يختار من أماكن الحصن ، ومواضع النقوب والتعليق ونصب السلام والكلايب [وكذلك نسب] ^(٢٠) المنجانيق والحجارة المناسبة لها ، ومواضع رمى النشاب والمقاليع والنقط ، وكيفية استعمال ذلك والعمل به ، بعد أن يضع من ينصبه لقتال ^(٢١) الحصن في مكان لاسييل للعدو عليه . ويفعل من ^(٢٢) ذلك الأنسب بالأنسب . ^(٢٣)

وعليه أن يعد من أصناف المقاتلة والصناع كل ما يحتاج إليه من الحديد والخشب ونحوها ، وصانع ^(٢٤) كل آلة تتعلق بالحرب ، ويأخذ الصناع بعمل الآلات والسلاح ، ولا يهمل ذلك ولا يؤخره ، ويظهر عمل ذلك لأهل الحصن ولا يخفيه ؛ فإن في ذلك إرهاباً لهم ، وتخويفاً وإضعافاً لقلوبهم .

ويعجل بنصب المنجانيق والرمي بها ؛ فإن لها على أهل الحصون روعة . ومهما أمكنه انتهاز الفرصة انتهزها وبادر إليها ، ولا يؤخر ذلك لمراجعة أهل الحصن ؛ فإن في التأخير راحة لهم ، وأخذ الأهبة ، وإدارة الرأي بينهم ، وذلك من أجل مقاصد العدو وما فيه مصلحته ، ولكل شيء وقت متى تعداه أفسده بمقدار التعدي .

وإذا وقع الحصار فلا يرفع عنهم رمى المنجانيق ، ولا يفتر عنها ساعة واحدة من ليل أو نهار ؛ فإن كف القتال عنهم [مما يرد روعتهم] ^(٢٥) ويقوى قلوبهم .

وإذا وقع القتال بالسلاح ينبغي أن يقاتلوا بالأسر منه فالأسر ، ويؤخر العظيم المهول ^(٢٦) من الآلات إلى آخر ما يقاتلون به ليظهر لهم كل قليل ما هو أقوى من الآخر ، إلى أن تدعو الضرورة إلى الابتداء بالأقوى فيبدأ به .

(٢٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٢١) « قتال » في ي .

(٢٢) « في » في ي .

(٢٣) « جميع » في ي .

(٢٤) ما بين الحاصرتين « مما يروع بروعهم » في ي .

(٢٥) « المهول » في ي .

وإن لم يتأت طاعتهم وانقيادهم فإن أمكنت حيلة يتحيل بها على خروج أهل الحصن للقتال ، مثل أن يطعمهم في الظفر به أو يولى به عنهم أو يظهر أنه راحل عنهم ليخرجوا في تبع العسكر ؛ فإذا خرجوا راوهم ودخل الحصن بغتة ، كان أعون على المقصود .

الفصل الثالث : في كيفية الحصار .

قال أهل الدربة بالحصار : أول ما يبدأ به^(١١) من عمل الحصار أن يحصر أهله من أول نزوله عليهم حصراً لا يقدرّون معه على أن يخرج منهم أحد ، ولا يدخل إليهم أحد^(١٢) لا يسمعون له كلاماً ، ولا ينظرون له إشارة ، ولا تبلغ^(١٣) إليهم رمية سهم . فإنه ربما بلغهم أحد أخبار العسكر مشافهة إن كانوا يسمعون كلامه ، أو يشير إليهم إشارة في ذلك يفهمونها^(١٤) ، أو يكتب كتاباً ويجعله في سهم ويرى به إليهم فيأخذون حذرهم .

وعليه أن يحترز من رسلهم ، ولا يدع أحداً^(١٥) من عسكره يدنو منهم إلا العلماء بتصاريف الكلام^(١٦) ومصادره وموارده ممن يثق به ، ويحذر أن يظفر أحد منهم بلفظة فما فوقها ، فرب كلمة فتحت باباً مغلقاً من الشر .

ويجب أن يكون رسوله إليهم ممن^(١٧) يوثق بنصيحته وديانته ووفائه وصحة تدبيره .

وعليه أن يعرف أحوال الحصن والمواضع الصعبة والسهلة والممتنعة^(١٨) والممكنة في العمل ، ومواضع المخاض^(١٩) والمغاير والجسور والقناطر التي يعبر منها إلى

(١١) ناقص في ف .

(١٢) « يبلغ » في ف .

(١٣) « أحد » في ف .

(١٤) « يفهمونه » في ف .

(١٥) « للكلام » في ف .

(١٦) « الممتنع » في ف .

(١٧) « من » في ف .

(١٨) « المخارص » في ف .

الفصل الثانى : فى بيان الطريق السهل لفتح الحصون .

قال أهل التجربة فى ذلك : من أنفع الأعمال فى فتح الحصون على اختلافها أن يأتىها صاحب الجيش على حين غفلة من أهلها ، وإن وافق أن يكون ذلك والأبواب مفتوحة فهو الغاية فى النجاح . وقد وقع ذلك للملك الظاهر بيبرس البندقدارى — رحمه الله تع — فى مدينة أنطاكية من عمل حلب ، فكان فتحها من أيسر الفتوح على ما هى عليه من الحصانة .

وإن لم يتهبأ ذلك فإن أمكنت الحيلة فى استسلام من فى الحصن ودخولهم فى الطاعة ، أو استمالة من أمكن منهم ليكون عوناً على الباقين قبل المناهضة ، كان أولى . وإن لم يجد^(٥) من يوصل الخبر إليهم كتب الكتب بما فيه إثارة الفتنة^(٦) بينهم مثل أن يظهر أن بعض الحصن معه ، ويجعل ذلك فى سهم ، ويرمى به إلى الحصن ، ونحو ذلك .

وعليه أن يظهر لأهل الحصن العدل والوفاء ودوام الإحسان ، ومراعاة النازلين إليه والاعتناء بهم ؛ فإنه إذا^(٧) اشتهر ذلك عنه وتحقق منه كان أسرع لانقيادهم له ، وأدعى لدخولهم فى طاعته . وإن طلبوا الأمان بذله لهم .

وإن خرج إليه منهم مستأمناً أولاه من البر ما يستطيعه مع^(٨) الحذر منه من غير إشعار له بذلك . وإن وصل إليه أحد من أهل الجرائم طمئنه^(٩) ووعدته كل خير ، وإن استطاع استجلاب أخصاء صاحب الحصن ليرجعوا عنه أو يكفوا مؤنته كان ذلك من أوفق^(١٠) أمور الفتح وأهدأها .

(٥) « تجد » فى النصين .

(٧) ناقص فى ف .

(٩) ناقص فى ف .

(٦) « الفتن » فى ى .

(٨) « من » فى ى .

(١٠) « أرفق » فى ف .

الباب التاسع عشر

في بيان ممارسة فتح الحصون وكيفية التوصل إلى ذلك
وفيه ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول : في ذكر أنواع الحصون وما يحتاج إليه كل منها في الفتح من
العلاج ^(١) .

اعلم أن الحصون في اللغة تطلق على كل ما يتحصن به المتحصن من
القلاع ، والمدن المسورة ، والجبال ، والخوانق ، والمغائر ، والمطامير المحفورة ،
وغياض ^(٢) الشجر ، وآجام القصب ، والبحار ، والرمال ، وغير ذلك . ولكل
منها حكم يخصه ^(٣) في المحاصرة والفتح . وقد يجتمع في الحصن الواحد عدة
من الأصناف المذكورة ^(٤) مثل أن يكون قلعة على جبل في داخل مدينة
مسورة ، وعلى ذلك خنادق دائرة ، وفي الحصن مطامير محفورة للاختفاء ونحو
ذلك ، فيحتاج كل صنف من ذلك إلى علاج يخصه في العمل والتدبير بحسب
ما يقتضيه الحال .

فإنها ما يحتاج إلى المطاولة والمصابرة وبناء الحصون عليه ، وإقامة المدة
الطويلة كالمدن الحصينة والقلاع المشحونة بالأزواذ وآلات الحرب . ومنها ما
يكتفى فيه بأدنى الحيلة والأيام القليلة . وبين هذين القدرين ضروب مختلفة
الأحوال ، يحتاج في كل واحد منها إلى آلات مخصوصة ، وتدبير مناسب في
الحصار والمجاربة .

(١) « القلاع » في ي .

(٢) « غياض » في ف .

(٣) ناقص في ي .

(٤) « مشهورة » في ف .

ويجب التنبيه عليه أن المهزمن من العدو لا ينبغي أن يستقبلهم أحد من العسكر في وجوههم ، وأن لا يردوا عن طريقهم ، وأن لا يصدوا عن الماء إذا طلبوه ؛ فإن المهزم إذا غلب على ظنه الهلاك حمل بكليته وقاتل القتال الشديد طلباً لسلامة نفسه . وإنما ينبغي أن يفرج عنهم ، ثم يستدار بهم ليؤخذوا من الجوانب . وبالجملة فالوقوف في طريق المهزم غير موافق .

الفصل الثاني : فيما يتعلق بأمر الغنيمة هـ

وما يجب تقدمه ^(٢) على ذلك أنه إذا وقعت الهزيمة على العدو أن لا يتشاغل ^(٣) أهل العسكر عن أمر القتال بالغنيمة والنهب ؛ فإن الهزيمة إن كانت حقيقة فالغنيمة لا تفوت ، وإن كانت خديعة من العدو فرما جرت إلى فساد يلحق ^(٤) العسكر عقب ذلك . وقد وقع مثل ذلك في غزوة أحد للصحابة رضى الله عنهم أجمعين ^(٥) فعاتبهم الله على ذلك ، وذلك أن النبي صلعم أمر بعض الرواة بحفظ مكان عينه لهم ، فلما وقعت الهزيمة على المشركين فسارع أولئك الرواة الذين أمرهم النبي صلعم بحفظ ذلك المكان إلى الغنيمة فعرض للمسلمين بسبب ذلك مشقة كبيرة ، وأنزل الله تع في ذلك : ” من بعد ما أراكم ما تحبون منكم من يريد الدنيا ومنكم من يريد الآخرة “ (٣ - ١٥٢) .

وقسمة الغنيمة المذكورة ^(٦) في كتب الفقه ، والذي يتعلق بهذا الموضوع منها أن مذهب الشافعي - رضى الله عنه - أنه يقسم للراجل سهم ، ولل فارس ثلاثة أسهم ، فيكون الفرس في ذلك بسهمين ؛ ومذهب أبى حنيفة - رضى الله عنه - أن للراجل سهم ، ولل فارس سهمان ، فتكون ^(٧) الفرس بسهم واحد . ولا حاجة إلى استيعاب الأحكام [في ذلك هنا] ^(٨) .

(٢) « تقديمه » في ي .

(٣) « يشتغل » في ي .

(٤) « يلحقه » في ف .

(٥) « ناقص في ي .

(٦) « مذكور » في ف .

(٧) « فيكون » في ي .

(٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

الباب الثامن عشر

فيما يجب فعله عند انهزام العدو

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فيما يتعلق بتمام أمر الحرب عند انهزام العدو .

قال المدبرون لأمر الحرب : إذا تحققت هزيمة العدو توليته فيجب حينئذ اتباعهم ، فركوب أفضيتهم ، والأخذ في أمرهم بالجد والاجتهاد قبل التيام صفوفهم ، والتحاق متفرق خيلهم ، مع الحذر من الكمين والتميقظ له ؛ فإنه ربما كانت الهزيمة من العدو خدعة ومكيدة كما تقدم ، والهزيمة الصحيحة لا تكاد تخفى على متيقظ ، وربما خفيت عليه لنفاد القدر .

وإذا استحكمت الهزيمة فينبغي أن تختص الميمنة والميسرة بطلب العدو . ويكون صاحب الجيش في القلب شاهر الألوية وأعلامه يسير^(١) على رسله قليلا قليلا ، فإذا انتهى إلى الموضع الذي يستحق الوقوف فيه وقف من معه من القلب ، وتبقى الميمنة والميسرة في الطلب للعدو بحيث أنهم لم يغيبوا عن بصر صاحب الجيش . وإن استرسلت الخيل في طلبهم فينبغي أن تحمل الرجالة على العدو ، وليشغلوا رجاله العدو عن التعرض للخيل إن رأى صاحب الجيش ذلك . وإن خيفت كثرة العدو بعد انهزامه أمر صاحب القلب أهل الميمنة والميسرة أن يزحفوا إليه من غير أن يولوا ظهورهم ، بل يكون رجوعهم انحرافاً وأزوراراً وصدورهم في وجه العدو ، كما تقدم .

(١) « تسير » في ي .

قبل قتله . وكذلك يجب حفظ المستأمنين والأسراء وإيثاقهم بعد التوفية بما وقع لهم من الالتزام .

واعلم أن أحوال الحرب لا تجرى على نظام واحد ، بل تختلف أحوالها وتتغير ، وربما دبر صاحب الجيش أو بعض قواده^(٥٥) أمراً فأتى الحال بخلافه ، فيعمل حينئذ بما يقتضيه رأيه ، ويؤدى إليه اجتهاده .

وقد حكى أن أفروطة من مراكب الفرنج قصدت مدينة سبتة^(٥٦) من بلاد المغرب ، فخرجت المقاتلة ، وجرى بينهم مصاف عظيم كانت النصره فيه آخراً للمسلمين . [فرغت النصارى] ^(٥٧) قلاع مراكبهم وأقلعت ، فتأخر مركب كبير لعسر حركته ، فاجتمع رماة المسلمين عليه ، فستروا عليه بالدرق والطوارق ، فصاح شيخ من مشايخ المسلمين على الرماة : عليكم بحبل النصارى [فارموا عليه ، فرموا عليه فاشتبك الشباب فيه] ^(٥٨) فتعذر جريانه فى البكر لاشتباك السهام فيه ، فأدركه المسلمون فأخذوه .

(٥٥) « المقاتلة » فى ى .

(٥٦) « سكتة » فى ف .

(٥٧) ما بين الحاصرتين « فرغت للمسلمين فرغت النصارى » فى ف .

(٥٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ى .

وإذا^(٤٧) جن عليهم الليل ، ولم ينصرف القتال ، فينبغي لفرسان العسكر ورجالته أن لا يزولوا عن موقفهم حتى ينصرف عدوهم ، ثم ينصرفوا بعد ذلك بصفوفهم على تعبثهم الأول فالأول . وفي هذه الحالة يجب الحذر من هجوم العدو ودخول جواسيسه .

فإذا دخل الناس إلى مواضعهم انصرف أرباب الخيل إلى مراكزهم ، وسدوا أبواب خنادقهم ، ودار العسس والقواد مع رؤساء الأجياد بالحرس حتى يصبحوا^(٤٨) .

وإن صفت الصفوف وهجم الليل^(٤٩) ولم يكن بد من المبيت فلينعطف [صف الميسرة]^(٥٠) على صدر القلب ، وينعطف^(٥١) طرف الميمنة حتى يصل إلى الميسرة ، فيستدير العسكر ، ويكون الإثقال حينئذ في الوسط قد أحاط بها الفرسان ، فإذا كان القلس الأكبر عادوا إلى مراكزهم .

وينبغي أن يدس إلى العدو من يأتي بخبرهم في الليل ، وما حدث لهم في حرب ذلك اليوم ، [وما أبرموه في ليلهم]^(٥٢) ، ليعملوا في نقضه بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال . ووقت ذهاب الجواسيس إلى العدو في هذه الحالة عند اشتغالهم في الرجوع إلى مواقعها^(٥٣) .

وينبغي أن يكون في جوانب العسكر من رجال اليقظة من ينظر في وجوه الناس ويتأملهم ؛ فمن رآه مريباً أو تخيل فيه مخيلة قبض عليه واستعلم^(٥٤) أمره ؛ فإن المريب يظهر حاله من وجهه ، ويعرفه أهل النباهة والفراسة . وإذا أنكر حال شخص وأقدم على قبضه فليحذر منه حينئذ ، فإنه ربما غلب على ظنه أنه يقتل فيبادر إلى قتل الذي قبض عليه لينجو بنفسه ، أو يأخذ بثأر نفسه

(٤٧) « وإن » في ف . (٤٨) « تصبحوا » في ف .

(٤٩) « العدو » في ف . (٥٠) ما بين الحاصرتين « صف طرف الميمنة » في ي .

(٥١) « يعطف » في ف .

(٥٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « وما أبدعوه في حربهم ليلهم » في ف .

(٥٣) « مواضعهم » في ي . (٥٤) « استعمله » في ي .

بين الفريقين . وقد نبه الله تع على ذلك بقوله : ” إن تكونوا تألمون فإنهم يألمون كما تألمون وترجون من الله ما لا يرجون “ (٤ - ١٠٤) .

وإن دخلت ميمنة العدو إلى بقية^(٤٠) العسكر فليس لأحد من أهل العسكر أن يخرج من العسكر ، إلا أن يكون واثقاً بأنه يدرك قرنه قبل رجوعه إلى موقفه ، لأن ضبطه مكانه ودفع عدوه [وهو فيه]^(٤١) أولى من الانصراف ، لأن المنفصل عن مكانه لا يدري كيف يكون حاله إلا أن يعلم أن العدو الداخل عليه ليس بناج فيحسن طلبه حينئذ .

الفصل الثالث : فيما يجب من الاحتراز في حال لقاء العدو .

قال أهل التجربة والدربة بالحروب : إذا [طرقت العسكر]^(٤٢) من ظهره خيل من خيل العدو [في حال المصاف]^(٤٣) ، أو خرج عليهم كمين ، حينئذ فيجب على صاحب الجيش أن يقيم [خيلاً يفردها]^(٤٤) لذلك لدفعه عن العسكر ؛ فإن لم يكن انتخب من الميسرة فرساناً تدفعهم^(٤٥) في نحورهم وتصددهم^(٤٦) عن ذلك .

قالوا : ويجب على الخارجين لهم أن لا يرجعوا إلا بأذن صاحب الجيش ، وأن لا يجاوزوا الموضع الذي حده لهم لأنه أعلم بما يوجههم فيه ، وهو في تلك الحالة كالطبيب للمريض .

(٤٠) « ميمنة » في ي . ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٤١) ما بين الحاصرتين « طرق العدو » في ف .

(٤٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « من المصاف » في ف .

(٤٣) « يفرد خيلاً » في ف . « يدفعهم » في ف .

(٤٤) « يصددهم » في ف .

أول حملة القوم] (٣٥) في أول وهلة ، فتنحرف الجبناء عن مواقفهم ، فيكون ذلك سبباً للكسرة . فإن اتفق أن يقع لهم ذلك فالطريق أن يومر بضبطهم ، يجعل معهم من رجال الحرب من يثبت معهم ليثبتوا بثبتهم ، ويقووا ما خار من قلوبهم .

فإن قدر أن يولى أحد من أهل العسكر عند خوفه الحرب أو عند ألم الجراح فلا يعترضه أحد من أهل العسكر بالوقوف في طريقه ، أو رده إلى الموقف من العسكر ، ولكن يرفق به ، ويؤخذ بالمدارة حتى يخرج إلى خلف (٣٦) الصفوف .

وإن كثّر العدو على العسكر ، وعجزوا عن دفع صولته ، رجعوا إلى عسكرهم على حميتهم حتى يلما أطرافهم ، ويعرضوا خيوطهم ورجلهم ، ويتقوا بالسلاح ، ويبعثوا بطلب (٣٧) المدد والتعجيل به ؛ فإذا اجتمعت لهم أطرافهم ووفاهم مددهم استأنفوا الحرب بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال .

وإن زحف العدو إلى العسكر إلى خنادقهم استعدوا لهم بأتم حالة ، وحملوا عليه (٣٨) حملة واحدة ، ناظرين مواطئ أقدام العدو دون وجودهم ؛ فإن ثبت العدو لملاقاتهم حينئذ فليس لهم إلا النزول إليهم بالسيوف والدبابيس المحرقة والأطبار . ومتى أخذ العسكر من عرضة الحرب قدر رمح من العدو ، وتوالى ذلك ، فقد عده أهل التجربة من مبادئ الظفر .

وعلى أهل العسكر أن يلزموا مواقفهم مع إحكام الصفوف حيث قصدهم العدو ، ولا يتركوا إشراع الأستة في صدورهم ، والرمي عليهم من كل ناحية . وإن طاول العدو وصابر فلا يأخذ أهل العسكر ضجر (٣٩) ولا قلق ، فإن الألم مشترك

(٣٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . (٣٦) « حد » في ف .

(٣٧) « يطلبو » في ف . (٣٨) « عليهم » في ي .

(٣٩) « ظافر » في ف .

في وجوههم من كل ناحية ، ويتحرك صاحب الجيش مع البند الأعظم ، وتحميه الخيل كلها وتحقق به ؛ فإن في ذلك روعة وإرهاباً للعدو ، لا سيما إذا ذاقوا حد الحديد . ومتى تأخر العدو حينئذ فهو ابتداء الظفر لإنشاء الله تع .

وإذا بارز مبارز من العسكر فليكن موقفه على الثلث مما بين أصحابه وبين العدو ، وإن استطرد فإلى الثلثين ، ولا يجاوز ذلك . ومنهم من قال : لا يجاوز الثلث بينه وبين أصحابه بكل حال .

[الفصل الثاني] ^(٣٠) : [فيما إذا زحف العدو على العسكر قبل زحف العسكر] . ^(٣١)

قال أهل التجربة في الحروب : إذا حمل العدو على العسكر قبل حملته أو استحكام ترتيبه وتعبته ، فالطريق في ذلك أن يحنو ^(٣٢) أهل العسكر على الركب ، ويشرعوا الأسنة في نحورهم ، ويتستروا بالدرق والطوارق ، ويكونوا صفاً واحداً متعاضدين ، إلى أن يندفع العدو أو يتهياً الركوب واللقاء . قال أهل التجربة للحرب : وهي ساعة فيها ^(٣٣) شدة على من لم يعتد مثلها .

وإن كانت حملة العدو على العسكر بعد استحكام تعبئة العساكر ، فالطريق في ذلك أن يتلقاهم رجالة العسكر ، ويشرعوا الأسنة في نحورهم ، ويلزموا مواقعهم ، ويعضدهم ^(٣٤) رماة العسكر بالرمي في وجوههم ؛ فإن لم تقف الرجالة في ذلك أجابت الخيل حينئذ .

ومن أنفع ما يعتمد في هذه الحالة الصبر ؛ فإنه لا يثبت لذلك إلا أهل القوة [والبسالة ومن له عادة باللقاء . والحذر أن يتضعضع العسكر عند

(٣٠) ما بين الحاصرتين « الفصل الثالث » في ف .

(٣١) ما بين الحاصرتين « فيما إذا زحف العسكر على العدو قبل زحف العسكر » في ي .

(٣٢) « يحنو » في النصين .

(٣٣) ناقص في ف .

(٣٤) « يقصدهم » في ي .

ومما ينبغى التنبيه إليه أن يعلم أن رجوع الفارس^(١٧) بعد الحملة إلى موضعه الذى خرج منه أولى إن أمكنه ذلك ، ليكون فى مكانه^(١٨) المقرر له . فإن لم يمكنه ذلك وقف على القرب منه ، ولا مشاحة^(١٩) فى ذلك ، لأن القصد^(٢٠) إنما هو قيامه فى صفه لا^(٢١) ذلك المكان بعينه .

وينبغى للحامل على العدو أن لا يستغرق جهده فى جرى فرسه ، وأن لا يتبع خصمه إلى^(٢٢) أكثر من الثلث مما بينه وبين العدو ، فيكون بينه وبين العسكر^(٢٣) الثلث من المسافة ، وبينه وبين العدو^(٢٤) الثلثان منها ؛ فإن فى الزيادة على ذلك تغرير ، « وما المغر بمحمود ولو سلما » .

ولا يأمن عند انهزام عدوه أمامه أن يكون ذلك لمكيدة من خروج كمين ونحوه ، اللهم إلا أن يظهر فشل العدو وخذلانه ؛ فيجب اتباعه ، لكنه لا يسرع فى الدخول فى عسكر العدو ، وإن ظهر فشله ، وتأخرت خيله ، حتى يتلاحق من عسكره أهل الشجاعة والصبر ، وتتراحف^(٢٥) فرسان الحرب .

وإن استطرد^(٢٦) العدو فأرهبوا فلا تقع الحملة عليهم حتى يسكن الرهيج ، ويتبين أمرهم حذرا من الكمين . وإذا ولى العدو وتحققت هزيمته فلا يتبعه كل العسكر ، بل يكون بعض العسكر خلفه [وبعض العسكر للغنيمة]^(٢٧) . وبعضهم الحفظ ؛ فإن اتباعهم بالجمع مذموم .

وإن ثبت العدو بعد انهزامه تقدم صاحب اللواء قليلا ، وتحمل الخيل التى قد انتخبت لذلك وأعدت^(٢٨) له . وينبغى فى هذه الحالة أن يسند^(٢٩) العسكر

(١٧) « للفارس » فى ف .

(١٩) « مشاحة » فى ي .

(٢١) « لان » فى ف .

(٢٣) « العدو » فى ي .

(٢٥) « ترأحف » فى ي .

(٢٧) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ف .

(٢٩) « يشد » فى ي .

(١٨) « مكان » فى ف .

(٢٠) « المقصود » فى ي .

(٢٢) ناقص فى ي .

(٢٤) « العسكر » فى ف .

(٢٦) « استظهر » فى ي .

(٢٨) « اعتدت » فى ي .

وإذا حملت طائفة من العسكر على العدو ، ثم اضطروا إلى الرجوع إلى مواقعهم ، فعليهم أن يتجنبوا قبح الرجعة والسرعة فيها ، لما في ذلك من الدلالة على الخوف والهلع . بل يكون رجوعهم على أتم الهيئات والثبات في الرجوع ؛ فإن سوء رجعته قد يؤدي إلى طمع العدو فيه ، فيتبعه العدو ، فتصير هزيمة .

وإن كان [الذي حمل على العدو وهم] ^(٩) أهل القلب بأجمعهم واحتاجوا إلى الرجوع رجعوا القهقري إلى وراء ظهورهم انحرافاً وازوراراً بالنظر ، وميل بعض المناكب والروس . وتكون ^(١٠) الصدور مواجهة لصدور العدو ، ولا تنحرف ^(١١) عنها حتى يصلوا إلى مواقعهم . وهم في ذلك مظهرون للقوة ، داعين بالظفر وطلب الثبات والنصر ، بحيث يسمعون أصحابهم ذلك ؛ فإن ذلك مما ^(١٢) يشعر بحضور القلب وقوته في مثل هذه الحالة التي تضعف ^(١٣) فيها القلوب . وإذا حمل أحد من القلب ، وانتهاز الفرصة من العدو ثم رجع ، انعطف متياسراً إلى الميسرة ، أو إلى ما بين جناح القلب والميسرة .

وإن كان الذين ^(١٤) حملوا هم من أهل الميمنة رجعوا القهقري إلى مواقعهم ، وإن حمل أحد منهم وانتهاز فرصة ثم أراد الرجوع عطف متياسراً إلى القلب أو إلى ما بين ^(١٥) جناح القلب والميمنة ؛ فإن ذلك أسهل له في رجوعه من أن يرجع إلى الميسرة وما يقرب منها .

وإن كان الذي حمل جميع الميسرة رجعوا القهقري إلى مواقعهم كما تقدم في الميمنة ، وإن حمل أحد من الميسرة ثم رجع عطف متياسراً ، فإن عطف الأيسر من الميسرة [بعد الحملة] ^(١٦) إلى نحو القلب أيسر منه إلى الأيمن .

(٩) ما بين الحاصرتين « الذي حمل العدو وهم أهل القلب » في ف .

(١٠) « يكون » في ي . (١١) « ينحرف » في ي .

(١٢) ناقص في ف . (١٣) « يضعف » في ي .

(١٤) « الذي » في ي . (١٥) ناقص في ف .

(١٦) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

الباب السابع عشر

فيما يجب فعله عند لقاء العدو وقتاله

وفيه ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول : فيما إذا زحف العسكر على العدو [قبل زحف العدو] ^(١) .

وإذا زحفت العساكر على العدو ابتداءً فينبغي أن يكون زحفهم ^(٢) عليه من مكان عال مرتفع عن الأرض ، ليكون العسكر أعلى ^(٣) من العدو ، ويكون زحفهم إليهم بالتثبيت ^(٤) والتحفظ والتؤدة ^(٥) . ويكون أمام الخيالة من الرجالة من يدب عنها ويحمي الفرسان من رجالة العدو ؛ فإن رجالة العسكر متى هزموا رجالة العدو ربما تبعهم فرسان العسكر في الانهزام . وإذا هزمت رجالة العدو رجعت على فرسانهم ^(٦) دعا ذلك خيلهم ^(٧) إلى الجفل ، وربما دام طلب رجالة العسكر لهم ، فيكون ذلك سبباً لكسر العدو وانهزامه .

وإن احتاج القلب إلى الزحف على العدو ، وسار أهله الهويث قليلاً قليلاً ، بلا ركض ولا عجلة ، فإنه إذا حدثت ^(٨) عجلة في الحركة إلى العدو ربما خطر لمن خلف الصف أنهم صاروا إلى العدو ليكونوا معه ، فانزعجوا لذلك وتأثروا له .

(١) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٢) « خروجهم » في ف .

(٤) « بالتثبيت » في ي .

(٦) « فرسان العدو » في ف .

(٨) « حدث » في ي .

(٣) « أعلا » في النصين .

(٥) ناقص في ي .

(٧) ناقص في ي .

ضعفاً للقلب ، وإن كان فيه قوة للجناحين . ولذلك كان من يصف صفة
 كذلك يجعل أهل البأس والنجدة ميمنة وميسرة ليكون أشد للقلب . والمغل من
 الترك معتادون أن يكون القوم كردوساً واحداً ليتدافعوا^(٢٨) على العدو ، ويمتنع
 على كل واحد منهم الهزيمة والرجوع ، ولهم بذلك الدربة العظيمة التي ليست
 لغيرهم .

(٢٨) « ليتدفعوا » في ي .

الحيز الرابع وراء الحيز الثالث ، وحكمه أن يكون حافظاً من خلف الأتقال . وقد شرطوا في هذا الحيز أن يكون فرسانه خفافاً أنجاداً من أهل التجارب في المعارك .

الحيز الخامس وراء الحيز الرابع ، وهو الساقة . وقد شرطوا [في هذا الحيز] ^(٢٠) أن يكون فيه [ذوو] ^(٢١) النجدة والبأس ممن يوثق بكفايته مما ^(٢٢) يندب إليه . وعلى هذا الحيز والحيز الرابع حفظ مؤخر العسكر ، والاحتراز من الغارة على مؤخر العسكر حسب الاستطاعة ؛ فإن العدو يطمع في أطراف العسكر .

الفصل الثالث : في بيان أشكال الصفوف في العدو الكثير .

وقد اختلفوا في ذلك ، فذهب أكثر العارفين بأمور الحرب أن أحسن الصفوف الصف المستوي المنضم ^(٢٣) بعضه إلى بعض . ويذكر أن ذلك هو ^(٢٤) مصطلح الفرس قديماً . وقد ^(٢٥) مدح الله هذه الصفة في كتابه العزيز ، فقال جلّت قدرته : ” إن الله يحب الذين يقاتلون في سبيله صفاً كأنهم بنيان مرصوص “ (٤ - ٦١) . وقد استحسّن بعض من له دربة بالحرب أن يكون الصف خارجاً من جناحيه ، داخلاً من صدره ، وهو أقوى لقلب الصف وأضعف لجناحيه ، [قد كان من] ^(٢٦) يفعل ذلك يعد لكل طرف من الجناحين كردوساً من الخيل المقومة عوضاً عما هو داخل من ^(٢٧) صدره .

وكرهوا أن يكون الصف خارج الصدر ، داخل الجناحين ؛ فإن فيه

(٢٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .
 (٢١) « ذووا » في ف .
 (٢٢) « فيما » في ي .
 (٢٣) « المنتظم » في ي .
 (٢٤) ناقص في ف .
 (٢٥) « في » في ي .
 (٢٦) « لذلك كان » في ي .
 (٢٧) « في » في ي .

ما على بين القلب ؛ والميسرة ما على يساره [ولكل من الثلاثة حكم يخصه^(٨)] وقد يسمون الميمنة والميسرة المجنبتين ، وتسمى الميمنة والميسرة الجناحين^(٩) ، فيقال جناح الميمنة ، وجناح الميسرة [وربما يسمى كل من الميمنة والميسرة جناحاً]^(١٠) .

وقد ينقسم كل من القلب والميمنة والميسرة إلى ثلاثة أجزاء على ما تقدم ، فيجعل للقلب قلب وميمنة وميسرة ، وللميمنة كذلك ، وللميسرة كذلك . ويجعل على كل جزء من هذه الأجزاء مقدما ، فتصير^(١١) في مقدمة العسكر تسعة مقدمين ، ليكون أقرب لتدبير أمرهم ؛ فإن كثرة المقدمين على الفرسان في أجزاء العسكر مما يزيدا قوة ، ويديم ثبوتها ، لا سيما إذا كان مع كل مقدم جزء من الجيش . قالوا : ينبغي أن يجعل ما^(١٢) بين جناحي القلب الميمنة الميسرة طريقاً ، ويوسع بينهما لتمر^(١٣) فيه الخيل وأرباب المبارزة .

الحيز الثاني وراء الحيز الأول ، ويكون^(١٤) في الترتيب على ثلاثة أجزاء : قلب وميمنة وميسرة على نظير الصف الأول : القلب خلف القلب ، والميمنة خلف الميمنة ، والميسرة خلف الميسرة . وقد شرطوا في هذا الحيز أن تكون^(١٥) فيه مشاهير الفرسان من يكفي في مثل ذلك ممن عرف بتدبير الحرب ، والقيام بمهماتهما ، والصبر على وقائعهما ، وصحة الرأي عند ورود المستصعبات^(١٦) فيها . الحيز الثالث وراء الحيز الثاني ، وهو الموضوع لحفظ الأثقال . وقد علم أنه لا مقام^(١٧) للعسكر إلا بثقله ؛ فيجب أن يكون الثقل محفوفاً بمن [يخاف معرة الفرار أكثر مما]^(١٨) يخاف الموت [لأنه لا قوام للعسكر إلا بثقله]^(١٩) .

(٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٩) القسم الكامل في ف . « ما على يساره ولكل من الثلاثة حكم يخصه ويسمى كل من طرفي

الميمنة والميسرة الجناحين » .

(١٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . (١١) « ليسير » في ي .

(١٢) « فيما » في ي . (١٣) « ليمر » في ي .

(١٤) « تكون » في ف . (١٥) « يكون » في ي .

(١٦) « المستصعبات » في ي . (١٧) « مكانة » في ي .

(١٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . (١٩) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

على ما تقدم ، واعتزل واحد منهم ناحية إن لاحت له فرصة من العدو وانتزها ، وإن احتاج أصحابه إلى معاضدة عاضدهم ، وهو أنفع من اختلاطه بهم ، إلا أن يحملوا كردوساً واحداً فتكون الأربعة مجتمعين .

وإن كان العدو ستة ترتبوا على ما تقدم : في القاب اثنين ، وفي الميمنة اثنين ، وفي الميسرة اثنين . وإن كان العدو ثمانية فالأحسن أن يترتب ستة على ما تقدم ، ويجعل الاثنان الباقيان كميناً ؛ لأن لخروج^(٥) الكمين عند وقوع القتال بغتة روعة عظيمة .

وذهب بعض أهل الحرب إلى أن العدو المتصدى للحرب إذا كان قليلاً في [الجملة أنهم]^(٦) لا يترتبون ، وإنما يحملون على العدو كردوساً واحداً ؛ فإن الاجتماع أعون لهم . وبالجملة ، فالأمر في ذلك راجع إلى اجتهد المقاتل بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال .

الفصل الثاني : فيما إذا كان العدو المتصدى للحرب كثيراً .

وقد اصطالحوا على أنه إذا كان العدو كثيراً كالعسكر الكبير جعل العسكر خمسة أحياز : الحيز الأول في مقدمة العسكر ، وهو الذي عليه العمدة ، فيجب أن يكون من فيه من الفرسان في غاية القوة والشجاعة والاستظهار والدربة بالحرب ، فإنهم الذين في نحر العدو ، وعليهم اعتماد من وراءهم من الأحياز .

وقد اصطالحوا على تقسيم المقدمة إلى ثلاثة أجزاء : القلب ، والميمنة والميسرة ؛ فالقلب هو الذي في الوسط ، ويعنون^(٧) به قلب العسكر ؛ والميمنة

(٥) « بخروج » في ي .

(٦) ما بين الحاصرتين « الجملة إلى أنهم » في ي .

(٧) « يريدون » في ي .

الباب السادس عشر

فى بيان كيفية تعبئة العساكر عند المصاف للقتال

وفيه ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول : فيما إذا كان العدو المتصدى للحرب قليلا ، ويختلف ذلك باختلاف حاله فى القلة .

فإن كان المتصدى للحرب واحداً^(١) واجه خصمه بالقتال ، ولا عمل له غير ذلك ؛ فإن اجتمع على واحد اثنان أخذ عنهما جانباً ، وأخذ [فى دفع كل منهما عنه]^(٢) وإن كان المتصدى للحرب ثلاثة نفر فيكون واحد منهم قلباً ، وواحد ميمنة ، وواحد ميسرة . ومنهم من ذهب إلى أنه إذا اجتمع ثلاثة لا يترتبون على هذا الوجه ، ولكن^(٣) يتحفظ كل رجل منهم ظهر صاحبه . وهو باب عظيم فى الحرب ، وعليه عمل كثير من أهل الدربة بالحروب .

وإن كان المتصدى للحرب تسعة نفر جعل القلب ثلاثة نفر ، والميسرة ثلاثة نفر ، والميمنة ثلاثة نفر .

وإن كان المتصدى للحرب اثنين جعل كل واحد منهم ظهره لظهر صاحبه إن تفرق العدو عليها ، وإلا واجهاه إن كان من جهة واحدة .

وإن كان المتصدى للحرب أربعة ترتب^(٤) ثلاثة منهم قلباً وميمنة وميسرة

(١) « قليلا » فى ف .

(٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « فى كل منهما عن نفسه » فى ف .

(٣) « لاكن » فى ى . (٤) « يرتب » فى ى .

وأما الموضع الذى يكمنون فيه فإنه يجب أن يكون خفياً مستتراً ، وأن يكون مما يحتمل الإقامة فيه إذا دعت الحاجة إلى طول الإقامة ، بأن يكون فيه الماء والمرعى وسائر ما يحتاج إليه أهل الكمين بحسب الإمكان .

الفصل الثانى : فى تدبير أمور الكمائى (٧) .

أول ما يتعين على أهل الكمين أنهم يقيمون لهم ديدباناً يطلع على أخبار العدو ومتجددات أمور العسكر ، ويعرفهم بذلك . ويجب أن يكون ذلك الديدبان ممن يوثق به ويتحقق نصيحته ؛ فإنه إذا كان بخلاف ذلك ربما (٨) مال إلى العدو ، فدل على الكمين ، فأخذوا (٩) بدلالته .

وعلى أهل الكمين أن يتجنبوا التعرض للصيد من الطير والوحش مما حولهم ؛ فإن ذلك مما يوجب نفار الطير والوحش ، وربما رأى أحد من أهل البصيرة بالحرب نفار الصيد فاستدل (١٠) به على أنه إنما نفر من منفر له ، فيتوصل بذلك [إلى العلم بالكمين] (١١) فيؤخذ .

ويتعين بأن يكون وقت ظهور الكمين فى حال غفلة العدو ، وبأن يكون ذلك غدوة النهار ؛ أو عند حط العدو عن دوابهم وإراحتهم ، بأن يكون ذلك فى آخر ساعة فى أيام الصيف أو أبرد ساعة فى أيام الشتاء . وينبغى أن يكون خروجهم من الكمين على العدو كراديس كراديس متقطعة (١٢) من غير أن يبعد بعضهم من بعض ، وأن يسرعوا الرجعة إلى مكمنهم (١٣) إذا لم يظفروا بحاجتهم ، وإن حصل ملاقاتهم العدو [بصدورهم للقتال] (١٤) وأظهر كل واحد منهم ما عنده (١٥) من القوة والبسالة .

-
- (٧) « الكمين » فى ف .
 (٩) « فأخذ » فى ف .
 (١٠) « فاستدلوا » فى ف .
 (١١) ما بين الحاصرتين « إلى الكمين » فى ف .
 (١٢) « متقطع » فى ف .
 (١٣) « مكمنهم » فى ف .
 (١٤) ما بين الحاصرتين « وصدقهم القتال » فى ف .
 (١٥) « لديه » فى ف .

الباب الخامس عشر

في بيان إكمان الكمائن وتدبير أمورهما

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : في ذكر صفة رجال الكمين وخيله والمكان الذي يكمنون فيه .

أما الرجالة فينبغي [أن يكونوا أشجع] ^(١) فرسان العسكر ، وأدربهم بالحرب ، وأعرفهم بالتجارب ؛ فإنهم ينفردون عن العسكر ، ويكونون في مكان ليس لهم فيه من يعينهم ولا ينجدهم من أهل العسكر لبعدهم [عنهم . ويتعين] ^(٢) مع ذلك أن يكون عليه مقدماً عارفاً بأمور الحروب ^(٣) ، درباً بمحاربها ، عالماً بأحوال الأماكن الصالحة للاختفاء ، ليكون ذلك أعون لحصول الغرض من أمر ^(٤) الكمين في اختفائه حيث يجب الاختفاء ، وظهوره حيث يقتضى الظهور .

وأما خيلهم فيتعين أن تكون ثابتة الخوافر ، سالمة الظهور ، عرية عن الحزن والجماع ، على ما تقدم في خيل الطلائع ، وأن لا يكون فيها من الخلق ما يستدل به عليهم حال أكانهم من الصهيل ونحوه . [وينبغي أن تكون] ^(٥) خيولهم كلها ذكوراً أو كلها إناثاً ؛ فإن اجتماع ذكور الخيل وإناثها ربما أوجب إثارة جلبة من صهيل الخيل أو صياحها ، فيؤدي ذلك إلى العلم بالكمين ، وربما جر إلى حصول الضرر بجميع العسكر . وبالجملته فكل أمر يظهر به ما يروم صاحب الكمين ستره ^(٦) فإنه يتعين تركه .

(١) ما بين الحاصرتين « أن يكونوا من أشجع » في ف .

(٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « عنه ويتعين » في ف .

(٣) « الحرب » في ي . (٤) ناقص في ف .

(٥) ما بين الحاصرتين « وسوا تكون » في ي . (٦) « سيره » في ي .

والثبات وحسن التدبير ، ويمضى فى حماية إلى الميمنة مما يلى جناح القلب .
فإن وجد هناك مستشرقاً أشرف منه ، وإن لم يجد هناك [مستشرقاً وطلبه] ^(٨)
فى ناحية الميسرة ^(٩) . فإن لم يجد وأمكن أن ينصب له فى القلب شئ يعلو
عليه ليشرف منه على العسكرين فعل .

الفصل الثانى : فى اختيار وقت المصاف .

يجب على صاحب العسكر أن يجتهد أن يكون مصافه فى وقت يكون الشمس
أو الريح ^(١٠) فيه من وراء ظهر عسكره . أما استدبار الشمس فلأنه إذا استقبلها
وقع شعاعها على السلاح المصقول من السيوف والخوذ وغيرها ، فيلحق شعاعها
الأعين ، فتكل الأبصار عن النظر ، وربما أثر فى بعضها ذهاب البصر بالكلية .
وأما استدبار الريح ليسلم مما يلقيه الريح فى العيون من التراب والرمل ، فإنه
متى سفت الريح التراب والرمل فى الأعين دعى ذلك إلى إطباق الجفون
مما يصيبها من ذلك . وقد نهى عن إطباق الجفون فى الحرب عند اللقاء ، ولو
أنه يرى السلاح يكاد يدخل فى عينه ، لأن بإطباق الجفون يصير المقاتل كأنه
أعمى ، والأعمى لا نفع له فى الحرب .

فإن لم يمكنه استدبار الريح جعل مجراها فى طرف ميمنة إلى ميسرة عدوه ،
ليقع [اشتراك عسكر العدو] ^(١١) مع عسكره فى ضررها ، فينال مثل ما ينال
أهل عسكره ، فإن يمكنه ذلك حرض على انحرافها ما استطاع ليأخذ العدو
منها بنصيبه . فإن لم يمكنه ذلك ، وألح العدو فى طلب القتال فى ذلك
الوقت ، أو تغيرت الريح وهو فى المصاف ، أما الفرسان بالتزول عن خيلهم
وقتلهم رجالة متراحمين كأنهم رجل واحد ، فإن إصابة الريح للفرسان
أشد من إصابتها للرجالة لارتفاع الفارس عن الأرض وانخفاض الراجل بوقوفه عليها .

(٨) ما بين الحاصرتين «مستشرقاً وجده وطلبه» فى ف . (٩) « اليمين » فى ى .

(١٠) ما بين الحاصرتين « الريح والشمس » فى ى .

(١١) ما بين الحاصرتين « اشتراك العدو » فى ف .

الباب الرابع عشر

في اختيار موضع المصاف للقتال وزمانه

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : في اختيار موضع المصاف .

قد استحسنوا ^(١) أن يكون موضع المصاف للقتال ^(٢) بحيث يسند أهل العسكر ظهورهم في مصاف القتال إلى جبل [أو نهر أو تل] ^(٣) ، بحيث يأمنوا ^(٤) هجوم العدو عليهم من ظهورهم ، وخروج الكمين من ورائهم [كما تقدم في النزول في الطريق] ^(٥) على ما تقدم بيانه في الباب العاشر . فإن لم يتهيأ له شيء من ذلك احتقر الخنادق ، واستظهر بأكان الكمائن من خلف عسكره ، لتخرج الكمائن على العدو إن قصد ظهر عسكره .

وعليه أن يحرص أن يكون موضع قلب العسكر على جبل أو شرف مرتفع صلب ليس فيه غبار ، وصاحب العسكر في وسطهم ليشرف على العسكرين ، ويعاين ما يدبره في أصحابه وعدوه من انتهاز فرصة ، وسد خلل ، وغير ذلك .

فإن لم يجد إلا منخفضاً ^(٦) من الأرض لا يرى منه العسكرين ^(٧) ، ولم يكن من اللقاء بد ، فعليه أن يخلف في القلب نائباً من أهل الدربة في الحرب

(١) « استحبوا » في ف . (٢) « في القتال » في ي .

(٣) ما بين الحاصرتين « أو نهر أو تل أو نهر » في ف .

(٤) « يؤمن » في ي . (٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٦) « متحفظاً » في ي . (٧) « العسكران » في ي .

لمصادمة الأبطال في مضيق الأوقات . والصنف الثاني من يكون مطيعاً لمن هو أعلم منه بذلك ، لأنه يصير كالآلة للعارف بالحرب ، فينتفع به كما ينتفع بالآلات الحرب من سيف ورمح ونحوهما . ولكن لا بد مع ^(٦) الطاعة من وصف الشجاعة والصبر والجلد والتحمل لما ينوب ، وإلا فالجبان ضرره في هذا الموضع أكثر ^(٧) من [نفعه] ^(٨) .

الفصل الثاني : في كيفية البيات .

قد استحسن أهل الدربة بالحرب أنه إذا أراد بيات العدو ، وهجمت فرقة من العسكر قاصدة ^(٩) وسط العدو ، ويحيط الباقيون بهم ، ثم تصيح الفرقة التي قصدت إلى وسط العدو ، فإنهم إذا صاحوا في وسطهم على حين غفلة أخذتهم الدهشة والدعر ؛ فإذا طلبوا أطراف عسكرهم وجدوا باقي العسكر الذي بينهم قد أحاط بهم ، ويأخذ الذين هم خارج العسكر في الرمي عليهم بالنشاب من الخارج ؛ فإن لذلك في الليل والظلمة أثر عظيم في المحاربة .

وإن استطاعوا أن يعقروا دواب عسكر ^(١٠) العدو ويحرقوها بالرماح بعد أن يقطعوا أرسانها وشكلها ففعلوا ذلك ؛ فإنها إذا أطلقت من الشكل والأرسان وأصابها الحديد جالت في العسكر لما نالها من الألم ، مع ما يحصل لها من هول الأصوات وإزعاجها .

مما يستحسن في ذلك أن القوم الذين يبيتون العدو إذا خالطوهم لا يثبتون في مكان واحد ، بل يكثرلون الجولان فيه ؛ فإنه أشد إرباعاً وأعظم نكاية ، وأوهن للعدو . ومن اللازم أن يجعل لهم علامة فيما بينهم يتنادون بها ^(١١) مثل فرج الله أو نصر الله ، وما شاكل ذلك [لمتازوا] ^(١٢) [عن العدو بذلك] ^(١٣) .

(٦) « من » في ف .

(٧) « أكبر » في ي .

(٩) « طالبين » في ف .

(١١) ناقص في ف .

(١٣) ما بين الحاصرتين « بذلك عن العدو » في ف .

(٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(١٠) ناقص في ي .

(١٢) « فيمتازون » في ي .

الباب الثالث عشر

في بيان كيفية بيات العدو إذا لاحت فرصة

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : في بيان الوقت الذي يحسن أن يبيت فيه العدو وصفة الرجال الذين يصلحوا لذلك ^(١) .

أما الوقت الذي يحسن أن يبيت العدو فيه فينبغي أن يتحرى لذلك الليلة المظلمة وليلة الريح ؛ وإن كان ذلك عند حصول دوى ^(٢) أو خربير ماء ليمنع حس الطارق الذي يطرق العدو فهو أحسن . ثم إن كان العدو الذي يريد بياته كثيراً دهمهم نصف الليل ليكون الوقت متسعاً لما يريده من البيات ، وإن كان قليلاً اختار له وجه الصبح لقرب الأسفار [وظهورهم بطلوع الصبح] ^(٣) ، فيأخذهم العسكر . وقد مدح الله تع الخيل بالإغارة [في الصبح] ^(٤) بقوله : ” والعاديات صبحاً فالموريات قدحاً فالمغيرات صبحاً “ (١٠٠ : ١) .

وأما الرجال الذين يصلحون لذلك فقد ذكروا أن الذين يختارون للبيات صنفان : الصنف الأول أهل التجارب للحرب والثبات ، لأنهم الذين ينتفع بهم في ذلك المقام ، لأنه لا ينتفع حينئذ [إلا بمن] ^(٥) علم منه الثبات والصبر

(١) في هامش ي مكتوب « معنى التبييت » أن يأق العدو في وقت مبيته .

(٢) « دوى » في ي .

(٣) ما بين الحاصرتين « ظهورهم الصبح للعدو » في ي .

(٤) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٥) ما بين الحاصرتين « إلا من » في ف .

الفصل الثانى : فى حفظ خزائن الأموال والأثقال .

أما الخزائن فقالوا : ينبغى لصاحب العسكر أن يوكل بخزائنه رجلاً ناصحاً أميناً ، ومعه جمع من الحيلة تسير بسير الخزائن ، وتنزل بنزولها ؛ تكون حولها فى السير والتزول لحفظها^(٣) من طوارق العدو ، وصونها^(٤) عن قرب أهل الخيانة . ويأمر^(٥) عامة الجند والجيش بالتنحية عنها ، والمجانبة لها فى السير والمنازل ، لإلّا من استخلصه لذلك ، وأهامه له . فإنه إذا لم يكن للخزائن من هو موكل بها من أهل الحفظ لها ، والذب عنها ، والقوة على من أراد نهبها ، ربما طرقها العدو أو أسرع الجند إليها ، وتداعوا^(٦) نحوها حتى يكاد يترامى ذلك بهم إلى انتهاب العسكر ثوران^(٧) الفتنة . فإن أهل الفتن ، وسيئى السيرة ، ومن همته الشرك كثير ، ومسارعهم إلى الخير بعيدة .

(٣) « تحفظها » فى ي .

(٥) « تأمر » فى ي .

(٧) « ثوران » فى النصين .

(٤) « تصونها » فى ي .

(٦) « تدعوا » فى ف .

البابُ الثاني عشر

فى بيان كيفية التعبئة عند الخوف فى المسير

وحفظ خزائن الأموال

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فى بيان كيفية التعبئة عند الخوف فى المسير .

قال أهل المعرفة بتدبير الحروب : إذا عرض للعسكر خوف فى المسير فإن الخوف قدام العسكر جعل نصف الميسرة قدام الصفوف فى السير ، ونصف الميمنة على أثرها ، ثم القلب على أثرها ، ثم نصف الميسرة على أثر ذلك ، ثم نصف الميمنة على أثر ذلك . وإن كان الخوف من جهة الميمنة جعل سير الميمنة أمام الصفوف ، ثم القلب ، ثم الميسرة . وإن كان الخوف من جهة الميسرة ^(١) جعل سير الميسرة أمام الصفوف ، ثم القلب ، ثم الميمنة . وإن كان الخوف مجهولا لم تعرف جهته بث اللاتع وجند ^(٢) الكشف فى نواحي جهات العسكر ، والناس على مراتبهم ومراكزهم ، ويكون صاحب الجيس فى وسط القلب .

(١) مكتوب فوق السطر فى ف .

(٢) « خيل » فى ف .

ذلك ويتأكد الحال فيه . وبالحملة فإنه يجب أن يكون مستظهِراً في حال سيره ونزوله وإقامته ، أخذاً أهبطه في جميع الأوقات . فإنه متى أخل بالتأهب [أو فوته] ^(٦) كان قد عرض نفسه من الحوادث لما لعله لا يستطيع تداركه .

الفصل الثاني : في بيان [ما يجب هن] ^(٧) التعبئة حينئذ .

قال العلماء بأمور الحرب وأحوالها : إذا كان المحارب على مسافة قريبة من عدوه فلا يسير إلا في مقدمة وميمنة وميسرة ، وساقة قد شهروا الأسلحة الأسلحة ونشروا البنود والأعلام ، [وقد عرف] ^(٨) كل منهم مركزه وموضعه من العسكر ^(٩)، سائرين تحت ألويتهم ، قد أخذوا أهبة القتال واستعدوا للقاء العدو ، وعارفين مواضعهم في سيرهم ومعسكرهم ^(١٠) . ويكون رحيلهم ونزولهم على راياتهم وأعلامهم ، وفي مراكزهم ^(١١) .

وقد عرف كل قائد أو أمير منهم أصحابه مواقفهم من الميمنة والميسرة والقلب والساقة والطلبة ، لازمين لها [غير مخلين بما استنجدوا له ولا متهاونين بما ندبوا إليه حتى يكون العساكر] ^(١٢) في كل منهل يصل ^(١٣) إليه ومسافة تجتازها ^(١٤) كأنها عسكر واحد في اجتماعها على العدو ، وأخذها بالحزم ، ومسيرها تحت راياتها، ونزولها في مراكزها ، ومعرفتها مواضعها ^(١٥) .

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- | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| (٦) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . | (٧) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف . |
| (٨) ما بين الحاصرتين « ليحرر » في ي . | (٩) « العساكر » في ف . |
| (١٠) « عسكرهم » في ي . | (١١) « مراكزهم » في ف . |
| (١٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . | (١٣) « تصل » في ف . |
| (١٤) « بجنازها » في ي . | (١٥) ناقص في ف . |

الباب الحادى عشر

فى بيان متى يجب تعبئة العساكر وترتيبها وما يجب

من التعبئة حينئذ

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فى بيان متى يجب تعبئة العساكر وترتيبها .

قال أهل الدربة بالحرب والتجربة لوقائعه : ينبغى لأهل العسكر إذا توجهوا إلى عدوهم أن يكونوا فى مسيرهم^(١) ونزولهم على تعبئة ، وأنه يجب التعبئة فى حال الأمن كما يجب فى حال الخوف ، إلا إذا توجب الضرورة ترك ذلك ، وأنه لا يترك ذلك ما استطاع . وقد حكى عن بعض أهل الحزم أنه توجه من الشام إلى الشرق يريد المحاربة ، فخذق فى أول منزل نزله [من الشام]^(٢) مع توفية التعبئة حقها ، ولم يزل يفعل^(٣) ذلك إلى أن بلغ موضع قصده ، وظفر بعده . وقد ذكر أن هذه كانت حال المهلب بن أبى صفرة ، شيخ الحروب وإمامها .

وذهب آخرون إلى أن التعبئة إنما تكون إذا كان [من العدو]^(٤) على مسافة قريبة قدرها بعضهم بخمس مراحل ، وكان [المراد أنه]^(٥) حينئذ يجب

(١) « سيرهم » فى ى . (٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ف .

(٣) « ينعل » فى ى . (٤) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ى .

(٥) ما بين الحاصرتين « المراد به » فى ى .

المستشرفات والمضايق من أبواب العسكر إلى غروب الشمس . فإذا دخل الليل أقام غيرهم مقامهم حتى تطلع الشمس .

وقد استحسنوا أن يجعل في الليل خيالة من وراء الجيوش^(١٢) غير بعيد ، يرفعون أصواتهم بالتهليل والتكبير لإيقاظ العسكر وطلب النصر^(١٣) من الله تع ؛ وهذه الخيالة تسمى الدراجة . وأن يجعل وراء هؤلاء على نصف شوط عسسا يدورون بالعسكر وهم سكوت ليدركوا من هو مخنف^(١٤) أو كامن من المكيدة يكيدها^(١٥) لا بأس^(١٦) حينئذ إذا كان الكمائن خارج العسس والحرس ، وإيقاد النيران في جميع نواحي العسكر لإرهاب العدو [على البعد]^(١٧) والاطلاع عليهم بظهور النور أن يقربوا^(١٨) .

وإن اتفق أن العدو طرقهم ليلاً من جهة من جهات العسكر خرج عليهم الكمين ، وتلقاهم الخيالة والحرس الذين هم خارج العسكر ، ليصير العدو الذي طرقهم محصوراً بين العسكر وبين الذين خرجوا عليه . وعلى أهل العسكر في هذه الحالة أن يلزموا أماكنهم ، ولا يخرج واحد منهم عن مكانه ما استطاع ، ولا يتكلم منهم أحد إلا أهل الجهة التي جاء^(١٩) العدو منها ؛ فإنهم يكبرون ثلاث تكبيرات متواليات عند مجيء العدو . وليعلم أن العدو قد أتى من جانبهم ؛ فإن ترك العدو ذلك الجانب وجاء من جانب آخر ، أو أتى إلى الجانب الآخر طائفة من العدو غير الأولى كبر أهل تلك الناحية أيضاً ليميل القوم إليهم .

(١٣) « النصر » في ي .

(١٥) « يكيدها » في ي .

(١٧) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(١٩) « حل » في ف .

(١٢) « الجيش » في ف .

(١٤) « مخيف » في ي .

(١٦) « ليأمن » في ف .

(١٨) « قربوا » في ي .

فإن لم يكن هناك ما يحفظ ظهره ربما هجم^(٥) العدو على العسكر على حين غفلة منه^(٦) .

الفصل الثاني : في ترتيب العسكر في المنزلة وما يجب من الاحتراز فيها .

أما ترتيب العسكر في المنزلة فيجب أولاً أن يكون نزول العسكر بترتيب صحيح ، لكل أحد من الأمراء وأرباب الوظائف منزلة معروفة في جهة من جهات منزل صاحب العسكر ؛ لأنه إذا كان لكل رئيس موضع معروف ، ودعت الضرورة إلى طلبه وهان وجوده ، ولو شردت دابة من دواب واحد منهم وعرفت بوسمها هان عودها إليه .

وأما الاحتراز في المنزلة إذا خيف هجوم العدو فينبغي^(٧) إذا أخذ كل واحد من العسكر منزلة ، أن يحتفروا خندقاً مستديراً على العسكر ، ويجعل له بابان ، أو أكثر من ذلك ، إن كان العسكر كثيراً . ويقف الرماة والفرسان على أبواب الخندق على أتم أهبة . وقد كان أصحاب العساكر^(٨) في الأزمنة السالفة إذا نزلوا منزلاً نثروا خارج الخندق حسك الحديد المعروفة الآن بالزقازيق ، وهو حديد له شوكات كيف وضع على الأرض قامت له شوكة منه ليكون ذلك كالسور على العسكر ؛ لأنه متى دهمهم العدو دخلت تلك الشوكات^(٩) في حوافر الخيل وأرجل الرجالة^(١٠) فيمنعهم^(١١) الحركة .

وإذا كان العسكر نازلاً منزلة فعلى صاحب العسكر أن يبعث الطلائع من عسكره نهراً في الطرق والمواضع المخوفة ، وقيم خيالة خارجاً عن عسكره على

(٦) ناقص في ف .

(٥) « يهجم » في ف .

(٨) « العسكر » في ي .

(٧) « ينبغي » في ي .

(٩) « الشوكاة » في ف ، وكلمة « ثلاث » مكتوبة في الهامش ، لعل عند الحسك ثلاث شوكات .

(١١) « منهم » في النصين .

(١٠) « الرجال » في ف .

الباب العاشر

في بيان ما يجب من التحرز عند النزول

والإقامة في المنزلة

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : في اختيار موضع المنزل .

قال أهل التجربة لأمر الحرب : يجب أن تكون المنزلة التي ينزل فيها^(١) الجيش ذات ماء وعشب وحطب وغير ذلك ما يرتفق به العسكر ، وأن يكون الموضع الذي يقع فيه^(٢) النزول لو أراد العسكر التقدم إلى العدو أمكنه ذلك ، ولو أراد التأخر عنه لمصلحة اقتضاها الحال أمكنه ذلك .

ويجتمد أن يسند ظهور أصحابه إلى الجبال ، أو التلال ، أو الأنهار ، وما أشبه ذلك ، مما يؤمن سرعة التطرق والكمين والبيات من العدو ؛ فإن لم يجد خلف عسكره جبلا ولا تلا ولا نهراً ، ولا غير ذلك مما يقي ظهره^(٣) أقام خلف العسكر نظارة كالطلائع ، ينظرون ما يأتي من خلفه ليأمن هجوم العدو عليه بغتة ، وذلك أن العدو إن أتى مواجهة واجهه أهل العسكر باللقاء بالسلح ، ودافعوه بما تصل^(٤) إليه طاقتهم من الدفاع . وأما إذا أتى من جهة ظهر العسكر

(١) « بها » في ف . (٢) ناقص في ي .

(٣) « العسكر » في ف . (٤) « تجب » في ف ، مع « تصل » تحت السطر .

العسكر لكشف ما وراء المتزلة بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال ، ثم يلاقيه بخبر ذلك وخبر نزول مقدمة العسكر^(١٢) ليكون على بصيرة من ذلك قبل وصوله إليه . فإن أبطأ عليه من وجهة للكشف ، أو داخلته ريبة في أمر ما هو أمامه ، أرسل من يكشف ذلك وتحققه ويعيد الخبر إليه . فإن بلغه خبر يكرهه لم يظهر خوفاً ولا هلعاً ؛ فإن ذلك مما يشوش قلوب عسكره .

وعلى صاحب الجيش أنه إذا عرض في الطريق مضيق ، أو عقبة ، أو نهر ، أو نحو ذلك ، وقف بنفسه حتى يجوز^(١٣) العسكر عن آخره ؛ فإنه إن لم يفعل ذلك ربما طلب كل واحد منهم تقديم نفسه على غيره ، فوُقت المضايقة ، وجرى الخلف بين العسكر ، وأدى ذلك إلى إثارة الفتنة . وقد حكى عن الملك الظاهر بيبرس البندقدارى أنه لما دخل بلاد الروم وفتح قيسارية وعاد كان هو الذى يتولى أمر ذلك بنفسه ، ويقف في المضايق وتعدية الأنهار حتى يجوز الجيش واحداً واحداً .

وعليه أن يوكل بساقة عسكره رجلاً ممن يرجع إليه ويعمل بقوله في جماعة من أصحابه ، يحبس الجند والغلمان ، ويمنع أحداً منهم من الرجوع إلى ما وراء العسكر ، ولا يمكن أحداً منهم من التخلف عن العسكر ؛ فإنه متى رجع أحد منهم أو تخلف عن العسكر ربما أخبر عن العسكر بشيء مما اتفق فيه مما لا ينبغي إشاعته ، أو يزيد فيه أو ينقص ، فيزيد بذلك تشويش خواطر الناس .

(١٣) « يجوز » فى .

(١٢) « عسكره » فى .

الأماكن ذات (٥) الطرق المختلفة أشد من المكان الذى ليس فيه إلا طريق واحد .

وعلى صاحب العسكر أن لا يمكن أحدا من أهل عسكره يتقدم على على طلائع العسكر [بحال فإنه ربما أصيب أحد من تقدم فيكون سبياً لطمع العدو فى العسكر] (٦) . وقد (٧) يجر ذلك إلى فساد عظيم لا يمكن تداركه ؛ فإن الأمور بأوائلها .

الفصل الثانى : فى بيان ما يجب فعله فى حال المسير .

أول ما يجب على صاحب الجيش أن يقدم طلائعه على عسكره لكشف خبر العدو ، على ما تقدم فى الباب قبله ؛ ثم بعد الطلائع يقيم رجلا من أهل الصرامة وصحة النظر والمعرفة بالطرق فى جماعة من ثقات عسكره . ويقيم رجلا لإصلاح الطرق ، وقطع الأشجار (٨) ، وإقامة الجسور والقناطر على الأنهار ، وإزالة سائر ضرورات الطرق ؛ فإن فى ذلك تسهيل الطريق على العسكر [وإزالة التعب عند ازدحام العسكر] (٩) ، وربما أوجبت تقصيراً فى السير أو تأخيراً عن بلوغ المقصد الذى يريده فى وقت معين .

ثم أول ما يقدم من عسكره مقدمة العسكر [وهى الخيالة التى تكون فى أول العسكر] (١٠) وراء ذلك على الترتيب إلى الساقة ، وهى آخر العسكر ، على ما سيأتى بيانه فى ترتيب المصاف إن شاء الله تع .

وعليه أن يأمر بعض طلائعه أن يجاوز المنزل التى تنزل (١١) فيها مقدمة

(٥) « و » فى ف .

(٦) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ف .

(٧) « فقد » فى ف .

(٨) « الشجر » فى ف .

(٩) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ف .

(١٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ف .

(١١) « ينزل » فى ف .

الباب التاسع

فى بيان ما يجب من التحرز عند الرحيل وبيان ما

يجب فعله فى حالة^(١) المسير

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فى التحرز عند الرحيل .

قال أهل النظر فى أمور الحروب^(٢) : على صاحب الجيش أن لا يأذن لأحد من أهل عسكره جملة فى الرحيل إلا بعد تعبئة عسكره وترتيبه ، وركوب خيولهم ، ولبس لامة حربهم ، ووقوف المقدم على العسكر القائم^(٣) بتعبئته ، وترتيبه بأصحابه فى نواحي العسكر بعدتهم وسلاحهم . فإذا فعلوا ذلك أخذ الناس فى التحميل والرحيل والخيل محيطة بهم من كل جانب ، حتى إذا استقلوا ساروا حينئذ بعد أن يعرف صاحب العسكر كل أمير أو قائد من أمراء عسكره وقواده والمقدمين على الطوائف^(٤) وولاة الأعمال بما يفعل كل واحد منهم فى حيزة ذلك ، وما هو من شأنه بحسب ما يناسب فى كل موطن وتدعو الحاجة إليه .

ويختلف الحال فى الاحتراس من الرحيل باختلاف الأماكن والأوقات ؛ فلا خفاء أن الرحيل فى الليل أولى بشدة الاحتراس من الرحيل فى النهار ، وفى

(٢) « الحرب » فى ف .

(٤) « طواف » فى ف .

(١) « حال » فى ف .

(٣) ناقص فى ف .

واحد بالخبر وبقى اثنان لإستبراء الكشف ، وإن كانت أكثر من ذلك صرفهم المقدم عليهم بالإتيان^(١٠) بالخبر والبقاء في الكشف على ما يختاره .

وينبغي أن يكون الذى يرجع بالخبر من الطلائع عاقلاً صدوقاً ؛ وإذا أتى بالخبر وصار^(١١) بحيث يرى العسكر نازلاً أو سائراً خفف جرى فرسه على التدرج إلى أن يصل العسكر فيدخله برفق ، ويخبر صاحب العسكر بما رأى ولا يخبر بذلك غيره .

وينبغي أن يكون بين صاحب العسكر وبين الذى يأتي بالخبر إشارة يفهم بها^(١٢) صاحب العسكر الخبر حيث لا يسع إظهاره . فقد روى أن النبي صلعم لما أرسل لكشف خبر بني قريظة^(١٣) قال : إن رأيتم خبراً فأعلنوا به ، وإن وجدتم عذراً فألحنوا إلى لحناً أعرف به ، ولا تفتوا^(١٤) به أعضاء المسلمين ، بمعنى لا تخبروهم^(١٥) بخبر يسوءهم .

وكذلك ينبغي لمن يأتي بالخبر إذا وقعت الإحالة بينه وبين العسكر بعدو أو نحوه أن يكون بينه وبين صاحب العسكر إشارات يفهم منها مقاصده من نزول العدو وسيره [وكثرته وقلته مثل أن يكون نزوله عن فرسه إشارة لنزول العدو وسيره]^(١٦) إلى جهة إشارة إلى سيره لتلك الجهة ، ويركض^(١٧) فرسه إشارة إلى غارة العدو ، ونحو ذلك .

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- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| (١٠) « في الأتيان » في ف . | (١١) ناقص في ف . |
| (١٢) « هـ » في ف . | (١٣) « قريظة » في ف . |
| (١٤) « تفتتوا » في ف . | (١٥) « يخبروهم » في ف . |
| (١٦) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف . | (١٧) « ركض » في ف . |

الفصل الثاني : فى أحكام الطليعة وما ينبغى أن يعتمد فيها .

أول ما يجب أن يعتمد فى أمر الطليعة أن لا يكون على أحد منهم درع ، ولا معه ^(٥) ترس ؛ وأن يكون فى جعبته عشرون سهماً فما حولها ، وأن لا يكون معه شئ يثقله البتة ، لأن ذلك مما يمنع سرعة الخبر ، وقد تقدم أن المطلوب منها سرعة الخبر .

والأحسن أن يكون مسيرهم فى أرض مستوية ليس فيها غبار إن أمكن ؛ لأنه أقرب لرؤية العدو ؛ فإن احتاج الأمر إلى الصعود إلى مكان عال من جبل أو نحوه صعد البعض وبقي البعض فى الأرض المستوية .

ولا ينتهى الطليعة فى السير إلى أكثر من ثلثى الطريق فيما بينهم وبين العدو ؛ وعليهم ^(٦) أن لا يسرعوا إلى جهة العدو متوغلين فى جهتهم ، بل يكون سيرهم بالرفق والتأنى ، مع ملاحظة ^(٧) الكشف يمينا وشمالا .

وإن أظهر العدو هزيمة بين يدى الطليعة فلا يتبعوه ؛ فإنه ربما كان هناك كمين يخرج عليهم لا سيما إذا كانت هزيمة طليعة العدو فى غير جهة عسكر العدو ، مثل أن يكون العدو فى القبلة فتنهزم ^(٨) طليعته إلى جهة أخرى ، فإن مثل ذلك لا ^(٩) تفعله طليعة العدو فى الغالب إلا عند إكمان كمين لهم فى تلك الجهة . وهذا مما يقع كثيراً للطلائع ، فيجب التحرز منه .

ثم إن كانت الطليعة فارساً واحداً فقط كشف الخبر وأتى به ، وإن كانت اثنين بقى واحد فى الكشف وأتى واحد بالخبر ، وإن كانت ثلاثة أتى

(٥) « عليه » فى ي .

(٦) « فيهزم » فى ف .

(٥) ناقص فى ي .

(٧) « ملاحظة » فى ف .

(٩) ناقص فى ف .

الباب الثامن

في الطلائع وترتيب أمورها وما يعتمد في ذلك

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : في [حقيقة الطليعة]^(١) وصفة رجالها وخيلها .

أما الطليعة فإنها عبارة عن الخيالة التي تتقدم العسكر لاستطلاع الأخبار وكشفها ؛ سميت بذلك الطلائع لاطلاعها على خبر العدو ، وتسمى الكشافة أيضاً لكشفها الخبر .

وأما رجالها فقد قالوا إنه ينبغي أن يختار للطليعة رجال النصح [والنجدة]^(٢) والمعرفة بمواقف الحروب ؛ فإن النصر متى حصلت للطليعة^(٣) كانت النصر للعسكر غالباً . ولذلك يستبشر أهل العسكر إذا حصلت النصر لطليعته . وينبغي أن يجعل على الطليعة مقدماً ترجع إليه وتطيعه ، لأنه إذا لم يكن عليهم مقدم يرجعون إليه ، يقفون عند قوله ، أدركهم الخلف ، وفاتت المصلحة فيما هم فيه .

وأما خيولهم فينبغي أن تكون خيولهم سوابق جيدة^(٤) الظهور ، سالمة الخوافر ، ليس بها جماع ولا فيها حرون ؛ فإن المقصود من الطليعة سرعة رد الخبر . وإذا كان في الفرس حرن أو جماع أو نحو ذلك فوت المقصود من الطليعة .

(١) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٤) « جيلة » في ف .

(٣) « لطليلة » في ي .

أرباب العقول هي انقياد العدو ودخوله في الطاعة ؛ فإذا حصل ذلك فقد حصل الفوز بالمقصود . ولو لم يكن من القنع بالطاعة إلا سلامة النفس والأموال لكان في ذلك كفاية . وإذا بذلت له الطاعة فعليه أن يكف عن القتل وسفك الدم ما استطاع إذا وثق^(٢٣) من عدوه بذلك ؛ إذ لا فائدة من قتل الطائع ، فلعل من يسلم من^(٢٤) القتل يصير عوناً له بعد أن كان عوناً عليه .

(٢٤) « تسلّم » في ف .

(٢٣) « وافق » في ف .

الفصل الثاني : فيما إذا كان الجيش ضعيفاً والعدو قوياً .

وفي هذه الحالة يجب التأني وترك العجلة في لقاء العدو ، وعدم التعرض له إن أعرض ، والأخذ في أمره بالحيل والخديعة والمكيدة ما أمكن ، ولا يسوغ التعرض له في هذه الحالة ابتداءً ؛ فإنه متى تعرض له كان كمن أثار ^(١٦) الحية من وكرها ^(١٧) مع عجزه عن مقاومتها ودفعها ، فعرض نفسه للضرر ، وألقى بيده إلى التهلكة . وقد قال بعض الحكماء ^(١٨) : خذ بالأناة في الحرب ما استقامت لك . [قال بعض العلماء] ^(١٩) يعني ما كنت على جانب من الأمن .

وبالجملة فعلى المتصدى لقتال العدو أن لا يعجل إلى لقائه ، وأن يقبل العافية والسلامة ما وهبت له . فقد قال النبي صلعم : لا تتمنوا لقاء العدو ، وسألوا الله العافية فإنهم ينصرون كما تنصرون ، فإذا لقيتموهم فاثبتوا . وعليه أن لا يسأم مطاولة عدوه ؛ فإن في خلال الانتظار انتهاء الفرص ^(٢٠) والظهور على أحوال العدو وخفي أمورهم . ولا يطلب الظفر باللقاء ما وجد إلى ^(٢١) الظفر بالحيلة سبيلاً ؛ فإن الخروج إلى العدو يقتضي التفرير بالنفس ، واستهلاك الأموال ، والغربة عن البلد ، ولو بظاهرها ، مع ما في ذلك من توقع تلاف النفس ، وركوب الأخطار ، وتحمل المشاق . وربما فعلت الحيلة ما لا يفعله الحرب على ما تقدم في باب الخديعة والحيل .

وعليه أن يصرف أكثر اهتمامه إلى دخول عدوه في طاعته وانقياده إليه ، حتى يكون ذلك مقدماً عنده على الغنيمة [فإن الغنيمة] ^(٢٢) العظمى عند

(١٦) « أثر » في ف . (١٧) « من جحرها » في ف .

(١٨) « العلماء » في ف ، لكن مكتوب تحت السطر « الحكماء » .

(١٩) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . (٢٠) « الفرصة » في ي .

(٢١) ناقص في ف . (٢٢) ناقص في ي .

حتى انتهى إلى خراسان [وأعمالها] ^(٧) . وكذلك فتحت [في أيامه قرى من قرى الشام] ^(٨) ومصر وبرقة وغيرها . وفتح في خلافة عثمان [رضى الله عنه] ^(٩) من جهة الشرق كرمان وسجستان وفارس وطبرستان وغير ذلك ، ومن جهة الغرب أفريقية وهي بلاد تونس ، ومن جزاير البحر قبرس .

وغزا معاوية في أيامه القسطنطينية ^(١٠) ، قاعدة ملك الروم ، وضايقها ^(١١) . وتوالت غزوات الخلفاء بعد ذلك وفتوحهم في الدولة الأموية والدولة العباسية بعدها ، حتى يقال إن المعتصم ، أحد خلفاء بني العباس ، بلغه أن امرأة شريفة أسرت تعذب ^(١٢) عند صاحب عمورية من بلاد الروم ، فصاحت المرأة : وامعتصماه ! فقال لها ملك عمورية : يأتي المعتصم لخلاصك إلا على أبلق . فنادى في عسكره بركوب الخيل البلق ، وخرج لخلاصها ، وفي مقدمة عسكره أربعة آلاف أبلق ، فخلصها وعاد ^(١٣) .

وكذلك توالت الفتوح العظيمة من ملوك مصر ؛ ففتح الملك الناصر ^(١٤) صلاح الدين يوسف بن أيوب — رحمه الله تع — وأخوه العادل أبو بكر ما كان غلب عليه الفرنج من بلاد الشام ، وهي القدس والسواحل وأنطاكية وبعض أعمال الفرات . ثم غلب الفرنج على بعض ذلك أيضاً حتى استخلصه منهم ملوك الترك بالغزوات المتوالية من الملك الظاهر بيبرس وغيره ، حتى كان آخر ما انتزع منهم من ذلك من سواحل الشام على يد أشرف بن قلاوون في سنة [تسعين وسمائة] ^(١٥) .

(٧ ، ٨ ، ٩) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف . (١٠) « القسطنطينة » في ي .

(١١) ناقص في ف . (١٢) « فقدت » في ي .

(١٣) في هامش ي بيت شعر لأبي تمام :

لبيت صوتاً زبطرياً هرت له كأس الكرى ورضاب الحرد العرب

(١٤) ناقص في ف . (١٥) ما بين الحاصرتين « تسع وسمائة » في ي .

البَابُ الْإِسْلَامِيّ

في بيان متى يجب ملاقات العدو وقتاله

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فيما إذا كان الجيش قوياً والعدو ضعيفاً .

وفي هذه الحالة تجب مناهضة العدو ومناجزته وغزوه في بلاده . وقد أمر الله تع نبيه صلعم بقتاله أهل الكفر [والإغلاظ عليهم] ^(١) ، فقال جلت قدرته : ” يا أيها النبي جاهد الكفار والمنافقين وأغلظ عليهم “ (٩ : ٧٣) . وأمر بقتال من جاور المسلمين من ^(٢) الكفار ، فقال جل من قائل : ” قاتلوا الذين يلونكم من الكفار وليجدوا فيكم غلظة “ (٩ : ١٢٣) .

[قال العلماء أقل ما يجب] ^(٣) الغزو في هذه الحالة في كل سنة مرة . وقد غزا ^(٤) النبي صلعم ثمانين وعشرين غزوة ، وفتح أكثر بلاد العرب قبل وفاته صلعم . وقاتل أبو بكر الصديق — رضى الله عنه — بعده في خلافته أهل الردة الذين ارتدوا بعد وفاة النبي صلعم ومانعى الزكاة ، وقال : لو منعوني عقالا كانوا يؤدونه إلى رسول الله صلعم لقاتلتهم عليه . وفتح بصرى من بلاد الشام في خلافته [وهى أول مدينة فتحت من بلاد الشام] ^(٥) . [وفتح عمر بن الخطاب رضى الله عنه بعده دمشق وسائر بلاد الشام] ^(٦) وما وراء ذلك من جهة الشرق ،

(١) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف . (٢) « و » في ف .

(٣) ما بين الحاصرتين « قال وأقل يجب » في ي . (٤) « غزى » في ف .

(٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف . (٦) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

ومنها ما يقتضى الإيقاظ والتنبيه خاصة ، مثل أن يسلك غير طريقه (٣٢) ،
أو يقف فى غير موقفه ، أو ينزل فى غير منزله .

وبالجملة فذلك موكول إلى رأى صاحب الجيش ، حيث رأى المصلحة فى
الفعل فعل ، وحيث رأى المصلحة فى الترك ترك . ولكل حالة حكم يختص بها .

(٣٢) « طريقته » فى ى .

من قلوبهم] (٢٥) ؛ فإن التآلف أدعى للنصرة ، وأقرب إلى حصول الغرض .

وأن يمنعهم من التعرض لمن مروا به من أهل الطاعة والانقياد ، وبسط اليد إلى شئ من أموالهم ، والتعرض لحريتهم ، ويعدمهم العوض عن ذلك بما (٢٦) ينالوه من عدوهم إذا ظفروا به .

ومن أتى منهم ذنباً قابله عليه وأدبه بحسب ما يقتضيه ذلك الذنب ، مثل أن يدل العدو على عورة أصحابه أو يطلعه على خباياهم ؛ فإن الذى يفعل ذلك عدو فى الحقيقة ، لأنه (٢٧) يطلع العدو على ما يتسلط به على أصحابه ، فيكون قد بلغ بالعدو ما لم يكونوا يبلغونه لولاه .

ومنها ما يقتضى العقوبة ، مثل أن يوارى الأسير حتى يهرب ، أو يصف أصحابه بالضعف ، أو يخذل أصحابه عن العدو ، أو يزحف بهم ؛ فإن من يتعاطى هذه الأمور (٢٨) موهن لأمر الجيش المضعف لقلوب العسكر .

ومنها ما يقتضى التوبيخ والتعنيف ، مثل أن يتأخر عن الموافاة يوم الحرب بغير عذر ، أو يطلع على خبر من أخبار العدو ولا (٢٩) يبلغه لصاحب العسكر ؛ فإن تأخير الخبر ساعة قد يعقب تعب سنة .

ومنها ما يقتضى اللوم ، مثل أن يوكل (٣٠) بشئ من أحوال القتال [فيخل به] (٣١) ، أو يخل بمصافه من غير عذر ، أو يصف العدو بالقوة ونحو ذلك .

(٢٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ف .

(٢٦) « فإنه » فى ف .

(٢٧) « فلا » فى ف .

(٢٨) « يأكّل » فى ف .

(٢٩) « الأحوال » فى ف .

(٣٠) « لما » فى ف .

(٣١) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص فى ي .

وينبغي له^(١٥) أن يعرف مع ذلك أحوال سائر أهل عسكره وأرباب وظائف دولته ، وما يشتمل عليه كل واحد منهم من المناقب السنية^(١٦) ليتعين كل واحد منهم فيما يصلح له يجعله في الموضع الذي يستحق أن يكون فيه . وينبغي أن يعرف ذا الرأي الصائب من أرباب دولته ، فيجعله أقرب الناس إليه وأخصهم به ؛ فإن الرأي شديد النفع في أمر الحروب ، بل هو مقدم على الشجاعة . وناهيك قول ابن أبي^(١٧) تمام الطائي :

الرأي قبل شجاعة الشجعان هو^(١٨) أول وهي الحل الثاني

وحكى عن المهلب بن أبي صفرة ، شيخ الحروب وإمامها ، أنه غاب عنه رجل من أهل عسكره اسمه يبهس [فقال]^(١٩) : ما يسرنى أن يكون في عسكرى ألف شجاع ويغيب عنى يبهس . فقيل له^(٢٠) : إنه ليس من^(٢١) الحل السامي من الشجاعة . فقال : نعم ، ولكنه شديد الخزم ، محكم العقل ، فلو كان مكانه ألف شجاع لما أمنت عليهم .

الفصل الرابع : في كيفية سياسة صاحب الجيش جيشه وتدريب عسكره وما يأخذهم به .

أول ما يجب عليه من ذلك أن يتزل كل واحد منهم منزله ، ويقصد به إلى منزلته^(٢٢) اللاتقة به ، ويوفيه من الإكرام حقه ، ويعرف له^(٢٣) قدر كل ما فعله مما يستحسن من مثله ، وأن يجارى المحسن على إحسانه ، ويقابل المسيء على إساءته ؛ يقلل المتنصل من الذنب عثرته . وعليه أن يأمر جنده وأتباعه بالألفة والمعاضدة والمناصرة ونزع الغل^(٢٤) من صدورهم [وسل الشحنا

(١٥) ناقص في ف .

(١٦) « السنة » في ف .

(١٧) ناقص في ف .

(١٩) هذه الكلمة تدخيل التحقيق .

(٢١) « في » في ف .

(٢٣) ناقص في ف .

(٢٤) « الحقده » في ف .

وإن كان راجلاً بأن^(١١) يكون صبوراً على السعى على رجله ، عارفاً بمواقع الضرب والتستر منه ، والمفاسدة في ملاقاتة الرجال ، ومحاوره الفرسان ومدافعتها ، وتشريد الخيل وتغييرها ، إلى غير ذلك من الأمور اللازمة للفارس والراجل .

الفصل الثالث : فيما يجب على صاحب الجيش من معرفة أصحابه .

قال أهل التجربة للحروب : ينبغي لصاحب الجيش أن يعرف ما استطاع معرفته عن أصحابه وجنده واحداً واحداً بخاصته ، وما يعانیه من أنواع الحرب ، وما يختص به من الشجاعة والحب وسائر أحواله ، وأن يعرف مراتب الشجعان وما يتعاناه كل منهم في شجاعته ؛ فإن منهم الشجاع الثابت الملازم لمواقفه ، المصمم [على خصمه]^(١٢) . ومنهم الشجاع الكرار الفرار الذي يذهب ويأتى . ومنهم الشجاع الجليل على الأقران الذي لا يجعل له خصماً بعينه ، بل أينما لاحت له فرصة انتهزها . ومنهم من يجيد القتال فارساً ، ومنهم الذي يجيد القتال راجلاً . ومنهم الذي يجيد الضرب بالسيف ، والذي يجيد الطعن بالرمح ، والذي يجيد الرمي بالسهم . ومنهم الجبان الذي يتشبه بالشجعان في زيهم ، والجبان الظاهر الجبن ، وغير ذلك من صفات الشجاعة والجبن .

فإنه إذا عرف كل واحد من هؤلاء بصفته أنزله في الحرب منزله ، وأقامه فيما يليق بإقامته فيه ، فحصل على الغرض المطلوب منه . وإن كان جباناً صرفه من مواقف القتال ، وعدل به^(١٣) عنها . وإن لم يعرف حاله في الشجاعة والجبن لم يعرف أين^(١٤) يضعه ولا أى منزلة ينزله .

(١٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(١٤) « أن » في ف .

(١١) « فأن » في ف .

(١٣) « منها » في ف .

على صلح أمضاه والتزمه ، وإذا بدل أماناً وفي به ، مع حفظ الناموس وقيام الأبهة وإظهار المهابة .

فإذا اشتمل على هذه الصفات وما في معناها كان حقيقاً بالتقدمة على الجيوش والقيام بأمر العساكر و [القيام بأمر]^(٥) الحرب .

الفصل الثاني : في صفات الجند وأهل العسكر من الفرسان والرجالة الذين يصلحون للقاء العدو وقتاله .

[ينبغي لمن يتصدى للخروج للقاء العدو وقتاله]^(٦) من الجند أن يكون شجاعاً مقداماً ، درباً بأمر الحرب مجرباً لأموها ، شديد الصبر على الغربة ومشقة الأسفار ومقاساة الأهوال ، غير قلق ولا ضجر ولا متوان ولا مهمل^(٧) . وأن يكون مع ذلك شديد المحبة لمن هو في خدمته ، ناصحاً له ، حريصاً على نصرته ، مؤثراً لحياته على حياة نفسه ، قائماً بما يلزمه من الخدمة ، موفياً حق مخدميه منها ، قائماً من طاعته بما تحمله قدرته ويصل إليه وسعه .

مع كونه عارفاً بالخيول وآلاتها وطرف^(٨) من البيطرة ، بحيث يضع المسار في النعل إذا سقط منه^(٩) في الطريق ، وإصلاح ما يحتاج إلى الإصلاح من آلات خيله وسلاحه حيث تدعو الضرورة إلى ذلك . وإن كان فارساً بأن يكون له دربة بركوب الخيل وحركاتها في الحرب ، وما يجب على الفارس حال اللقاء من المقابلة والمقاتلة والثبات حيث [احتيج إليه الكر والفر حيث]^(١٠) احتيج إلى ذلك ، والمراوغة والاستطراد حيث دعت الضرورة إليه .

(٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٦) « مهله » في ف .

(٧) « طرق » في ي .

(٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٩) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(١٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

الباب السادس

فى صفة مقدم الجيش وجنده وما ينبغى أن يأخذهم به

وفيه أربعة فصول

الفصل الأول : فى صفة مقدم العسكر (١) .

قال العلماء بشأن الحرب والدربة بأموره : ينبغى أن يكون مقدم الجيش كامل العقل ، ثابت القلب ، تام الشجاعة ، وافر اليقظة ، كثير الحذر ، شديد الحزم ، بصيراً بأحكام الحروب ومواضع الفرص منها ، عارفاً بالخيال والمكايد والخداع فيها ، عالماً بتدبير العساكر وترتيب الجيوش ، خبيراً بالطرق والمخارص ومناهل المياه وأحوال المراحل والمنازل ، والأوقات التى يستحق فيها السير والتى يستحق فيها التزول ، مجتهداً فى إدخال الأمن على عساكره ، مدافعاً عن القتال بلطف (٢) الحيلة ما أمكن ، متقدماً فى العلم بمراتب القتال ومحاصرة الحصون والمدافعة عنها ، صبوراً على المطاولة فى القتال والحصار ، حسن الانصراف بعد بلوغ الغرض .

وأن يكون مع (٣) ذلك عارفاً بالخيال شياتها (٤) وآلاتها والقيام بمصالحها ، وأصناف السلاح ، وما يستحسن منها ، وما يليق لبسه من أنواعها فى كل وقت من أوقات الحرب ، مع كونه حسن السيرة ، طاهر السريرة ، نقى الجيب ، صالح النية ، سخياً ببذل المال ، مرتاحاً لطلبه ، مؤثراً العفو على العقوبة ، والصفح على المؤاخذه . وإذا وعد وعداً أنجزه ، وإذا قال قولاً فعله ، وإذا عاقد

(١) « الجيش » فى ف .

(٢) « يلطف » فى ف .

(٣) « يعد » فى ف .

(٤) « لسانها » فى ف .

عسكره ، فوافى رجلين يلعبان بالشطرنج وإلى جانبيهما رجل آخر . فقال أحد اللاعبين : شاه مات كما مات المنصور بن أبي عامر ، فقال الرجل الذى إلى جانبيهما : لم يمت ولم يمت المنصور بن أبي عامر ، ولم يزل يديذب للمغلوب حتى غلب . فتقدم إليه المنصور بن أبي عامر والرجل لا يعرفه ، وقال : قد قلت إنه لم يمت (٣١) وصدق قولك ، [وقلت إن] (٣٢) المنصور بن أبي عامر [لم يمت] (٣٣) فما الطريق فى خلاصه . فقال له الرجل : الطريق فى ذلك أن يقطع الأخشاب ، ويجمع أحجاره ، ويظهر أن هذا المكان أعجبه للإقامة ، وأنه يقصد أن يقيم فيه ويبنى ويزرع ولا يرتحل . فإذا سمع العدو ذلك كره مجاورته له ، فخلا طريقه وفتح له الدروب حتى يخرج . فتركه المنصور ، وعاد إلى محل ملكه (٣٤) ، وأرسل خلف ذلك الرجل ، فحضر إليه فعرفه بنفسه وقال : هل عندك من رأى آخر غير الذى ذكرت لى ؟ قال : لا . ففعل ما قاله له ، فبلغ ذلك العدو ، فثقل عليه ، وخاف أن يقيم بجواره ، ففتح له الدروب وخلا له (٣٥) طريقه فخرج سالماً .

(٣٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « فغلب » فى ي .

(٣٤) « الملك » فى ي .

(٣١) « يغلب » فى ف .

(٣٣) ناقص فى ي .

(٣٥) ناقص فى ي .

الضرب^(٢٣) الثاني أن يكون المستشار فيه مما لا تسع^(٢٤) إشاعته ، كما إذا كانت الاستشارة في أمر خفي يحتاج إلى الكتمان عن العامة دون الخاصة ، مثل أن يقصد غزو العدو في ديارهم على حين غفلة ، ونحو^(٢٥) ذلك خص به من يختاره من خاصته ونصحائه وذويه الذين يثق بهم .

فإن اختص به^(٢٦) واحداً بمفرده لم يطلع عليه غيره ؛ فقد حكى أن ملكاً من ملوك الهند استشار وزراءه في أمر ، فقال له أحدهم : أصلح الله الملك ؛ إن في تحصين السر الظفر بالحاجة والسلامة من الخلل ، ولا يصلح لسرنا هذا إلا لسانان وأربعة آذان ، يعني أن يكون المشاوران اثنين فقط ، فخلا به الملك وكلمه بمفرده .

وإن احتاج إلى مشاركة جمع من أخصائه فيه استشار كل واحد منهم بمفرده ، ولم يعلمه أنه أظهره لغيره ؛ فإن ذلك أدعى لكتمانهم وعدم إشاعته ، لأن كلا منهم يخاف من إظهاره فيشيع ، مع أن^(٢٧) في ظنه أنه لم يعلمه غيره .

وإن لم يسغ إظهار ذلك السر ، ولا استشارة أحد فيه البتة لخطر أمره ، فالطريق في ذلك أن يقيسه على أشباهه من الأمور ، ويأخذه بنظائره ، ويتسمع^(٢٨) ما يقع من كلام الناس في ذلك من غير إظهار لقصد سماعه . فقد حكى أن المنصور بن أبي عامر ، ملك الأندلس ، دخل في بعض مغازيه إلى بلاد الكفر بالأندلس ، وتوغل فيها ، فدخل عليه الشتاء ، وأحاط به العدو وحصلوه ، وسدوا عليه الدروب ، وحصنوها بالرجال ، فثقل [ذلك عليه]^(٢٩) [وخاف الهلاك على نفسه]^(٣٠) وعلى المسلمين ، فخرج متنكراً يمشي في

(٢٣) « الفصل » في ي .

(٢٤) « يسع » في ف .

(٢٥) « ودون » في ف .

(٢٦) « ناقص في ف .

(٢٧) « ناقص في ف .

(٢٨) « يسمع » في ف .

(٢٩) ما بين الحاصرتين « عليه ذلك » في ف .

(٣٠) ما بين الحاصرتين « على نفسه وعلى الهلاك » في ي .

الفصل الثاني : في آداب ^(١٢) الاستشارة في الحرب .

قد ذكر ^(١٣) العلماء بأمر الحروب ^(١٤) أن الأمر المستشار فيه في الحرب على ضربين : الضرب الأول أن يكون المستشار فيه مما ^(١٥) يسوغ إظهاره ، ولا يبالي بانتشاره كالاستشارة في أمر العدو الظاهر المواجه بالقصد ، فالأولى به أن تقدم فيه مشاورة أهل العقل والعلم ؛ فقد سئل بعض الحكماء : أى الأمور أشد للملك ^(١٦) تأييداً [وأيها أشد ضرراً به] ؟ ^(١٧) فقال : [أشدها تأييداً له] ^(١٨) ثلاثة أشياء : مشاورة العلماء ، وتجربة الأمور ، وحسن التثبت ؛ وأشدها إضراراً به ثلاثة أشياء : الاستبداد بالرأى من غير مشورة ، والتهاون ، والعجلة .

وقيل لرجل من بني عبس : ما أكثر صوابكم . قال : نحن ألف رجل ، وبيننا حازم واحد ، فنحن نشاوره ، فكأننا ^(١٩) بذلك ألف حازم ، وإن لم يظهر ^(٢٠) له صواب في رأى الأكابر عم ^(٢١) الرأى ، واستشار كل كبير وصغير ؛ فإن الرأى قد يوجد حيث لا يظن وجوده .

قال الحسن : كان النبي صلعم يستشير حتى المرأة ، فتشير عليه بالشئ فيأخذ به . ويقال لم تزل حزمة الرجال يستشيرون صواب الرأى حتى من الأمة الوكاء ، والله ^(٢٢) در القائل :

لا تحقرن الرأى وهو موافق نهج الصواب إذا أتى من ناقص

(١٣) « جعل » فى ى .

(١٥) ناقص فى ى .

(١٧) ناقص فى ف .

(١٩) « فكأنما » فى ى .

(٢١) « الأعم » فى ى .

(١٢) « أدب » فى ف .

(١٤) ناقص فى ى .

(١٦) « للعقل » فى ى .

(١٨) ناقص فى ف .

(٢٠) « فإن تم له » فى ى .

(٢٢) ناقص فى ى .

ما وراءنا من القلب ، يعنى الآبار ، ثم نبى عليه حوضاً فتملأه ماء ، ثم نقاتل
فنشرب ولا يشربون . فقال رسول الله صلعم : لقد أشرت بالرأى . ثم نهض
رسول الله صلعم بمن معه من الناس ، فسار حتى أتى أدنى ماء من القوم ، فنزل
عليه ، ثم أمر بالقلب فغورت ، وبنى حوضاً على القلب الذى نزل عليه وقتلهم ،
فكانت النصرة للمسلمين ، كما أخبر الله ^(٥) تع بقوله : ” ولقد نصركم الله
بيدر وأتم أذلة “ (٢ : ١١) . وروى ^(٦) الواقدي فى مغازيه أن النبى صلعم
لما نزل على خير يحاصرها ^(٧) نزل بين ظهرائى النخل ^(٨) بالقرب من الحصن ،
فقال له الحباب بن المنذر أيضاً : يا رسول الله إنك نزلت منزلك هذا ، فإن كان
عن أمر أمرت به فلا نتكلم ، وإن كان رأى تكلمنا . فقال النبى صلعم : بل
هو الرأى . فقال : يا رسول الله دنوت من الحصن ، ونزلت بين ظهرائى
النخل ^(٩) ، فيكون نبل القوم إلينا أسرع لارتفاعهم [على حصونهم] ^(١٠)
مع أنى لا آمن من بياتهم لنا ، يدخلون فى ذرى ^(١١) النخل . تحول يا رسول الله
إلى موضع برى من التز والوباء ، نجعل الحرة بيننا وبينهم ، حتى لا تنالنا
سهامهم ، ونأمن بياتهم ونرتفع عن التز .

فقال رسول الله صلعم : أشرت بالرأى . ثم دعا محمد بن مسروق فقال :
انظر منزلاً بعيداً عن حصونهم برى من الوباء ، نأمن فيه من بياتهم . ففعل ،
وكانت النصرة للنبى صلعم أيضاً .

(٥) ناقص فى . (٦) « قال » فى ف .

(٧) « الحاصرها » فى . (٨) « النخيل » فى .

(٩) « النخيل » فى . (١٠) ما بين الحاصرتين « على حصون حصونهم » فى .

(١١) « ذرى » فى ، و « دار » فى .

الباب الخامس

في الاستشارة في أمر الحرب

وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : في الحث على الاستشارة في الحرب .

لا نزاع في أن الاستشارة في نفس الأمر مطلوبة ؛ وقد روى أن النبي صلعم قال : ما خاب من استخار ، ولا ندم من استشار . ولا شك أنها في الحرب أكد . وقد أمر الله تع النبي بها ، مع أنه أكمل الناس عقلاً ، وأذكاهم لباً ، فقال جل من قائل : ” ولو كنت فظاً غليظ القلب لانفضوا من حولك ، فاعف عنهم ، واستغفر لهم ، وشاورهم في الأمر “ (٣ : ١٥٩) . وذهب الكثير من المفسرين إلى أن المراد بذلك الاستشارة في الحرب ^(١) .

[ويروى أن النبي صلعم كان كثير الاستشارة في الحروب] ^(٢) . وقد روى ابن إسحاق في سيرته أن النبي صلعم ، لما نزل ببدر للقاء قريش وقتالهم ، قال له الحباب بن المنذر : يا رسول الله أرايت ^(٣) هذا المنزل ؟ أمتزلاً أنزلك الله ليس لنا أن نتقدمه ولا نتأخر عنه ؟ أم هو الرأي والحرب والمكيدة ؟ فقال النبي صلعم : بل هو الرأي والحرب والمكيدة . قال : يا رسول الله ، إن هذا ليس بمنزل ، فانهض بالناس حتى نأقن أدنى ماء من القوم ، فننزله ثم نغور ^(٤)

(٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٤) « نغول » في ف .

(١) « حروبه » في ف .

(٣) « أويت » في ف .

تلك العصا إليه وعرفه بأمر الكتاب ، فاستخرجه وقرأه ، فشق ذلك عليه ، وتغير على ذلك الأمير الذى انضم إليه من جهة أبرويز ملك الفرس ، وحلف إن وقعت عينه عليه ليقتلنه شرقلة . فلما بلغ ذلك الأمير فر بنفسه ، ورجع ملك الروم إلى ملكه . فلما بلغ ذلك الخبر أبرويز ملك الفرس ، قال : إن كلمة هزمت أربع مائة ألف لجليل (٣٧) قدرها .

ولما كان الحرب بين أهل الشام والعراق بصفين ، وطالت الحرب بينهم ، حصلت القوة فى آخر الأمر لأهل العراق ، ولاح لهم الأمر (٣٨) والنصر والظفر ، وعلم أهل الشام أنهم قد (٣٩) أحيط بهم ، وتجهزوا (٤٠) للهزيمة ؛ فبادر بعض أهل الشام برفع المصاحف على الرماح ، فوقع الخلف بين أهل العراق بسبب ذلك ؛ فبعضهم يقول : نقاتلهم ، وبعضهم يقول : [لا نقاتل قوماً] (٤١) رفعوا لنا المصاحف ، فبردت بذلك نار الحرب ، وكان سبباً لنصر أهل الشام على أهل العراق . والحكايات فى ذلك كثيرة يطول ذكرها .

(٣٧) « بجليل » فى ى .

(٣٩) ناقص فى ف .

(٤١) ما بين الحاصرتين « لا نقاتلهم لأنهم » فى ف .

(٣٨) ناقص فى ى .

(٤٠) « ظهروا » فى ف .

فبهت الملك لذلك ، وزاد تعجبه ، وقال له : أفي هذه المملكة من يرى زمايتك ؟ فضحك ، وقال : أيها الملك ، إني من أضعفهم رماية . فقال له الملك : إن ملككم جاهل ، أما علم أنني قربت من دياره ؟^(٣١) فضحك وقال : إن أعطاني الملك الأمان نصحته . قال : قد أعطيتك الأمان . فقال : إن ملكنا إنما فعل ذلك استهانة بك ، وتصغيراً لأمرك ، ولتتورط في بلاده حتى لا تخرج من قبضته ؛ فإن عنده مائة ألف رام كلهم يرى أجود مني . فلما سمع ذلك الملك كلام بهرام قال : قد نصحتني ، وأمر مقدم جيشه أن يرتحل راجعاً إلى بلاده .

وانصرف بهرام إلى دار ملكه ليلاً ، فلما أصبح قعد^(٣٢) للناس ، فدخل عليه وزراؤه وعظماء دولته ، فسألهم عن خبر العدو ، فأخبروه بانصرافه ، فضحك وأخبرهم الخبر .

وحكى الجاحظ أيضاً أن كسرى أبرويز ، أحد ملوك الفرس ، وجه إلى قتال ملك الروم أميراً من أمرائه ، فعصى عليه ، وانحاز إلى ملك الروم ، وحمله على أبرويز . فخرج ملك الروم لقتال أبرويز في [أربع مائة]^(٣٣) ألف ، فلما بلغ ذلك أبرويز عمد إلى كتاب كتبه إلى أميره الذي عصى عليه ببلاد الروم يقول فيه : إذا وافاك^(٣٤) كتابي هذا فأحرق ديار الروم ، وأنا وأنت بملك الروم في يوم كذا . ونقب عصا ، وجعل ذلك^(٣٥) الكتاب في ضمنها ، وطلب نصرانياً كان عنده أسيراً يظهر المحبة للملك ، فعرّفه بأمر الكتاب الذي في العصا ، ودفع إليه العصا وقال : اذهب إلى أميرى فلان في بلاد الروم ، وادفع له هذه العصا ، وعرفه بالكتاب الذي فيها . فخرج النصراني حتى أتى^(٣٦) ديار الروم ، فسمع نحو عشرة آلاف ناقوس تضرب ، فأدركته حمية النصرانية ، ومال إلى دينه . فأتى إلى ملك الروم واستأذن عليه فأذن له ، فدفع

(٣١) « داره » في ى .

(٣٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « أربعماية » في ف .

(٣٣) « وفاك » في ى .

(٣٤) ناقص في ف .

(٣٥) « أنا » في ى .

(٣٦) « نفد » في ى .

دعوه ، فأنا أعلم بضعفه منكم .

فلما دنا العدو من دياره دخلوا عليه ليخبروه الخبر ، فلما بلغه أمرهم عمد إلى مائتي جارية من جواريه ، فألبسهن التيجان والثياب المصبغات ، وأركب (٢١) كل واحدة منهن قصبه (٢٢) ، ولبس هو أيضاً ثوباً مصبوغاً وركب قصبه ، وخرج والجواري يغنين بين يديه ، وهو يغني أيضاً (٢٣) معهم ، فلما رآه الوزراء وأكابر الدولة يشسوا منه وتركوه (٢٤) ومضوا .

فدخل من ساعته إلى بيته ، وحلق رأسه ، ولبس مسحاً من صوف ، وصبر إلى الليل ، فخرج ومعه قوسه (٢٥) ونشابه ، حتى انتهى إلى القرب من طلائع العدو ؛ فكمن في مكان على ظهر الطريق ، وكان مجيداً في الرمي ، فجعل لا يمر به طائر في السماء ولا وحش في البرية إلا رماه فأصابه ، حتى اجتمع له من الصيد قدر كثير .

فبينما (٢٦) هو كذلك إذ مر به المقدم على طليعة العدو ، ونظر (٢٧) إلى الصيد، فبهت لكثرته ، وقال له : من (٢٨) أنت ؟ قال : إن أعطيتني الأمان أخبرتك . قال : لك الأمان . قال : أنا غلام سايس خيل (٢٩) غضب على مولاي فترع ثيابي وحلق رأسي وألبسني هذا المسح ، وأجاعني بعد أن كان محسناً إلى (٣٠) ، فاستغفلته وخرجت أطلب شيئاً أصيدُه فأكله ، فاستدعاني ذلك إلى أن رميت هذا الصيد بجميع ما معي من السهام .

فأخذه مقدم الطليعة ، وحمله إلى ملكه ، وقص عليه القصة فقال له : ارم بين يدي فرمي ؛ فكانت تقع سهامه في أي مكان أحب الملك من الصيد ،

(٢٢) قصبه في ف .

(٢٤) « فتركوه » في ي .

(٢٦) « فبينما » في ف .

(٢٨) « ما » في ف .

(٣٠) « لي » في ف .

(٢١) « ألبس » في ف .

(٢٣) ناقص في ي .

(٢٥) « فرسه » في ف .

(٢٧) « فنظر » في ف .

(٢٩) « جئني » في ي .

رسول الله صلعم : اذهب فأخذل عنا ما استطعت ، فإن الحرب خدعة . فخرج نعيم بن مسعود حتى أتى بنى قريظة يهود^(١٥) المدينة ، وكان نديما لهم في الجاهلية ، فقال : قد عرفتم ودى لكم ، وأنا لكم ناصح أن قريشا وغطفان قد جاءوا من بلادهم لقتال محمد وأصحابه ، وقد وافقتموهم على قتاله ، وأنتم مقيمون بهذا البلد وفيه أموالكم ونساؤكم وأبناؤكم ، وأموالهم ونساؤهم وأبناؤهم بعيدة ، فإن وجدوا خيراً أصابوه وانصرفوا إلى بلادهم ، وخلوا بينكم وبين محمد وأصحابه ، ولا طاقة لكم بهم فلا تقاتلوهم معهم حتى تأخذوا منهم رهناً من أشrafهم يكونون عندكم ؛ فقالوا : أشرت بالرأى .

ثم انصرف إلى قريش وغطفان وقال : قد علمتم مودتي لكم وفراقى محمدا ، وقد أتيتكم بنصيحة فاكتموها عني . إن بنى قريظة قد ندموا على حرب محمد ، ووافقوه عليكم ، ووعدوه أن يأخذوا منكم^(١٦) رهناً من أشrafكم ، ويدفعوهم إليه ليقتلهم فلا تدفعوا إليهم [رجلاً واحداً منكم]^(١٧) .

فلما أرسل قريش وغطفان إلى بنى قريظة يسألونهم المساعدة طلبوا منهم الرهن من رجالهم ، فلما سمعوا ذلك منهم قالوا : صدق نعيم بن مسعود فيما قال . وأبوا أن يعطوهم^(١٨) الرهن ، فوقع الخلف بينهم ، وكانت الهزيمة عليهم والنصرة لرسول الله صلعم وأصحابه .

وحكى الجاحظ في بعض مصنفاته أن بهرام جور ، أحد ملوك الفرس ، لما ملك بعد أبيه يزدجرد غلب العدو على بعض أطراف بلاده ، فأظهر الاستهانة بأمر العدو والاستخفاف به ، حتى قوى أمر العدو ، واشتدت شوكته ، وزحف نحوه^(١٩) فاجتمع وزراء [الملك بهرام]^(٢٠) إليه ، وكلموه في ذلك ، فقال :

(١٥) « يهودا » في ي .

(١٦) « منه » في ف .

(١٧) ما بين الحاصرتين « منكم رجلاً واحداً » في ي .

(١٨) « يؤدوهم » في ي .

(١٩) « عليه » في ي .

(٢٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

وما استحسنوه في ذلك أن يكتب إلى بعضهم كتباً كأنها جواب عن كتب وصلت منهم إليه ، ويكتب كتباً عن ^(١٠) ألسنتهم إليه ^(١١) ويلقيها في المواقع التي يتوقع أن تصير إلى رئيسهم . فإنه إذا وقف رئيسهم على شيء من هذه الكتب كدرت خاطره عليهم ، وأنزلهم عنده بمنزلة التهمة ، فيكون ذلك سبباً إلى افتراق كلمتهم ، وتشتيت جماعتهم ، وتغيير خواطرها ، أو تغيير خاطره عليهم . فإن وثب على واحد منهم ، أو قتله ^(١٢) ، أو سفك دمه ، داخلهم الخوف منهم ، وشملهم الرعب ، ودعاهم ذلك إلى الهرب من رئيسهم إليه . وإن كان رئيسهم متأنياً محتملاً فلا بد أن يبقى في نفس كل منهم وحشة .

الفصل الثالث : في ذكر طرف من الخديعة والحيل التي وقعت لأهل تدبير الحروب .

وهذا الباب مما لا ينتهي إلى حد ، وفي كتب التواريخ وسير الملوك في الجاهلية والإسلام منه ما ملأ الدفاتر وشحنها .

فمن أحسن ذلك موقعاً ، وألطفه مأخذاً ، ما رواه ابن إسحاق ^(١٣) في مغازيه أن النبي صلعم ، في يوم الأحزاب ، قصده قريش وبنو غطفان من مكة وما حولها ، وصاروا إلى المدينة الشريفة لقتاله ، ووافقهم على قتاله بنو قريظة يهود المدينة . وكان من مضايقتهم ومحاصرتهم للمسلمين ما أخبر الله تع بقوله : ” إذا جاءوكم من فوقكم ومن أسفل منكم وإذا زاغت الأبصار وبلغت القلوب الحناجر “ (٣٣ : ١٠) .

فبينما النبي صلعم على ذلك ، إذ أتاه نعيم بن مسعود ، أحد بني غطفان ، فقال : يا رسول الله إني قد ^(١٤) أسلمت ، وإن قومي لم يعلموا بي . فقال له

(١١) ناقص في ي .

(١٣) « اسحق » في ي .

(١٠) « على » في ف .

(١٢) « قتل » في ف .

(١٤) ناقص في ي .

وإطفاء لنار الحرب . [وإنه سمع ذات يوم بعض خاصكيته يتحدثون ويقول]^(٤) بعضهم لبعض : إن السلطان يهادى التتر خوفاً منهم ؛ فنهزمهم وقال : إن الذى أهادى به التتر جميعه ما يجى فى نظير كلفة أنعال خيولكم عند خروجكم لقتالهم . فأذعنوا لمقاتلته^(٥) واعترفوا بالحق فى ذلك .

الفصل الثانى : فى كيفية التحيل والمخادعة .

وهذا ، وإن كان باباً لا يدخل تحت الحصر ، إلا أن الأصل فيه السياسة والأخذ بالقلوب فى الظاهر ، وإعمال الفكر^(٦) فيما فيه تفريق شمل^(٧) العدو ، ووقوع الخلف بينهم ، ووثوب بعضهم ببعض بالطف الحيل وأحسن المكاييد ، والعمل فى كل واقعة بما يناسبها على ما يدل عليه العقل .

ومن أحسن المواقع فى ذلك أن يدس إلى^(٨) عدوه الدسائس ، ويتوقع له الغوائل ، ويكاتب رؤسائهم بما فيه استجلاب قلوبهم واستمالة خواطريهم ، وخروجهم عن طاعة صاحبهم ، بأن يعدهم كل جميل ، ويطمع آمالهم فى بلوغ كل مقصود ، والعفو عنهم والصفح عن جرائمهم إن مالوا إليه أو فارقوا صاحبهم وقصدوه . ويبدل الأمان لكل من سأل^(٩) منهم ، ويرغبهم من كل وجه يقتضيه الترغيب ، ويعرفهم أنهم إن أقاموا على المخالفة حتى يظفر بهم أوقع بهم أشد النكال والخزى والهوان ، ويدعوهم إلى الوثوب بصاحبهم إن أمكنهم أو اعتزاله والخروج عنه إن لم يكن لهم بالوثوب عليه طاقة .

(٤) ما بين الحاصرتين « وإنه سمع بعض خاصكيته ذات يوم يتحدثون ويقولوا » فى .

(٥) « لمقالة » فى . (٦) « الكفر » فى ف .

(٧) « شمائل » فى ف . (٨) ناقص فى .

(٩) « سأل » فى .

الباب الرابع

في الخديعة والحيل المغنية عن الحرب

وفيه ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول : في الحث على الخديعة في الحرب والحيل فيه .

لا نزاع أن الخديعة والحيل في الحرب مطلوبة شرعاً وعقلاً ؛ أما الشرع فقد ورد في الصحيحين عن حديث أبي هريرة وجابر بن عبد الله الأنصاري - رضي الله عنهما - أن النبي صلعم قال : الحرب خدعة .

وأما العقل فلا خلاف بين العقلاء أن ما حصل من الظفر بحسن الحيلة ولطف المكيدة ، مع سلامة النفس وحفظ الجنود والراحة من التعب ، أحسن وأجمل وأعلى في الفضل ، وأرفع في الرتبة ؛ لأن الخارج للقاء العدو ومبارزة الفرسان ، وإن ساعده الظفر وحفه النصر ، ففي مخاطرة من مكروه المصايب ، وعضاض السيوف ، وألم الجراح ، ومضاض الحروب ، ومغاورة الأبطال غاية المشقة ونهاية المخاطرة [على أنه لا يدري أيكون ^(١) الظفر بعد ملاقة ^(٢) المشاق له أو لعدوه .

ومن أحسن ما يحكى في ذلك أن الملك الناصر محمد بن قلاوون - رحمه الله تع - في آخر زمنه بعد الصلح ^(٣) مع التتر ، كان يحاسنهم ويرأسلهم ويهاديهم ما بين كبير وصغير ، حتى يهادى العجائز في البيوت كسراً للفتنة

(١) ما بين الحاصرتين « على أن لا يدري أن يكون » في ف .

(٢) « ملاقات » في ي . (٣) « الفتح » في ي .

شيئاً [حتى يرسل مع رسول آخر يحكى]^(٢٢) للمرسل إليه كتابه أو رسالته حرفاً حرفاً ومعنى معنى ؛ فإن الرسول ربما فاته بعض ما يوصله فافتعل الكتب وغير ما شوفيه به ، فحرض بذلك المرسل على المرسل إليه ، فأدى ذلك إلى فساد شديد ، كما تقدم في حكاية الإسكندر في الفصل الأول من هذا الباب .

(٢٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « حتى يرسل رسولا يحكى » في ي .

بمقام الإله ، فلو كان إلهاً^(١٩) كما يزعمون لما تسلط عليه اليهود بالقتل والصلب بزعمهم .

فإذا حصل رسول الملك على هذه الشروط وما في معناها كان حقيقاً بأن يرسل بالمهمات ويمشى بالرسالة بين الملوك ، ومتى فات فيه شرط عن ذلك لا ينبغي أن يستعمل في رسالة أصلاً .

الفصل الثاني : في تدبير أمر الرسل وما ينبغي أن يعتد في أمرهم .

قال المتكلمون في آداب الملوك : على الملك أن يمتحن رسوله مدة طويلة قبل أن يوجهه في رسالة ، ليعلم حقيقة حاله ، فيكون على يقين من أمره ، فيثق به فيما يرسله فيه . وكان من شأن ملوك الفرس فيما سلف ، إذا أرادوا إرسال شخص ، قدموا امتحانه بإرساله إلى بعض خواص الملك ممن هو في قرار داره في بعض المهمات ، ثم يجعل عليه عيناً فيما يرسله فيه من حيث لا يشعر ؛ فإذا أدى الرسول رسالته رجع بجوابها ، سأل الملك الذي أرسله في أثره للكشف^(٢٠) عنه ، فإن طابق ما أتى به كلام الآخر صار عند الملك مميزاً لأن يكون رسولا له إلى الملوك .

وكان أزدشير بن بابك ، أحد ملوك الفرس ، يقول : على الملك الحازم ، إذا وجه رسولا إلى ملك ، أن^(٢١) يرسل بآخر ، وإن وجه برسولين وجه بعدهما باثنين ، وإن أمكنه أن لا يجمع بين رسله في طريق فعل . ومن الحزم أن الرسول إذا أتاه برسالة أو كتاب فيه خبر أو سر وارتاب به أن لا يحدث في ذلك

(١٩) ما بين الحاصرتين « مما لا يليق بالإله ولو كان إلهاً » في ف .

(٢٠) « الكشف » في ف . (٢١) « بأن » في ف .

فقص عليه الخبر ، وذكر له (١٢) ما قاله ملك الروم ، فقال : والله ما أردت إلا ما قال .

ومنها أن يكون عالماً بمواقع الخطاب والجواب ؛ أما الخطاب إذا كان عارفاً بمواقعه (١٣) أورد الكلام في موقعه ، وقام بالحجة على من أرسل إليه ، كما روى أن النبي صلعم لما وجه دحية الكلبي - رضى الله عنه - إلى هرقل ملك الروم بالشام ، قال لهرقل : ناشدتك الله ، أتعلم أن المسيح كان يصلى ؟ قال : نعم . قال : فأنى أدعوك إلى من كان يصلى إليه المسيح ، فانظر إلى هذا الخطاب الملزم للخصم (١٤) الحجة ، لأن النصارى يعتقدون في المسيح أنه الله . والإله لا يصلى لغيره ، وإنما يصلى العبد . فلما قرره بصلاة المسيح ، ألزمه من ذلك أن المسيح عليه السلام عبد الله تع .

وأما الجواب ، فإنه إن كان عارفاً بمواقعه فورد عليه سؤال ، أجب عنه بما يقطع الخصم ويدفعه ، كما روى أن خاطب ابن أبى بلتعة - رضى الله عنه - بعثه النبي صلعم إلى المقوقس ملك مصر . سأله المقوقس عن حال النبي صلعم في القتل ، وأنه هل يغلب قومه أو يغلبونه . فقال : الحرب بينه وبينهم سجال ، تارة له وتارة عليه . فقال له المقوقس : النبي يغلب . فقال له خاطب (١٥) : فالإله يصلب . فسكت المقوقس ، وذلك أن المقوقس أراد أن يقيم الحجة [على خاطب بن أبى بلتعة بأنه ربما يتغالب في الحرب] (١٦) والنبي لا يليق به ذلك في زعمه ، فناقضه خاطب [بن أبى بلتعة] (١٧) - رضى الله عنه - بأن النصارى يزعمون أن المسيح إله (١٨) ، ويقولون إن اليهود قتلوه وصلبوه ، وذلك [مما لا يليق

(١٢) ناقص في ي . (١٣) « مواقعه » في ي .

(١٤) « يتحتم » في ف . (١٥) « الخطاب » في ف .

(١٦) ما بين الحاصرتين « على خاطب بأنه ربما غلب في الحرب » في ف .

(١٧) ناقص في ف . (١٨) « الإله » في ي .

أم أنت شاك فيه ؟ فقال الرسول : بل ^(٧) أنا على يقين منه أنه قاله . فأمر الإسكندر أن تكتب الألفاظ حرفاً حرفاً ، وتعاد إلى الملك مع رسول آخر فتقرأ عليه ، وترجم له . فلما قرئ الكتاب على الملك مرّ بذلك الحرف فأنكره ، وقال للمترجم : ضع يدي على هذا الحرف ووضعهما فأمر بعلامة فوضعت عليه ، وكتب ذلك الملك إلى الإسكندر كتاباً يقول فيه إن من أس المملكة صدق لهجة الرسول إذا كان عن لسانه ينطق ، وإلى أذنه يؤدي .

فلما وصل الرسول إلى الإسكندر دعا رسوله الأول ، وقال : ما حملك على كلمة قصدت بها فساد مملكتي ^(٨) . فذكر أن ذلك وقع منه لتقصير من الملك في حقه . فقال له الإسكندر : فأراك لنفسك قد سعت لا لنا ، فلما فاتك ما أملت مما لا تستحقه على من أرسلت إليه جعلت ذلك ثأراً توقعه في الأنفس الخطيرة ^(٩) الرفيعة . ثم أمر بلسانه فترع من قفاه .

ومنها أن يكون جسوراً مقداماً ؛ فإنه متى كان جباناً امتنع عليه تأدية الأمور المكروهة إلى الملك الذي أرسل إليه ^(١٠) خوفاً منه ورهبة . ومن أحسن ما يحكى في ذلك أن معاوية بن أبي سفيان ، أحد أصحاب النبي صلعم ، في خلافته أرسل رسولا إلى ملك الروم ، وأعطاه دية رجلين على أنه إذا أدى الرسالة إلى الملك وفرغ من كلامه معه رفع صوته بالأذان بين يديه . فلما وصل إلى ملك الروم وأدى الرسالة رفع صوته بالأذان بين يديه ، فهم البطارقة بقتله ، فمنعهم الملك وقال : ليس هذا منه ، وإنما هو من معاوية ، فإنه أراد أن أقتل هذا الرسول فيقتل كل مستأمن في بلاد الإسلام ، ويهدم كل كنيسة فيها . ثم إنه أكرمه وبعث به إلى معاوية فلما عاد [إلى معاوية ورأه] ^(١١) ضحك ،

(٨) « ملكين » في ف .

(١٠) ناقص في ي .

(٧) ناقص في ي .

(٩) ناقص في ي .

(١١) ما بين الحاصرتين « وراه معاوية » في ف .

الباب الثالث

فى الرسل وما يتعين^(١) أن يكونوا عليه من الصفات
وما يستحق من خرج منهم عن جادة الطريق
وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول : فى صفاتهم .

قد ذكر العلماء المتكلمون فى آداب الملوك أنه ينبغى أن يكون رسول
الملك ذكى الفطنة^(٢) ، صحيح المزاج ، بصيراً بالأمور ، عارفاً بالأحوال ، عالماً
بمواقع الكلام ؛ فقد^(٣) كان أزدشير بن بابك ، أحد ملوك الفرس ، يقول :
كم من دم سفكه الرسول بغير حلة ، وكم جيوش هزمت بذلك وقتل أكثره ،
وكم حرمة انتهكت ، ومال قد نهب ، وعهد^(٤) قد نقض بخيانة الرسل وأكاذيب
ما يأتون به .

وقد شرطوا فى رسول الملك شروطاً منها : أن يكون صدوقاً قليل الطمع ؛ فقد
حكى أن الإسكندر وجه رسولا إلى بعض ملوك المشرق ، فجاء برسالة شك
الإسكندر فى حرف منها ، فقال له الإسكندر : ويلىك إن الملوك لا تخلو^(٥)
من مقوم ومسدد إذا مالت^(٦) ، وقد جيتنى برسالة صحيحة الألفاظ بينة
المعانى ، وقد وجدت فيها حرفاً يناقضها ، أفعلى يقين أنت من هذا الحرف

(٢) « الفطرة » فى ى .

(٤) « عقد » فى ى .

(٦) « قالت » فى ى .

(١) « يتعينوا » فى ف .

(٣) ناقص فى ف .

(٥) « تخلوا » فى ى .

يقوله ، لأن كل واحد منهم قد يرى خلاف ما يراه الآخر ، ويسمع غير ما يسمعه .

وإذا عثر على (٢٠) أحد من جواسيسه الثقات النصحاء بزلة سترها عليه ، ولم يعاقبه عليها ، ولم يوبخه إلا أن يرى في التوبيخ مصلحة ، فإنه يوبخه (٢١) بخلوة ويعاتبه (٢٢) على ذلك عتياً لطيفاً ، فإن ذلك أدعى لاستصلاحه .

وإذا حضر إليه جاسوسه (٢٣) بنجر عن عدوه استعمل فيه التثبت (٢٤) ودوام البشر ، من غير أن يظهر لمن أتاه بالخبر سروراً بما قدم عليه من خبر عدوه ، ولا فرحة به بحيث يظهر معه الخفة ، ولا عراضاً يفوت قدر المناصحة . ولا يظهر لجاسوسه كراهة ما يأتيه به من الأخبار المكروهة ؛ فإن ذلك مما يستدعى كتمان السر عنه في الأمور المكروهة ، فيؤدي إلى الأضرار . فقد حكى عن بعض الملوك أنه كان يعطى من يأتيه بالأخبار المكروهة أكثر من الذى يأتيه بالأخبار السارة ، ويقول : إن الذى يأتينى بالأمر المكروه قد ينهينى (٢٥) على ما فيه مصلحتى .

واعلم أن صاحب الجيش لا يستطيع أن يمنع عسكريه من جواسيس عدوه ، فيجب الاحتراز منهم بكم السر ما أمكن .

-
- | | |
|--------|----------------------|
| (٢٠) | ناقص فى ى . |
| (٢١) | « فيوبخه » فى ى . |
| (٢٢) | « يعتبه » فى ى . |
| (٢٣) | « جاسوس » فى ى . |
| (٢٤) | « الشبثيت » فى ى . |
| (٢٥) | « قد تنهينى » فى ف . |

وإن قضى على من وجهه منهم إلى العدو يموت^(١٢) ، وقبض العدو عليه ، أحسن على من خلفه من أهله ، وجعل لهم من بعده من الإحسان ما كان يجعله له إذا عاد ليكون داعياً لغيره على النصيحة. وإن قدر أن أحداً منهم عاد غير ظافر بقصده ، وهو ممن يوثق بقوله^(١٣) ، فلا يظهر له وحشة ولا يلومه على ذلك ، ولا يوبخه عليه ، بل يوليه الجميل ، ويعامله بالإحسان ؛ فإنه إذا لم يصعد له شيء في هذه المرة صعد له في المرة الأخرى .

الفصل الثالث : فيما يجب عليه من تدبير عيونه وجواسيسه .

على صاحب الجيش أن لا يعرف أحداً من عسكره بأحد من جواسيسه ؛ فإن ذلك مما يؤدي إلى انتشار الخبر وظهوره ، بل إن استطاع أن لا يجعل بينه وبين أحد من جواسيسه واسطة فعل ، وإن لم يمكنه ذلك جعل لكل واحد منهم واحداً من خواصه يوصله إليه بمفرده .

وعليه أيضاً أن يحترز أن لا يعرف جواسيسه بعضهم بعضاً [فإنه إذا عرف بعضهم بعضاً]^(١٤) ربما اتفقوا على أمر^(١٥) ورتبه وأخبروه به إذا رجعوا ، وتوافقوا على ممالاة^(١٦) العدو والميل إليه ، بخلاف ما إذا لم يعرف بعضهم بعضاً ؛ فإن كل أحد منهم يأتي بخبر على حدته ، يظهر الصحيح منهم والسقيم بقرائن الأحوال . وليس ممالاة^(١٧) البعض للعدو كممالاة^(١٨) الكل .

وعليه أن يصغي إلى كل ما يلقيه كل من جواسيسه وعيونه وإن اختلفت أخبارهم ، ويأخذ بالأحوط فيما يؤدي إليه^(١٩) اجتهاده من ذلك . ولا يجعل اختلافهم ذنباً لأحد منهم ؛ فقد تختلف أخبارهم وكل منهم صادق فيما

(١٢) « يموت » في ي .

(١٤) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(١٥) ناقص في ف .

(١٦) « ممالاة » في ف .

(١٧) « ممالاة » في ف .

(١٨) « كممالاة » في ف .

(١٩) « يؤيده » في ف .

ومنها أن يكون له دربة بالأسفار ومعرفة بالبلاد التي يتوجه إليها ،
فيكون غنياً عن السؤال عنها وعن أهلها . فإنه إذا سأل ربما تنبه له العدو
وفطن به ، فيكون ذلك سبباً لهلاكه ، بل ربما عوقب ، فدل على حال مرسله ،
فصار ^(٦) عيناً عليه بعد أن كان عيناً له .

ومنها أن يكون عارفاً بلسان أهل البلاد التي يتوجه إليها ، ليلتقط ما يقع من
الكلام الذي يسمعه ممن يخالطه من العدو ، ومع ذلك لا يكون من جنس
العدو ؛ فإن الجنس يميل إلى الجنس بالطبع ، فيفسد الأمر على من أرسله .

ومنها أن يكون صبوراً على ما لعله يصير إليه من العقوبة إذا ظفر
به العدو ، حتى لا يخبر بأحوال مرسله ، ولا يطلع على وهن فيه وفي عسكره ؛
فإن ذلك قد لا يخلصه من يد ^(٧) عدوه ، ولا يدفع عنه سطوته .

فإذا وجد من العيون والجواسيس من ^(٨) هو مشتمل على هذه الشروط كان
حقيقاً بالإرسال في المهمات واستطلاع أخبار العدو .

الفصل الثاني : فيما يجب من إكرام العيون والجواسيس والأخذ بقلوبهم .

ينبغي على الملك وصاحب الجيش ، إذا اختار عيناً أو جاسوساً ، أن يظهر له
الود والمصافاة ^(٩) ، ويتحفه بالإحسان ، ويعده بالمزيد ، ويتعاهده بالصلوات
في كل وقت قبل احتياجه إليه ، ويزيد في الإحسان إليه عند توجهه في
المهمات ، ويتعهد أهله بالبر في حضوره ^(١٠) . وغيبته . يملك بذلك قلبه
ويستصني ^(١١) خاطره ، ولا يخطر إلى انحطاط رتبته وصغر قدره ، إذا كان
صغير المقدار ، فإن الأمر الذي هو فيه كبير .

(٦) « يكون » في ف .

(٧) ناقص في ف .

(٨) « ممن » في ف .

(٩) « المصافاة » في ف .

(١٠) ناقص في ف .

(١١) « يصني » في ف .

الباب الثاني

في العيون والجواسيس وما يتعلق بذلك
وفيه ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول : في الصفة التي ينبغي أن يكون العيون والجواسيس عايتها .

قد شرطوا في الجاسوس شروطاً يتعين الحرص عليها ؛ منها أن يكون ممن يوثق بنصيحته وصدقه . فإنه يتوجه إلى العدو ، وإذا كان متهماً لا ينتفع بخبره ، وإن كان صادقاً لأنه ربما أخبر بالصدق فاتهم فيه فلا يعمل بقوله ، فتفوت ^(١) فيه النصيحة ^(٢) بسبب ذلك . بل إن كان غير ناصح فإنه يعود بالضرر على مرسله ، لأنه يكون عيناً عليه لا له .

ومنها أن يكون ذا حدس صائب وفراصة تامة ، ليدرك بوفور عقله وصائب حدسه من أحوال العدو ، وبالمشاهدة ما كتمه العدو عن النطاق به يستدل ببعض الأمور على بعض ؛ فإذا أخذ بالفراصة في أمر ثم لاح له أمر آخر ، قوى عنده واعتقد ^(٣) بانضمام بعض القرابين إلى بعض .

ومنها أن يكون كثير الدهاء والخيال والخديعة ليتوصل بدهائه إلى كل ^(٤) موصل ، ويدخل بجيلته في كل مدخل ، ويدرك مقصده من أى طريق أمكنه ؛ فإنه متى كان قاصراً في هذا الباب ربما ظفر العدو به ، أو عاد بغير مقصوده وطلبته ^(٥) .

(٢) « المصلحة » في ف .

(٤) ناقص في ف .

(١) « فيفوت » في ف .

(٣) « اعتضد » في ف .

(٥) ناقص في ف .

ذلك إلى أن انقرضت دولتهم ، وجاءت الدولة التركية والأمر على ذلك .

فلما ولي الملك الظاهر بيبرس البندقدارى - رحمه الله - السلطنة ، واجتمع له ملك مصر والشام وحلب إلى الفرات ، وأراد تواصل أخبار المملكة إليه ، قرر البريد بالديار المصرية والبلاد الشامية . وقد كانت [مراكز البريد] ^(٤٥) متصلة من القلعة المحروسة إلى الإسكندرية وإلى دمياط وإلى قوص ، ثم من قوص تركب ^(٤٦) . المهجن إلى أسوان وعيذاب . وكانت المراكز متصلة من القلعة أيضاً إلى سائر الممالك الشامية حتى تتصل بالفرات ، على ما هو مقرر ^(٤٧) معروف [مما لا حاجة لذكره هنا] ^(٤٨) .

ودون ذلك في السرعة السعاة ، وهم الذين يعدون على أرجلهم ، ويسافرون بالمطافات عند تعذر وصول البريد إلى ناحية من النواحي ، وهو من أعظم مهمات السلطنة وأكدها . وقد ذكر ابن الأثير في تاريخه أن أول من اتخذ السعاة من الملوك معز الدولة ابن بويه ، أول ملوك الديلم ببغداد ، بعد الثلاثين والثلاث مائة من الهجرة . وكان سبب ذلك أنه كان ببغداد وأخوه ركن الدولة بأصفهان ^(٤٩) فأراد معز الدولة سرعة إعلام ركن الدولة بتجددات ^(٥٠) الأخبار ، فاتخذ السعاة . وانتشر في أيامه ساعيان ، وبلغ من شأنهما أن كل واحد منهما كان ^(٥١) يسير في كل يوم نيفاً وأربعين فرسخاً .

ودون ذلك في السرعة العيون الجواسيس ، وهى أشد الجميع إبطاء بالخبر ، لما يحتاجون إليه من استطلاع الأخبار واستعلامها ، وتتبع آثارها . [وسياتى الكلام عن ذلك] ^(٥٢) في الباب الثانى إن شاء الله تع .

(٤٥) ما بين الحاصرتين « مراكز بريرية » في ف .

(٤٦) « يركب » في ف .

(٤٧) « مقررة » في ف .

(٤٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٤٩) « بأصفهان » في ف .

(٥٠) « متجددات » في ي .

(٥١) ناقص في ف .

(٥٢) ما بين الحاصرتين « وسياتى ذلك مستوفاً » في ف .

فقد حكى صاحب «الروض المعطار في خبر الأقطار» أن الحمام كان يرسل من مصر إلى البصرة ، وهى فوق بغداد في الشرق ، مما يزيد على عشرين يوماً . وحكى ابن سعيد أيضاً^(٣٨) في كتابه «المغرب في أخبار المغرب» أن الوزير اليازورى^(٣٩) المغربي ، وزير المستنصر الفاطمي خليفة مصر ، وجه الحمام من مدينة^(٤٠) تونس من أفريقية من بلاد المغرب ، فجاء إلى مصر [العهد عليهم في جميع ذلك]^(٤١) .

وقد كانت أبراج الحمام بمملكة الديار المصرية في الزمن المتقدم متصلة من قلعة الجبل ، ثم إلى قوص ، ثم إلى أسوان وعين شمس ، وإلى الإسكندرية ودمياط والسويس من طريق الحج ، وكذلك إلى دمشق وحلب وسائر النيابات . وكان ذلك من النفع في سرعة إيصال الخبر ما لا يخفاء فيه على المتأمل .

ودون ذلك في سرعة إيصال الخبر البريد ، وهو الذى يجيء بالكتب المطولة ، وبالأخبار المفصلة ؛ فإن البريد يقطع غالباً^(٤٢) مسيرة عشرين يوماً في ثلاثة أيام ، كما يقطع من دمشق إلى مصر في هذا المقدار ، وربما زاد على ذلك . فقد قطع بعض البريدية من حلب إلى مصر في أربعة أيام . وقد كان البريد موجوداً في زمن الأكاسرة ملوك الفرس ، والقيصرية ملوك الروم ، واعتناء منهم لشأنه . ثم قرره في الإسلام معاوية بن أبي سفيان أحد أصحاب النبي صاعم في أيام خلافته ، وبقى بعد ذلك أيام خلفاء بني العباس وخلفاء بني أمية ، يستمر تارة وينقطع أخرى^(٤٣) بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال . وكان المقرر له بغللاً مقصوصة الأذنان ، ليكون ذلك علامة لها يعرف بها أنها من بغل البريد ، وتعاناه ملوك الإسلام في أكثر الأقطار إلا بني^(٤٤) زنكي ملوك الشام ، وبنو أيوب ملوك مصر ؛ فإنهم أعدوا لذلك الهجن المنتخبة السابقة . وبقى الأمر على

(٣٨) نانص في ي . (٣٩) «بازورى» في ف .

(٤٠) «قونية» في ي . (٤١) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٤٢) «في الغالب» في ي . (٤٣) «تعرفها» في ف .

(٤٤) «بنو» في ف .

من الفرات إلى غزة ؛ فإذا حدث حادث من جهة التتر ، أوقدوا النار ودخنوا ، فيتصل ذلك في أسرع وقت من الفرات إلى غزة ، فيعلم أنه حادث حدث في الحملة ، ثم يرسل الحمام من غزة إلى مصر فيعلم خبر ذلك في اليوم الواحد . ثم بطل ذلك بوقوع الصلح بين التتر وملوك الديار المصرية وزالت معاملة .

ودون ذلك في سرعة وصول الخبر الحمام [وهو أن ينتقل الحمام] (٣٢) من كل بلد إلى بلد آخر ؛ فإذا حدث في أحد البلدين التي فيها الحمام حادث ، كتبت (٣٣) البطائق ، وعلقت بأجنحة الحمام وأرسل (٣٤) فيطل برجه الذي في بلده فيحضر في أسرع وقت ، ولكن لا يسع معه استيفاء الخبر [على الطول] (٣٥) وإنما يلوح فيه بالضرورة من الأمر ليقع إحاطة العلم به .

ولا يخفى أن الحمام من أسرع المواصلات ؛ فإن الحمام يقطع مسيرة عشرين يوماً في بعض يوم . فقد حكى ابن سعيد في كتابه « حيا المحل وجنى النحل » أن الوزير أبا (٣٦) الفرج يعقوب بن كلس ، وزير العزيز أحد خلفاء الفاطميين ، قال له العزيز : إني لم أر القراصية البعلبكية قط ، وإني أحب أن أراها . وكان عند الوزير حمام من دمشق ، وفي دمشق حمام من مصر ؛ فكتب الوزير بطاقة وأرسله في الحمام الذي كان عنده إلى دمشق ، فأمرهم فيها بأن يعلقوا في كل طائر من الحمام المصرى الذى بدمشق حبات من القراصية البعلبكية ، فوصل الحمام إليهم بذلك ، فعلقوا القراصية في الوقت بأجنحة الحمام ، ووجهوا بها إلى الديار المصرية ، فطلع بها الوزير [من وقتها إلى الخليفة في يوم طلبه إياها] (٣٧) فأعجب بذلك غاية الإعجاب . بل ربما زاد الحمام في قطع المسافة عن هذا القدر .

(٣٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي . (٣٣) « كتب » في ف .

(٣٤) « أرسلت » في ف . (٣٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٣٦) « أبو » في ف . (٣٧) ما بين الحاصرتين « من يومه إلى الخليفة » في ف .

وأما نصب المرايا على الأماكن العالية للنظر^(٢٣) فقد كان للملوك اهتمام به في بلاد الثغور ، حتى أن الإسكندر لما بنى الإسكندرية جعل فيها مناراً طوله أربع^(٢٤) مائة ذراع ، ونصب في أعلاه مرآة من أخلاط إذا نظر فيها الإنسان رأى البلاد التي تقابلها من جزائر البحر وما يصنع فيها من عمارة المراكب وغيرها ، فيقع التأهب لهم ، إلى غير ذلك من أمور الملوك الماضية التي يقع بها الاحتراس [والله تعالى أعلم]^(٢٥) .

الفصل الثالث : في استطلاع أخبار العدو واستعلامها ليقع التأهب له .

لا يشك^(٢٦) في أن استطلاع خبر العدو واستعلام أمره من أهم الأمور وأعودها تفعلاً ؛ فإنه بذلك يعلم حال عدوه ، وما هو عليه من قصده إليه أو كفه عنه ، فيكون على علم من أمره . ثم لاستطلاع الأخبار واستعلامها عند طلب سرعة وصول الخبر أسباب :

أسرعها إيقاد النيران على رؤوس الجبال ؛ وهو أنه إذا حدث حادث في طرف من أطراف المملكة من طروق عدو ونحو ذلك ، وكان هناك جبال عالية ، فإن كان في الليل أوقدوا^(٢٧) النار على رأس^(٢٨) جبل عال ؛ وإن كان في النهار أثاروا^(٢٩) الدخان ، فيراهم من على رأس الجبل الذي يليه ، فيفعل^(٣٠) كذلك حتى ينتهي إلى المكان الذي يقصد بالخبر . وقد كان أول الدولة التركية ، عند وقوع الحرب بين ملوك الديار المصرية وبين التتر ، أناس مرتبون على رؤوس الجبال ، مرصدون لذلك بمرتبات على السلطان ، مركزون^(٣١)

(٢٣) ناقص في ي .

(٢٥) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٢٦) « لاشك » في ف .

(٢٧) « أوقدت » في ي .

(٢٨) « روس » في ي .

(٢٩) « أثر » في ف .

(٣٠) « فيعد » في ف .

(٣١) ناقص في ف .

وقد شوهدت مدن وقلاع كثيرة نزلت عليها الجيوش العظيمة ، وحاصرتها الحصار الشديد في الزمن الطويل ، ولم يظفروا منها بطائل . ولم تنزل ملوك الجاهلية تهتم بذلك وتحفل به غاية الاحتفال ، حتى يقال إن سور أنطاكية من بلاد الشمال (١٣) محيط بها وبقلعتها وداخله خمسة جبال (١٤) حتى لا تكون مشرفة عليها من خارجها يتسلط عليها العدو منها .

وقد (١٥) بنت دلوكة ، المعروفة بالعجوز (١٦) ، التي ملكت مصر بعد فرعون — لعنه الله — على الديار المصرية سوراً من الطوب اللبن ممتداً على جميعها من العريش إلى أسوان من الجانب الشرقى والجانب الغربى في سفح الجبل ، جعلت فيه أبراجاً ومحارس على كل ثلاثة أميال ، وأقامت عليه حرساً (١٧) يسمع بعضهم بعضاً حتى إذا طرق جهة أحد منهم طارق تسامعوا به ، حتى ينتهى الخبر إلى قصر الملكة (١٨) ، فتتنبه لذلك في أسرع وقت وأقربه . وأثر هذا السور باق إلى الآن في الجبل الشرقى والجبل الغربى [يسمى بحائط العجوز] (١٩) .

وقد كان سور القاهرة في أول بنائها من الطوب اللبن ، وكان قصر الخلافة بوسطها مكان المدرسة الصالحية وما حوطا ، ولم يكن السور المذكور حصيناً [لكونه في وطأة من الأرض] (٢٠) ، فلما ملك السلطان صلاح الدين يوسف بن أيوب — رحمه الله تع — الديار المصرية بنى قلعة الجبل على مكان مرتفع ، أدار سوراً من الحجر عليه وعلى القاهرة ومصر جميعاً . وآثار السور الأول (٢١) باق إلى الآن [بالقرب من الباب الحديد وغير ذلك] (٢٢) .

(١٤) « أجبل » في ف .

(١٦) ناقص في ف .

(١٨) « المملكة » في ف .

(٢٠) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٢٢) تحت السطر في ي .

(١٣) « الشام » في ف .

(١٥) ناقص في ف .

(١٧) ناقص في ف .

(١٩) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(٢١) « أكثره » في ي .

وبالحملة فإنه يجب أن يكون سيئ الظن بعدوه بكل حال ، آخذاً حذره منه ، معظماً لأمره في نفسه ، مستعداً له بما فوق قدره ؛ فإنه إذا أعد له ما هو أكبر ^(٥) منه ثم وجد أمره صغيراً ^(٦) لم يضره ذلك ، وإن وجدته كبيراً كان قد أعد له ما يكافئه أو يزيد على مكافأته ، فيكون قد استظهر عليه في التأهب . والنصر من عند الله تع .

وقد قيل إنه لا ينبغي أن يأمن عدوه وإن بعد عنه ، ولا يأخذ في لقائه بالهويته إذا قرب منه ، ولا يترك معاجلة لقائه حيث تحقق قصده إليه ؛ فإنه متى ترك ذلك في وقته حتى فاتته كان قد ضيع الحزم ، وإذا دخل على نفسه الخوف وعرض أمره للندم فإن الفرصة [قلما تعود] ^(٧) إذا ضيعت . والحزم أن يستعد للأمر قبل وقته ليجد ذلك عند الحاجة إليه .

[الفصل الثاني] ^(٨) : في التحرز باتخاذ الأسوار ^(٩) والحنادق على المدن والحصون ونصب المرايا بالأمكنة العالية للنظر .

أما ^(١٠) الأسوار والحنادق ، فإنه لم تنزل الملوك في كل زمن يحصنون المدن والحصون والقلاع بالأسوار العالية ، والحنادق الدائرة الممتلئة بالماء . ولا يخفى على ما في ذلك من عظيم النفع في المدافعة عند الحصار إذا هجم العدو على المدينة أو الحصن بغتة . وقد ^(١١) ثبت في الصحيح أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم احتفر خندقاً على المدينة النبوية يوم الأحزاب ، وأنه [كان صلى الله عليه وسلم] ^(١٢) يعمل فيه بنفسه ، لولا ما في ذلك من النفع الكامل لما فعله النبي صلعم .

(٦) « خطيراً » في ف .

(٨) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ف .

(١٠) ناقص في ف .

(٥) « أكثر » في ف .

(٧) « ما تعود » في ف .

(٩) فوق السطر في ف .

(١١) ناقص في ف .

(١٢) ما بين الحاصرتين مكتوب « صلى الله عليه وسلم كان » في ف .

الباب الأول

في التحرز في حال الأمن عند إقامة الملك في دار ملكه

وفيه ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول : في أخذ الحذر في الجملة .

قال العلماء بأمور الحرب وتديرها : ينبغي أن يكون الملك في حال الأمن وهو مقيم بدار ملكه في غاية من الحذر والتحرز من العدو [فإنه إن تحرك عليه عدو كان على أهبة الكفاية ، وإن لم يتحرك عليه عدو لم يضره الاحتراز ؛ فإن الخلل قل أن يقع مع التحرز ، وإنما يقع مع التفريط والإهمال والاتكال على الفوت] ^(١) . وقد أمر الله تع بالحذر فقال تع : ” يا أيها الذين آمنوا خذوا حذركم فانفروا ثبات أو انفروا جميعاً “ (٤ : ٧١) . وقال تع : [جلّت قدرته] ^(٢) : ” وأعدوا لهم ما استطعتم من قوة ومن رباط الخيل ترهبون به عدو الله وعدوكم “ (٨ : ٦٠) .

ويروى ^(٣) أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال : الحزم سوء الظن . ويحكى ^(٤) عن عنترة الفوارس أنه سئل عن كثرة ظفروه في حروبه وعدم نيل عدوه منه ، فقال : ما كذبت على عدوى خبراً ، ولا بتّ منه إلا على حذر .

(٢) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٤) ناقص في ف .

(١) ما بين الحاصرتين ناقص في ي .

(٣) ناقص في ف .

وكننت ممن نظر في كتب التاريخ على اختلافها ، وتدبر وقائع الحروب منها على تباين أصنافها ، وما رتبته في ذلك أهل التدبير من رؤسائها ، وما اقتضاه رأى كل من مشايخ الحرب وعلمائها ، وما أورده أفاضل الكتاب في وصايا المتقدمين على العساكر ، وما وقع لدهاة^(٤) الحروب من حيلة محتمل ومكر ماكر .

دعاني ذلك إلى أن أخدم خزانته الشريفة — عمرها الله تعالى بدوام ملكه وطول بقائه ، وعلو نجمه الزاهر وسطوع ضيائه — بكتاب أضعه في تدبير الحروب وترتيبها ، ومعرفة أحوال القتال وتقديرها ، ليهتدى بذلك من يقف عليه من أمرائه الأنجاد وقواد عساكره ، ويقتدى منهم من لم يخبر طريق الحرب لحدائث سنه بخبره ، وإلا فهو ثبت الله قواعد دولته ، وجعل مصير أعدائه المارقين إلى قبضته ، قد عرك الحروب وخبرها ، وعرف بالتجارب والوقائع حالها وخبرها ، وخدمته السعود فأعقبته بكل واقعة ظفرا ، وصحبته الحظوظ فلم يفارقه النصر سفراً ولا حضراً ، وما النصر إلا من عند الله العزيز الحكيم .

وقد سميته « تفريج الكروب في تدبير الحروب » ، وجعلت مقاصده منحصرة في عشرين باباً^(٥) .

(٥) ثم تتبع أسماء الأبواب والفصول في ف .

(٤) « لدهاة » في النص .

مع شدة الاحتياج اليه وربما ظفر به العدو فصرم عليه
 عاهز رضى به اولا وعلم ان لا يناله من عدوه ولا يباخره بالقبال
 اللامعة الضرورة الى الدفع عن نفسه ولا يقابل ما وهدا الى العلم
 اكله واخذ يبعه سبيلا وعليه بالمحاولة والمدافعة
 وان ادام الحقدار ويقوم اليوم والسمعة والخطم لتتأمله
 الحكيم وينظر حوادث الزمان وما يقع من الفزع وقد
 اخبر الصادق المهدي صلى الله عليه وسلم ان النضر مع الصبر
 وبالحلم فانه يحب عليه ان يملك قلوب الرعية بالعدل وال
 حسان فانه ليس غايته مراد الرعية الا ذلك ومن عانى العدل
 والاحسان كانت رعيته من انفع الجند له نظما ينته
 قلوبهم اليه ونما ضبطوا مكانه اذا غا عنهم جند الملك
 الرحيم حضور من يتوق به الملك من التدوير لذلك والله اعلم
 من ذلك بيان لا محالة من الحكيم من الله تعالى وعونه
 على ذلك انهم يحسنون على الله تعالى الحسنى من الله تعالى
 حاشا له وحاشا له وحاشا له

The colophon of the Princeton Manuscript of *Tafrīj al-kurūb*
 (Yahudah Collection ELS 3954) dated 25th of Munarram 924 (7th
 February 1518).

الصفحة الأخيرة من مخطوطة جامعة برينستون ، بتاريخ ٢٥ من المحرم عام ٩٢٤ هجرية
 (٧ من فبراير ١٥١٨ ميلادية) .

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
 الحمد لله رب العالمين والعاقبة للمتقين. وصلى الله على
 سيدنا محمد خاتم النبيين وعلى اله وصحبه وسلم تسليما كثيرا
 وبعد فهذا كتاب يسمى بتفريع الكروب
 في تدبير الحروب مرتباً على عشرين باباً في كل باب حشر لك
 ثلاث فصول في تدبير الحروب ومعرفة احوال القتال
 وتقريرها باليف العبد الفقير الى الله عمر بن ربيع
 اللوسى الانصارى رحمه الله الاول
 في التحرز في حال الامن عند اقامة الملك في داركم وفيه
 ثلاث فصول الفصل الاول في احوال الحذر
 في الحزم قال العلماء بامور الحروب وتدبيرها
 ينبغي ان يكون الملك في حال الامن وهو مقيم في دار مملكة
 في غاية من الحذر والتحرز من العدو وقد امر الله سبحانه
 بقول

The opening folio of the Princeton Manuscript (Yahudah collection ELS 3954), containing title and author of work.

الصفحة الأولى من مخطوطة جامعة برينستون (مجموعة يهودا رقم ELS 3954) ، وتشتمل على عنوان الكتاب واسم المؤلف .

أنجزت وقائعهم للأعداء مواعيد الأجل ، وكرعت في دماء الكفر سيوفهم فعدت
بخلق النصر لا بحمرة الحجل ، صلاة يطلع في مطالع النجوم نجومها ، ولا
يتغير على ممر الزمان إن شاء الله تعالى رسمها ، وسلم تسليماً كثيراً .

وبعد ، فلما كان السلطان الأعظم الملك الناصر ، العالم المجاهد المرابط
المتاغر (٢) ، المؤيد المظفر المنصور ، زين الدنيا والدين ، سلطان الإسلام
والمسلمين ، محيي العدل في العالمين ، وارث ملك ملوك العرب والعجم والترك ،
ظل الله في أرضه ، القائم بسنته وفرضه ، إسكندر الزمان ، ملك أصحاب الأسرة
والتيجان ، واهب الأقاليم والأمصار ، مبيد الطغاة والبغاة والكفار ، حامى
الحرمين ، حائز القبلتين ، جامع كلمة الإيمان ، ناشر لواء العدل والإحسان ،
سيد ملوك الزمان ، إمام المتقين ، قسيم أمير المؤمنين ، أبو السعادات فرج بن
السلطان الشهيد الملك الظاهر أبي سعيد برقوق ، خلد الله تعالى على مدى الأيام
سلطانه ، ونصر على توالى الدهور جنوده وجيوشه وأعوانه .

هو الذى قهر ملوك الأرض بأسه وشدته ، وأعجز الحصر والوصف
عدده وعدته ، وشاع في الآفاق النائية صيته وذكره وسمعته ، وحفه النصر
من كل جانب فتوالى بتوالى الوقائع ظفروه ونصرتة ، ما قصده قاصد بسوء
إلا رد خائباً ، ولا رماه أحد بمكر إلا رجع سهم مكره عليه صائباً ، ولا رام
تذليل صعب إلا أتى من تسهيله بالعجب العجيب ، ولا حاول معالجة فتح
إلا تلى عليه لسان الظفر « نصر من الله وفتح قريب » (٦١ : ١٣) .
فسعوده أبداً بالنصر تسعد ، وسهم سعادتة في كل زمان ينشد :

عساكر البغي قد أعيت مقارعه لناصر أعوزت في كسره الحيل
كناطح صخرة يوماً ليفلقها فلم يضرها وأوهى قرنه الوعل (٣)

(٢) « متاغر » في النص .

(٣) من ديوان الأعشى .

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ (١)

مؤيد الإسلام من سلطانه الناصر بغزيز نصره ، ومرغم أنف الخارج عن طاعته بتعجيل هلاكه ورد كيده في نحره ، ومريه من مصارع أعدائه ما يتعظ به العاقل وي بعده المتأمل من عجائب دهره ، ومسعد جده العالی بإياداة أعدائه الطغاة المارقين والله غالب على أمره ، على أن أخرج الأمة من ضيق إلى فرج ، ورفع عن الرعية بأرفق سلطان كل مشقة وخرج ، وأطلب قلوب البرية بأسعد ملك يستنشق من طيب أيامه الزاهرة أطيب شذاً وأعبق أرج .

وأشهد أن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له ، شهادة يتوارثها عظماء الملوك كابراً عن كابر ، ويوصى بها على الدوام أبداً الأول منهم الآخر ، ويقوم بنصرتها الابن بعد الأب فيرويه بالسند الناصر عن الظاهر . وأشهد أن سيدنا محمداً عبده ورسوله المخصوص بالتأييد عن تتابع الدهر ، والمنصور بالرعب المؤثر في قلوب أهل الكفر على مسيرة شهر ، صلى الله عليه وعلى آله الذين

(١) هذه المقدمة ناقصة في ى حيث تبتدئ المخطوطة بالمقدمة الآتية :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

« الحمد لله رب العالمين والعاقبة للمتقين وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد خاتم النبيين وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً كثيراً .

وبعد ، هذا كتاب يسمى بتفريج الكروب في تدبير الحروب ، مرتباً على عشرين باباً ، في كل باب من ذلك ثلاثة فصول في تدبير الحروب ، ومعرفة أحوال القتال وتقريرها ، تأليف العبد الفقير إلى الله (تع) عمر بن إبراهيم الأوسى الأنصارى رحمه الله (تع) . »

في هذا النص بدل « ثلاثة » ذكرت كلمة « ثلاث » .

مُتَدِمَة

يضم هذا الكتاب بحثاً عن الحرب بعنوان «تفريج الكروب في تدبير الحروب» ؛ قمنا بتحقيقه وترجمته إلى الإنجليزية. ولا يعرف أصل له سوى مخطوطتين رجعنا إليهما عند تحقيقه وترجمته : إحداهما موجودة في مسجد الفاتح باستانبول (تحت رقم ٣٤٨٣) ، والأخرى ضمن مجموعة «يهودا» في جامعة برينستون (رقم ٣٩٥٤ ELS) . ومن هذه الأخيرة عرفنا اسم المؤلف ، وهو عمر بن إبراهيم الأوسى الأنصارى . أما المخطوطة الأولى فعرفنا منها أن المؤلف قد وضع كتابه في عهد السلطان المماوكى فرج بن برقوق الذى حكم فى الفترة من عام ٨٠١ إلى عام ٨١٤ هجرية / ١٣٩٩ - ١٤١١ ميلادية . ولم تكتشف بعد أية معلومات دقيقة عن هذا المؤلف .

وقد ذيلنا النص العربى الوارد فى الصفحات التالية ببعض الحواشى المتصلة بالنص نفسه ، واستعملنا حرف «ى» للكناية عن مخطوطة برينستون ، وحرف «ف» للكناية عن مخطوطة مسجد الفاتح . أما الترجمة الإنجليزية فقد ذيلناها بالمراجع والشروح والتفسيرات ، كما أضفنا فى نهايتها قائمة بالمصطلحات العسكرية الحربية الواردة فى النص مع شىء من التوسع . ويجد القارئ هذه القائمة بين النص العربى والترجمة الإنجليزية .

وقد مهدنا للترجمة الإنجليزية بمقدمة مطولة تناوانا فيها ما كتب عن الحروب الإسلامية ، وأوردنا بياناً بالمخطوطات العربية الأصلية التى ما زالت فى حاجة إلى التحليل لإمكان تقدير الموضوع حق قدره . كذلك يتبين أن «تفريج الكروب» يتفق والفلسفة العامة للحرب فى الشرق خلال فترة الحروب الصليبية والفترة التى تلتها مباشرة .

جورج سكانيون

القاهرة

يناير ١٩٦١

حقوق الطبع والنشر محفوظة

للجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

١٩٦١



طبع على مطابع دار المعارف بمصر

هـ شارع ماسبيرو - بالقاهرة ج.ع.م.

تَفْهِيمُ الْكُرُوبِ فِي تَدْيِيرِ الْحُرُوبِ

تأليف

عمر بن إبراهيم الأوسى الأنصاري

تحقيق وترجمة

دكتور جورج سكانلون



منشورات الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

١٩٦١

تَفْرِجُ الْكَرُوبِ فِي تَدْبِيرِ الْحَرْبِ



تأليف عمر بن إبراهيم الأوسى الأنصاري

تحقيق وترجمة : دكتور جورج سكانلون